commit: 54169cefe0925095a46bcead1b4b875a62873e3e Author: Quentin Retornaz <gentoo <AT> retornaz <DOT> com> AuthorDate: Sat Jan 30 15:09:05 2021 +0000 Commit: Quentin Retornaz <gentoo <AT> retornaz <DOT> com> CommitDate: Sat Jan 30 15:09:05 2021 +0000 URL: https://gitweb.gentoo.org/repo/proj/libressl.git/commit/?id=54169cef
net-misc/openssh: add missing patches Package-Manager: Portage-3.0.13, Repoman-3.0.2 Signed-off-by: Quentin Retornaz <gentoo <AT> retornaz.com> .../openssh-6.7_p1-openssl-ignore-status.patch | 17 + ...penssh-7.5_p1-disable-conch-interop-tests.patch | 20 ++ .../files/openssh-7.9_p1-include-stdlib.patch | 48 +++ ...mget-shmat-shmdt-in-preauth-privsep-child.patch | 31 ++ .../files/openssh-8.0_p1-fix-putty-tests.patch | 57 ++++ .../files/openssh-8.0_p1-hpn-14.20-X509-glue.patch | 111 +++++++ .../openssh/files/openssh-8.0_p1-hpn-version.patch | 13 + .../openssh/files/openssh-8.1_p1-GSSAPI-dns.patch | 359 +++++++++++++++++++++ .../files/openssh-8.1_p1-X509-12.3-tests.patch | 11 + .../files/openssh-8.1_p1-X509-glue-12.3.patch | 35 ++ .../files/openssh-8.1_p1-hpn-14.20-glue.patch | 105 ++++++ .../files/openssh-8.1_p1-hpn-14.20-sctp-glue.patch | 19 ++ .../openssh/files/openssh-8.1_p1-tests-2020.patch | 26 ++ 13 files changed, 852 insertions(+) diff --git a/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-6.7_p1-openssl-ignore-status.patch b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-6.7_p1-openssl-ignore-status.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fa33af3 --- /dev/null +++ b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-6.7_p1-openssl-ignore-status.patch @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +the last nibble of the openssl version represents the status. that is, +whether it is a beta or release. when it comes to version checks in +openssh, this component does not matter, so ignore it. + +https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2212 + +--- a/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c ++++ b/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c +@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ ssh_compatible_openssl(long headerver, long libver) + * For versions >= 1.0.0, major,minor,status must match and library + * fix version must be equal to or newer than the header. + */ +- mask = 0xfff0000fL; /* major,minor,status */ ++ mask = 0xfff00000L; /* major,minor,status */ + hfix = (headerver & 0x000ff000) >> 12; + lfix = (libver & 0x000ff000) >> 12; + if ( (headerver & mask) == (libver & mask) && lfix >= hfix) diff --git a/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.5_p1-disable-conch-interop-tests.patch b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.5_p1-disable-conch-interop-tests.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a5647ce --- /dev/null +++ b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.5_p1-disable-conch-interop-tests.patch @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +Disable conch interop tests which are failing when called +via portage for yet unknown reason and because using conch +seems to be flaky (test is failing when using Python2 but +passing when using Python3). + +Bug: https://bugs.gentoo.org/605446 + +--- a/regress/conch-ciphers.sh ++++ b/regress/conch-ciphers.sh +@@ -3,6 +3,10 @@ + + tid="conch ciphers" + ++# https://bugs.gentoo.org/605446 ++echo "conch interop tests skipped due to Gentoo bug #605446" ++exit 0 ++ + if test "x$REGRESS_INTEROP_CONCH" != "xyes" ; then + echo "conch interop tests not enabled" + exit 0 diff --git a/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.9_p1-include-stdlib.patch b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.9_p1-include-stdlib.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c5697c2 --- /dev/null +++ b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.9_p1-include-stdlib.patch @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +diff --git a/auth-options.c b/auth-options.c +index b05d6d6f..d1f42f04 100644 +--- a/auth-options.c ++++ b/auth-options.c +@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ + #include <stdarg.h> + #include <ctype.h> + #include <limits.h> ++#include <stdlib.h> + + #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" + +diff --git a/hmac.c b/hmac.c +index 1c879640..a29f32c5 100644 +--- a/hmac.c ++++ b/hmac.c +@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ + + #include <sys/types.h> + #include <string.h> ++#include <stdlib.h> + + #include "sshbuf.h" + #include "digest.h" +diff --git a/krl.c b/krl.c +index 8e2d5d5d..c32e147a 100644 +--- a/krl.c ++++ b/krl.c +@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ + #include <string.h> + #include <time.h> + #include <unistd.h> ++#include <stdlib.h> + + #include "sshbuf.h" + #include "ssherr.h" +diff --git a/mac.c b/mac.c +index 51dc11d7..3d11eba6 100644 +--- a/mac.c ++++ b/mac.c +@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ + + #include <string.h> + #include <stdio.h> ++#include <stdlib.h> + + #include "digest.h" + #include "hmac.h" diff --git a/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-8.0_p1-deny-shmget-shmat-shmdt-in-preauth-privsep-child.patch b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-8.0_p1-deny-shmget-shmat-shmdt-in-preauth-privsep-child.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fe3be24 --- /dev/null +++ b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-8.0_p1-deny-shmget-shmat-shmdt-in-preauth-privsep-child.patch @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +From 3ef92a657444f172b61f92d5da66d94fa8265602 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Lonnie Abelbeck <[email protected]> +Date: Tue, 1 Oct 2019 09:05:09 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH] Deny (non-fatal) shmget/shmat/shmdt in preauth privsep child. + +New wait_random_seeded() function on OpenSSL 1.1.1d uses shmget, shmat, and shmdt +in the preauth codepath, deny (non-fatal) in seccomp_filter sandbox. +--- + sandbox-seccomp-filter.c | 9 +++++++++ + 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c +index 840c5232b..39dc289e3 100644 +--- a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c ++++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c +@@ -168,6 +168,15 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = { + #ifdef __NR_stat64 + SC_DENY(__NR_stat64, EACCES), + #endif ++#ifdef __NR_shmget ++ SC_DENY(__NR_shmget, EACCES), ++#endif ++#ifdef __NR_shmat ++ SC_DENY(__NR_shmat, EACCES), ++#endif ++#ifdef __NR_shmdt ++ SC_DENY(__NR_shmdt, EACCES), ++#endif + + /* Syscalls to permit */ + #ifdef __NR_brk diff --git a/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-8.0_p1-fix-putty-tests.patch b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-8.0_p1-fix-putty-tests.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4310aa1 --- /dev/null +++ b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-8.0_p1-fix-putty-tests.patch @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +Make sure that host keys are already accepted before +running tests. + +https://bugs.gentoo.org/493866 + +--- a/regress/putty-ciphers.sh ++++ b/regress/putty-ciphers.sh +@@ -10,11 +10,17 @@ fi + + for c in aes 3des aes128-ctr aes192-ctr aes256-ctr ; do + verbose "$tid: cipher $c" ++ rm -f ${COPY} + cp ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy \ + ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/cipher_$c + echo "Cipher=$c" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/cipher_$c + +- rm -f ${COPY} ++ env HOME=$PWD echo "y" | ${PLINK} -load cipher_$c \ ++ -i ${OBJ}/putty.rsa2 "exit" ++ if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then ++ fail "failed to pre-cache host key" ++ fi ++ + env HOME=$PWD ${PLINK} -load cipher_$c -batch -i ${OBJ}/putty.rsa2 \ + cat ${DATA} > ${COPY} + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then +--- a/regress/putty-kex.sh ++++ b/regress/putty-kex.sh +@@ -14,6 +14,12 @@ for k in dh-gex-sha1 dh-group1-sha1 dh-group14-sha1 ; do + ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/kex_$k + echo "KEX=$k" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/kex_$k + ++ env HOME=$PWD echo "y" | ${PLINK} -load kex_$k \ ++ -i ${OBJ}/putty.rsa2 "exit" ++ if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then ++ fail "failed to pre-cache host key" ++ fi ++ + env HOME=$PWD ${PLINK} -load kex_$k -batch -i ${OBJ}/putty.rsa2 true + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + fail "KEX $k failed" +--- a/regress/putty-transfer.sh ++++ b/regress/putty-transfer.sh +@@ -14,6 +14,13 @@ for c in 0 1 ; do + cp ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy \ + ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/compression_$c + echo "Compression=$c" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/kex_$k ++ ++ env HOME=$PWD echo "y" | ${PLINK} -load compression_$c \ ++ -i ${OBJ}/putty.rsa2 "exit" ++ if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then ++ fail "failed to pre-cache host key" ++ fi ++ + env HOME=$PWD ${PLINK} -load compression_$c -batch \ + -i ${OBJ}/putty.rsa2 cat ${DATA} > ${COPY} + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then diff --git a/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-8.0_p1-hpn-14.20-X509-glue.patch b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-8.0_p1-hpn-14.20-X509-glue.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..167adfc --- /dev/null +++ b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-8.0_p1-hpn-14.20-X509-glue.patch @@ -0,0 +1,111 @@ +diff -ur a/openssh-8_1_P1-hpn-AES-CTR-14.20.diff b/openssh-8_1_P1-hpn-AES-CTR-14.20.diff +--- a/openssh-8_1_P1-hpn-AES-CTR-14.20.diff 2020-02-04 15:49:15.746095444 -0800 ++++ b/openssh-8_1_P1-hpn-AES-CTR-14.20.diff 2020-02-04 15:49:54.181853707 -0800 +@@ -4,8 +4,8 @@ + +++ b/Makefile.in + @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ CC=@CC@ + LD=@LD@ +- CFLAGS=@CFLAGS@ +- CPPFLAGS=-I. -I$(srcdir) @CPPFLAGS@ $(PATHS) @DEFS@ ++ CFLAGS=@CFLAGS@ $(CFLAGS_EXTRA) ++ CPPFLAGS=-I. -I$(srcdir) @CPPFLAGS@ @LDAP_CPPFLAGS@ $(PATHS) @DEFS@ + -LIBS=@LIBS@ + +LIBS=@LIBS@ -lpthread + K5LIBS=@K5LIBS@ +@@ -803,8 +803,8 @@ + ssh_packet_set_connection(struct ssh *ssh, int fd_in, int fd_out) + { + struct session_state *state; +-- const struct sshcipher *none = cipher_by_name("none"); +-+ struct sshcipher *none = cipher_by_name("none"); ++- const struct sshcipher *none = cipher_none(); +++ struct sshcipher *none = cipher_none(); + int r; + + if (none == NULL) { +@@ -948,9 +948,9 @@ + /* Portable-specific options */ + sUsePAM, + + sDisableMTAES, +- /* Standard Options */ +- sPort, sHostKeyFile, sLoginGraceTime, +- sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel, ++ /* X.509 Standard Options */ ++ sHostbasedAlgorithms, ++ sPubkeyAlgorithms, + @@ -643,6 +647,7 @@ static struct { + { "trustedusercakeys", sTrustedUserCAKeys, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "authorizedprincipalsfile", sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile, SSHCFG_ALL }, +diff -ur a/openssh-8_1_P1-hpn-DynWinNoneSwitch-14.20.diff b/openssh-8_1_P1-hpn-DynWinNoneSwitch-14.20.diff +--- a/openssh-8_1_P1-hpn-DynWinNoneSwitch-14.20.diff 2020-02-04 15:41:42.512910357 -0800 ++++ b/openssh-8_1_P1-hpn-DynWinNoneSwitch-14.20.diff 2020-02-04 15:56:40.323299499 -0800 +@@ -382,7 +382,7 @@ + @@ -884,6 +884,10 @@ kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh) + int nenc, nmac, ncomp; + u_int mode, ctos, need, dh_need, authlen; +- int r, first_kex_follows; ++ int r, first_kex_follows = 0; + + int auth_flag; + + + + auth_flag = packet_authentication_state(ssh); +@@ -391,8 +391,8 @@ + debug2("local %s KEXINIT proposal", kex->server ? "server" : "client"); + if ((r = kex_buf2prop(kex->my, NULL, &my)) != 0) + @@ -954,6 +958,14 @@ kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh) +- peer[ncomp] = NULL; +- goto out; ++ else ++ fatal("Pre-authentication none cipher requests are not allowed."); + } + + debug("REQUESTED ENC.NAME is '%s'", newkeys->enc.name); + + if (strcmp(newkeys->enc.name, "none") == 0) { +@@ -1169,15 +1169,3 @@ + # Example of overriding settings on a per-user basis + #Match User anoncvs + # X11Forwarding no +-diff --git a/version.h b/version.h +-index 6b3fadf8..ec1d2e27 100644 +---- a/version.h +-+++ b/version.h +-@@ -3,4 +3,6 @@ +- #define SSH_VERSION "OpenSSH_8.1" +- +- #define SSH_PORTABLE "p1" +--#define SSH_RELEASE SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE +-+#define SSH_HPN "-hpn14v20" +-+#define SSH_RELEASE SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE SSH_HPN +-+ +diff -ur a/openssh-8_1_P1-hpn-PeakTput-14.20.diff b/openssh-8_1_P1-hpn-PeakTput-14.20.diff +--- a/openssh-8_1_P1-hpn-PeakTput-14.20.diff 2020-02-04 15:41:42.512910357 -0800 ++++ b/openssh-8_1_P1-hpn-PeakTput-14.20.diff 2020-02-04 16:02:42.203023609 -0800 +@@ -12,9 +12,9 @@ + static long stalled; /* how long we have been stalled */ + static int bytes_per_second; /* current speed in bytes per second */ + @@ -127,6 +129,7 @@ refresh_progress_meter(int force_update) ++ off_t bytes_left; + int cur_speed; +- int hours, minutes, seconds; +- int file_len; ++ int len; + + off_t delta_pos; + + if ((!force_update && !alarm_fired && !win_resized) || !can_output()) +@@ -33,12 +33,12 @@ + @@ -166,7 +173,7 @@ refresh_progress_meter(int force_update) + + /* filename */ +- buf[0] = '\0'; +-- file_len = win_size - 36; +-+ file_len = win_size - 45; +- if (file_len > 0) { +- buf[0] = '\r'; +- snmprintf(buf+1, sizeof(buf)-1, &file_len, "%-*s", ++ if (win_size > 36) { ++- int file_len = win_size - 36; +++ int file_len = win_size - 45; ++ snmprintf(buf+1, sizeof(buf)-1, &file_len, "%-*s ", ++ file_len, file); ++ } + @@ -191,6 +198,15 @@ refresh_progress_meter(int force_update) + (off_t)bytes_per_second); + strlcat(buf, "/s ", win_size); diff --git a/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-8.0_p1-hpn-version.patch b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-8.0_p1-hpn-version.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..37905ce --- /dev/null +++ b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-8.0_p1-hpn-version.patch @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c +index 34808b5c..88d7ccac 100644 +--- a/kex.c ++++ b/kex.c +@@ -1126,7 +1126,7 @@ kex_exchange_identification(struct ssh *ssh, int timeout_ms, + if (version_addendum != NULL && *version_addendum == '\0') + version_addendum = NULL; + if ((r = sshbuf_putf(our_version, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s%s\r\n", +- PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_VERSION, ++ PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_RELEASE, + version_addendum == NULL ? "" : " ", + version_addendum == NULL ? "" : version_addendum)) != 0) { + error("%s: sshbuf_putf: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); diff --git a/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-8.1_p1-GSSAPI-dns.patch b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-8.1_p1-GSSAPI-dns.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6aba6f2 --- /dev/null +++ b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-8.1_p1-GSSAPI-dns.patch @@ -0,0 +1,359 @@ +diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c +index ca450f4e..2994a4e4 100644 +--- a/auth.c ++++ b/auth.c +@@ -723,120 +723,6 @@ fakepw(void) + return (&fake); + } + +-/* +- * Returns the remote DNS hostname as a string. The returned string must not +- * be freed. NB. this will usually trigger a DNS query the first time it is +- * called. +- * This function does additional checks on the hostname to mitigate some +- * attacks on legacy rhosts-style authentication. +- * XXX is RhostsRSAAuthentication vulnerable to these? +- * XXX Can we remove these checks? (or if not, remove RhostsRSAAuthentication?) +- */ +- +-static char * +-remote_hostname(struct ssh *ssh) +-{ +- struct sockaddr_storage from; +- socklen_t fromlen; +- struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop; +- char name[NI_MAXHOST], ntop2[NI_MAXHOST]; +- const char *ntop = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); +- +- /* Get IP address of client. */ +- fromlen = sizeof(from); +- memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from)); +- if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh), +- (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) == -1) { +- debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); +- return strdup(ntop); +- } +- +- ipv64_normalise_mapped(&from, &fromlen); +- if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6) +- fromlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6); +- +- debug3("Trying to reverse map address %.100s.", ntop); +- /* Map the IP address to a host name. */ +- if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, name, sizeof(name), +- NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD) != 0) { +- /* Host name not found. Use ip address. */ +- return strdup(ntop); +- } +- +- /* +- * if reverse lookup result looks like a numeric hostname, +- * someone is trying to trick us by PTR record like following: +- * 1.1.1.10.in-addr.arpa. IN PTR 2.3.4.5 +- */ +- memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); +- hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM; /*dummy*/ +- hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST; +- if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &ai) == 0) { +- logit("Nasty PTR record \"%s\" is set up for %s, ignoring", +- name, ntop); +- freeaddrinfo(ai); +- return strdup(ntop); +- } +- +- /* Names are stored in lowercase. */ +- lowercase(name); +- +- /* +- * Map it back to an IP address and check that the given +- * address actually is an address of this host. This is +- * necessary because anyone with access to a name server can +- * define arbitrary names for an IP address. Mapping from +- * name to IP address can be trusted better (but can still be +- * fooled if the intruder has access to the name server of +- * the domain). +- */ +- memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); +- hints.ai_family = from.ss_family; +- hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; +- if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &aitop) != 0) { +- logit("reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for %.700s " +- "[%s] failed.", name, ntop); +- return strdup(ntop); +- } +- /* Look for the address from the list of addresses. */ +- for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { +- if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop2, +- sizeof(ntop2), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) == 0 && +- (strcmp(ntop, ntop2) == 0)) +- break; +- } +- freeaddrinfo(aitop); +- /* If we reached the end of the list, the address was not there. */ +- if (ai == NULL) { +- /* Address not found for the host name. */ +- logit("Address %.100s maps to %.600s, but this does not " +- "map back to the address.", ntop, name); +- return strdup(ntop); +- } +- return strdup(name); +-} +- +-/* +- * Return the canonical name of the host in the other side of the current +- * connection. The host name is cached, so it is efficient to call this +- * several times. +- */ +- +-const char * +-auth_get_canonical_hostname(struct ssh *ssh, int use_dns) +-{ +- static char *dnsname; +- +- if (!use_dns) +- return ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); +- else if (dnsname != NULL) +- return dnsname; +- else { +- dnsname = remote_hostname(ssh); +- return dnsname; +- } +-} +- + /* + * Runs command in a subprocess with a minimal environment. + * Returns pid on success, 0 on failure. +diff --git a/canohost.c b/canohost.c +index abea9c6e..4f4524d2 100644 +--- a/canohost.c ++++ b/canohost.c +@@ -202,3 +202,117 @@ get_local_port(int sock) + { + return get_sock_port(sock, 1); + } ++ ++/* ++ * Returns the remote DNS hostname as a string. The returned string must not ++ * be freed. NB. this will usually trigger a DNS query the first time it is ++ * called. ++ * This function does additional checks on the hostname to mitigate some ++ * attacks on legacy rhosts-style authentication. ++ * XXX is RhostsRSAAuthentication vulnerable to these? ++ * XXX Can we remove these checks? (or if not, remove RhostsRSAAuthentication?) ++ */ ++ ++static char * ++remote_hostname(struct ssh *ssh) ++{ ++ struct sockaddr_storage from; ++ socklen_t fromlen; ++ struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop; ++ char name[NI_MAXHOST], ntop2[NI_MAXHOST]; ++ const char *ntop = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); ++ ++ /* Get IP address of client. */ ++ fromlen = sizeof(from); ++ memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from)); ++ if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh), ++ (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) { ++ debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); ++ return strdup(ntop); ++ } ++ ++ ipv64_normalise_mapped(&from, &fromlen); ++ if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6) ++ fromlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6); ++ ++ debug3("Trying to reverse map address %.100s.", ntop); ++ /* Map the IP address to a host name. */ ++ if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, name, sizeof(name), ++ NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD) != 0) { ++ /* Host name not found. Use ip address. */ ++ return strdup(ntop); ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * if reverse lookup result looks like a numeric hostname, ++ * someone is trying to trick us by PTR record like following: ++ * 1.1.1.10.in-addr.arpa. IN PTR 2.3.4.5 ++ */ ++ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); ++ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM; /*dummy*/ ++ hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST; ++ if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &ai) == 0) { ++ logit("Nasty PTR record \"%s\" is set up for %s, ignoring", ++ name, ntop); ++ freeaddrinfo(ai); ++ return strdup(ntop); ++ } ++ ++ /* Names are stored in lowercase. */ ++ lowercase(name); ++ ++ /* ++ * Map it back to an IP address and check that the given ++ * address actually is an address of this host. This is ++ * necessary because anyone with access to a name server can ++ * define arbitrary names for an IP address. Mapping from ++ * name to IP address can be trusted better (but can still be ++ * fooled if the intruder has access to the name server of ++ * the domain). ++ */ ++ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); ++ hints.ai_family = from.ss_family; ++ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; ++ if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &aitop) != 0) { ++ logit("reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for %.700s " ++ "[%s] failed.", name, ntop); ++ return strdup(ntop); ++ } ++ /* Look for the address from the list of addresses. */ ++ for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { ++ if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop2, ++ sizeof(ntop2), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) == 0 && ++ (strcmp(ntop, ntop2) == 0)) ++ break; ++ } ++ freeaddrinfo(aitop); ++ /* If we reached the end of the list, the address was not there. */ ++ if (ai == NULL) { ++ /* Address not found for the host name. */ ++ logit("Address %.100s maps to %.600s, but this does not " ++ "map back to the address.", ntop, name); ++ return strdup(ntop); ++ } ++ return strdup(name); ++} ++ ++/* ++ * Return the canonical name of the host in the other side of the current ++ * connection. The host name is cached, so it is efficient to call this ++ * several times. ++ */ ++ ++const char * ++auth_get_canonical_hostname(struct ssh *ssh, int use_dns) ++{ ++ static char *dnsname; ++ ++ if (!use_dns) ++ return ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); ++ else if (dnsname != NULL) ++ return dnsname; ++ else { ++ dnsname = remote_hostname(ssh); ++ return dnsname; ++ } ++} +diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c +index f78b4d6f..747287f7 100644 +--- a/readconf.c ++++ b/readconf.c +@@ -162,6 +162,7 @@ typedef enum { + oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost, + oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout, + oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds, ++ oGssTrustDns, + oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly, + oSendEnv, oSetEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oControlPersist, + oHashKnownHosts, +@@ -203,9 +204,11 @@ static struct { + #if defined(GSSAPI) + { "gssapiauthentication", oGssAuthentication }, + { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oGssDelegateCreds }, ++ { "gssapitrustdns", oGssTrustDns }, + # else + { "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported }, + { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oUnsupported }, ++ { "gssapitrustdns", oUnsupported }, + #endif + #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 + { "pkcs11provider", oPKCS11Provider }, +@@ -992,6 +995,10 @@ parse_time: + intptr = &options->gss_deleg_creds; + goto parse_flag; + ++ case oGssTrustDns: ++ intptr = &options->gss_trust_dns; ++ goto parse_flag; ++ + case oBatchMode: + intptr = &options->batch_mode; + goto parse_flag; +@@ -1864,6 +1871,7 @@ initialize_options(Options * options) + options->challenge_response_authentication = -1; + options->gss_authentication = -1; + options->gss_deleg_creds = -1; ++ options->gss_trust_dns = -1; + options->password_authentication = -1; + options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1; + options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL; +@@ -2011,6 +2019,8 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options) + options->gss_authentication = 0; + if (options->gss_deleg_creds == -1) + options->gss_deleg_creds = 0; ++ if (options->gss_trust_dns == -1) ++ options->gss_trust_dns = 0; + if (options->password_authentication == -1) + options->password_authentication = 1; + if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1) +diff --git a/readconf.h b/readconf.h +index 8e36bf32..c9e4718d 100644 +--- a/readconf.h ++++ b/readconf.h +@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ typedef struct { + /* Try S/Key or TIS, authentication. */ + int gss_authentication; /* Try GSS authentication */ + int gss_deleg_creds; /* Delegate GSS credentials */ ++ int gss_trust_dns; /* Trust DNS for GSS canonicalization */ + int password_authentication; /* Try password + * authentication. */ + int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */ +diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5 +index 02a87892..95de538b 100644 +--- a/ssh_config.5 ++++ b/ssh_config.5 +@@ -762,6 +762,16 @@ The default is + Forward (delegate) credentials to the server. + The default is + .Cm no . ++Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI. ++.It Cm GSSAPITrustDns ++Set to ++.Dq yes to indicate that the DNS is trusted to securely canonicalize ++the name of the host being connected to. If ++.Dq no, the hostname entered on the ++command line will be passed untouched to the GSSAPI library. ++The default is ++.Dq no . ++This option only applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI. + .It Cm HashKnownHosts + Indicates that + .Xr ssh 1 +diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c +index 87fa70a4..a6ffdc96 100644 +--- a/sshconnect2.c ++++ b/sshconnect2.c +@@ -697,6 +697,13 @@ userauth_gssapi(struct ssh *ssh) + OM_uint32 min; + int r, ok = 0; + gss_OID mech = NULL; ++ const char *gss_host; ++ ++ if (options.gss_trust_dns) { ++ extern const char *auth_get_canonical_hostname(struct ssh *ssh, int use_dns); ++ gss_host = auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, 1); ++ } else ++ gss_host = authctxt->host; + + /* Try one GSSAPI method at a time, rather than sending them all at + * once. */ +@@ -711,7 +718,7 @@ userauth_gssapi(struct ssh *ssh) + elements[authctxt->mech_tried]; + /* My DER encoding requires length<128 */ + if (mech->length < 128 && ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(&gssctxt, +- mech, authctxt->host)) { ++ mech, gss_host)) { + ok = 1; /* Mechanism works */ + } else { + authctxt->mech_tried++; diff --git a/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-8.1_p1-X509-12.3-tests.patch b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-8.1_p1-X509-12.3-tests.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..67a93fe --- /dev/null +++ b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-8.1_p1-X509-12.3-tests.patch @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +--- a/openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile.in 2019-06-17 10:59:01.210601434 -0700 ++++ b/openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile.in 2019-06-17 10:59:18.753485852 -0700 +@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ + CC=@CC@ + LD=@LD@ + CFLAGS=@CFLAGS@ +-CPPFLAGS=-I. -I.. -I$(srcdir) -I$(srcdir)/.. @CPPFLAGS@ @DEFS@ ++CPPFLAGS=-I. -I.. -I../.. -I$(srcdir) -I$(srcdir)/.. @CPPFLAGS@ @DEFS@ + EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@ + LIBCOMPAT=../libopenbsd-compat.a + LIBS=@LIBS@ diff --git a/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-8.1_p1-X509-glue-12.3.patch b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-8.1_p1-X509-glue-12.3.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..48cce79 --- /dev/null +++ b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-8.1_p1-X509-glue-12.3.patch @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +Only in b: .openssh-8.1p1+x509-12.3.diff.un~ +diff -ur a/openssh-8.1p1+x509-12.3.diff b/openssh-8.1p1+x509-12.3.diff +--- a/openssh-8.1p1+x509-12.3.diff 2019-10-14 11:33:45.796485604 -0700 ++++ b/openssh-8.1p1+x509-12.3.diff 2019-10-14 11:39:44.960312587 -0700 +@@ -35343,12 +35343,11 @@ + + install: $(CONFIGFILES) $(MANPAGES) $(TARGETS) install-files install-sysconf host-key check-config + install-nokeys: $(CONFIGFILES) $(MANPAGES) $(TARGETS) install-files install-sysconf +-@@ -339,6 +360,8 @@ ++@@ -339,6 +360,7 @@ + $(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5 + $(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8 + $(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir) + + $(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(sshcadir) +-+ $(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(piddir) + $(MKDIR_P) -m 0755 $(DESTDIR)$(PRIVSEP_PATH) + $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh$(EXEEXT) + $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) scp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/scp$(EXEEXT) +@@ -83536,16 +83535,6 @@ + + return mbtowc(NULL, s, n); + +} + +#endif +-diff -ruN openssh-8.1p1/version.h openssh-8.1p1+x509-12.3/version.h +---- openssh-8.1p1/version.h 2019-10-09 03:31:03.000000000 +0300 +-+++ openssh-8.1p1+x509-12.3/version.h 2019-10-13 09:07:00.000000000 +0300 +-@@ -2,5 +2,4 @@ +- +- #define SSH_VERSION "OpenSSH_8.1" +- +--#define SSH_PORTABLE "p1" +--#define SSH_RELEASE SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE +-+#define SSH_RELEASE PACKAGE_STRING ", " SSH_VERSION "p1" + diff -ruN openssh-8.1p1/version.m4 openssh-8.1p1+x509-12.3/version.m4 + --- openssh-8.1p1/version.m4 1970-01-01 02:00:00.000000000 +0200 + +++ openssh-8.1p1+x509-12.3/version.m4 2019-10-13 09:07:00.000000000 +0300 diff --git a/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-8.1_p1-hpn-14.20-glue.patch b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-8.1_p1-hpn-14.20-glue.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..90fa248 --- /dev/null +++ b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-8.1_p1-hpn-14.20-glue.patch @@ -0,0 +1,105 @@ +diff -ur a/openssh-8_1_P1-hpn-DynWinNoneSwitch-14.20.diff b/openssh-8_1_P1-hpn-DynWinNoneSwitch-14.20.diff +--- a/openssh-8_1_P1-hpn-DynWinNoneSwitch-14.20.diff 2020-02-04 14:55:30.408567718 -0800 ++++ b/openssh-8_1_P1-hpn-DynWinNoneSwitch-14.20.diff 2020-02-04 15:16:14.646567224 -0800 +@@ -409,18 +409,10 @@ + index 817da43b..b2bcf78f 100644 + --- a/packet.c + +++ b/packet.c +-@@ -925,6 +925,24 @@ ssh_set_newkeys(struct ssh *ssh, int mode) ++@@ -925,6 +925,16 @@ ssh_set_newkeys(struct ssh *ssh, int mode) + return 0; + } + +-+/* this supports the forced rekeying required for the NONE cipher */ +-+int rekey_requested = 0; +-+void +-+packet_request_rekeying(void) +-+{ +-+ rekey_requested = 1; +-+} +-+ + +/* used to determine if pre or post auth when rekeying for aes-ctr + + * and none cipher switch */ + +int +@@ -434,20 +426,6 @@ + #define MAX_PACKETS (1U<<31) + static int + ssh_packet_need_rekeying(struct ssh *ssh, u_int outbound_packet_len) +-@@ -951,6 +969,13 @@ ssh_packet_need_rekeying(struct ssh *ssh, u_int outbound_packet_len) +- if (state->p_send.packets == 0 && state->p_read.packets == 0) +- return 0; +- +-+ /* used to force rekeying when called for by the none +-+ * cipher switch methods -cjr */ +-+ if (rekey_requested == 1) { +-+ rekey_requested = 0; +-+ return 1; +-+ } +-+ +- /* Time-based rekeying */ +- if (state->rekey_interval != 0 && +- (int64_t)state->rekey_time + state->rekey_interval <= monotime()) + diff --git a/packet.h b/packet.h + index 8ccfd2e0..1ad9bc06 100644 + --- a/packet.h +@@ -476,9 +454,9 @@ + /* Format of the configuration file: + + @@ -167,6 +168,8 @@ typedef enum { +- oHashKnownHosts, + oTunnel, oTunnelDevice, + oLocalCommand, oPermitLocalCommand, oRemoteCommand, ++ oDisableMTAES, + + oTcpRcvBufPoll, oTcpRcvBuf, oHPNDisabled, oHPNBufferSize, + + oNoneEnabled, oNoneSwitch, + oVisualHostKey, +@@ -615,9 +593,9 @@ + int ip_qos_bulk; /* IP ToS/DSCP/class for bulk traffic */ + SyslogFacility log_facility; /* Facility for system logging. */ + @@ -112,7 +116,10 @@ typedef struct { +- + int enable_ssh_keysign; + int64_t rekey_limit; ++ int disable_multithreaded; /*disable multithreaded aes-ctr*/ + + int none_switch; /* Use none cipher */ + + int none_enabled; /* Allow none to be used */ + int rekey_interval; +@@ -700,9 +678,9 @@ + + options->hpn_buffer_size = CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT; + + } + + ++ if (options->disable_multithreaded == -1) ++ options->disable_multithreaded = 0; + if (options->ip_qos_interactive == -1) +- options->ip_qos_interactive = IPTOS_DSCP_AF21; +- if (options->ip_qos_bulk == -1) + @@ -486,6 +532,8 @@ typedef enum { + sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, + sListenAddress, sAddressFamily, +@@ -1079,11 +1057,11 @@ + xxx_host = host; + xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr; + +-@@ -422,6 +433,28 @@ ssh_userauth2(struct ssh *ssh, const char *local_user, ++@@ -422,7 +433,28 @@ ssh_userauth2(struct ssh *ssh, const char *local_user, + + if (!authctxt.success) + fatal("Authentication failed."); +-+ ++ + + /* + + * If the user wants to use the none cipher, do it post authentication + + * and only if the right conditions are met -- both of the NONE commands +@@ -1105,9 +1083,9 @@ + + } + + } + + +- debug("Authentication succeeded (%s).", authctxt.method->name); +- } +- ++ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL ++ if (options.disable_multithreaded == 0) { ++ /* if we are using aes-ctr there can be issues in either a fork or sandbox + diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c + index 11571c01..23a06022 100644 + --- a/sshd.c diff --git a/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-8.1_p1-hpn-14.20-sctp-glue.patch b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-8.1_p1-hpn-14.20-sctp-glue.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3f5c7a4 --- /dev/null +++ b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-8.1_p1-hpn-14.20-sctp-glue.patch @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +diff -ur a/openssh-8_1_P1-hpn-DynWinNoneSwitch-14.20.diff b/openssh-8_1_P1-hpn-DynWinNoneSwitch-14.20.diff +--- a/openssh-8_1_P1-hpn-DynWinNoneSwitch-14.20.diff 2020-02-04 14:55:30.408567718 -0800 ++++ b/openssh-8_1_P1-hpn-DynWinNoneSwitch-14.20.diff 2020-02-04 16:36:51.394069720 -0800 +@@ -1191,15 +1191,3 @@ + # Example of overriding settings on a per-user basis + #Match User anoncvs + # X11Forwarding no +-diff --git a/version.h b/version.h +-index 6b3fadf8..ec1d2e27 100644 +---- a/version.h +-+++ b/version.h +-@@ -3,4 +3,6 @@ +- #define SSH_VERSION "OpenSSH_8.1" +- +- #define SSH_PORTABLE "p1" +--#define SSH_RELEASE SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE +-+#define SSH_HPN "-hpn14v20" +-+#define SSH_RELEASE SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE SSH_HPN +-+ diff --git a/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-8.1_p1-tests-2020.patch b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-8.1_p1-tests-2020.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..505e34d --- /dev/null +++ b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-8.1_p1-tests-2020.patch @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +diff --git a/regress/cert-hostkey.sh b/regress/cert-hostkey.sh +index 86ea6250..844adabc 100644 +--- a/regress/cert-hostkey.sh ++++ b/regress/cert-hostkey.sh +@@ -252,7 +252,7 @@ test_one() { + test_one "user-certificate" failure "-n $HOSTS" + test_one "empty principals" success "-h" + test_one "wrong principals" failure "-h -n foo" +-test_one "cert not yet valid" failure "-h -V20200101:20300101" ++test_one "cert not yet valid" failure "-h -V20300101:20320101" + test_one "cert expired" failure "-h -V19800101:19900101" + test_one "cert valid interval" success "-h -V-1w:+2w" + test_one "cert has constraints" failure "-h -Oforce-command=false" +diff --git a/regress/cert-userkey.sh b/regress/cert-userkey.sh +index 38c14a69..5cd02fc3 100644 +--- a/regress/cert-userkey.sh ++++ b/regress/cert-userkey.sh +@@ -338,7 +338,7 @@ test_one() { + test_one "correct principal" success "-n ${USER}" + test_one "host-certificate" failure "-n ${USER} -h" + test_one "wrong principals" failure "-n foo" +-test_one "cert not yet valid" failure "-n ${USER} -V20200101:20300101" ++test_one "cert not yet valid" failure "-n ${USER} -V20300101:20320101" + test_one "cert expired" failure "-n ${USER} -V19800101:19900101" + test_one "cert valid interval" success "-n ${USER} -V-1w:+2w" + test_one "wrong source-address" failure "-n ${USER} -Osource-address=10.0.0.0/8"
