commit: 18291de3d601dfa31b3cf7b34bc3e58f03cd4dd2 Author: Craig Andrews <candrews <AT> gentoo <DOT> org> AuthorDate: Thu Dec 13 14:21:13 2018 +0000 Commit: Craig Andrews <candrews <AT> gentoo <DOT> org> CommitDate: Sat Dec 22 19:33:42 2018 +0000 URL: https://gitweb.gentoo.org/repo/gentoo.git/commit/?id=18291de3
net-libs/libsrtp: 1.6.0-r1 OpenSSL 1.1 compatibility Uses the patches from FreeBSD, see https://svnweb.freebsd.org/ports?view=revision&revision=472170 Also EAPI=7 Closes: https://bugs.gentoo.org/666160 Package-Manager: Portage-2.3.52, Repoman-2.3.12 Signed-off-by: Craig Andrews <candrews <AT> gentoo.org> .../libsrtp/files/libsrtp-1.6.0-openssl-1.1.patch | 361 +++++++++++++++++++++ .../files/libsrtp-1.6.0-openssl-aem_gcm-key.patch | 83 +++++ .../files/libsrtp-1.6.0-openssl-aem_icm-key.patch | 113 +++++++ .../libsrtp/files/libsrtp-1.6.0-openssl-hmac.patch | 254 +++++++++++++++ net-libs/libsrtp/libsrtp-1.6.0-r1.ebuild | 90 +++++ 5 files changed, 901 insertions(+) diff --git a/net-libs/libsrtp/files/libsrtp-1.6.0-openssl-1.1.patch b/net-libs/libsrtp/files/libsrtp-1.6.0-openssl-1.1.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..5d17cb426e8 --- /dev/null +++ b/net-libs/libsrtp/files/libsrtp-1.6.0-openssl-1.1.patch @@ -0,0 +1,361 @@ +Backport of https://github.com/cisco/libsrtp/commit/0b45423678ddc46d702f3a51614f20bfbd112ddd + +--- a/crypto/cipher/aes_gcm_ossl.c 2018-06-11 07:46:09 UTC ++++ b/crypto/cipher/aes_gcm_ossl.c +@@ -117,6 +117,14 @@ err_status_t aes_gcm_openssl_alloc (cipher_t **c, int + } + memset(gcm, 0x0, sizeof(aes_gcm_ctx_t)); + ++ gcm->ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); ++ if (gcm->ctx == NULL) { ++ crypto_free(gcm); ++ crypto_free(*c); ++ *c = NULL; ++ return err_status_alloc_fail; ++ } ++ + /* set pointers */ + (*c)->state = gcm; + +@@ -140,7 +148,6 @@ err_status_t aes_gcm_openssl_alloc (cipher_t **c, int + + /* set key size */ + (*c)->key_len = key_len; +- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&gcm->ctx); + + return (err_status_ok); + } +@@ -155,7 +162,7 @@ err_status_t aes_gcm_openssl_dealloc (cipher_t *c) + + ctx = (aes_gcm_ctx_t*)c->state; + if (ctx) { +- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx->ctx); ++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx->ctx); + /* decrement ref_count for the appropriate engine */ + switch (ctx->key_size) { + case AES_256_KEYSIZE: +@@ -205,7 +212,7 @@ err_status_t aes_gcm_openssl_context_init (aes_gcm_ctx + break; + } + +- if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(&c->ctx, evp, NULL, key, NULL, 0)) { ++ if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(c->ctx, evp, NULL, key, NULL, 0)) { + return (err_status_init_fail); + } + +@@ -227,19 +234,19 @@ err_status_t aes_gcm_openssl_set_iv (aes_gcm_ctx_t *c, + + debug_print(mod_aes_gcm, "setting iv: %s", v128_hex_string(iv)); + +- if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(&c->ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, ++ if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(c->ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, + NULL, (c->dir == direction_encrypt ? 1 : 0))) { + return (err_status_init_fail); + } + + /* set IV len and the IV value, the followiong 3 calls are required */ +- if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(&c->ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IVLEN, 12, 0)) { ++ if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(c->ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IVLEN, 12, 0)) { + return (err_status_init_fail); + } +- if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(&c->ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED, -1, iv)) { ++ if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(c->ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED, -1, iv)) { + return (err_status_init_fail); + } +- if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(&c->ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN, 0, iv)) { ++ if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(c->ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN, 0, iv)) { + return (err_status_init_fail); + } + +@@ -263,9 +270,9 @@ err_status_t aes_gcm_openssl_set_aad (aes_gcm_ctx_t *c + * Set dummy tag, OpenSSL requires the Tag to be set before + * processing AAD + */ +- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(&c->ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG, c->tag_len, aad); ++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(c->ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG, c->tag_len, aad); + +- rv = EVP_Cipher(&c->ctx, NULL, aad, aad_len); ++ rv = EVP_Cipher(c->ctx, NULL, aad, aad_len); + if (rv != aad_len) { + return (err_status_algo_fail); + } else { +@@ -291,7 +298,7 @@ err_status_t aes_gcm_openssl_encrypt (aes_gcm_ctx_t *c + /* + * Encrypt the data + */ +- EVP_Cipher(&c->ctx, buf, buf, *enc_len); ++ EVP_Cipher(c->ctx, buf, buf, *enc_len); + + return (err_status_ok); + } +@@ -313,12 +320,12 @@ err_status_t aes_gcm_openssl_get_tag (aes_gcm_ctx_t *c + /* + * Calculate the tag + */ +- EVP_Cipher(&c->ctx, NULL, NULL, 0); ++ EVP_Cipher(c->ctx, NULL, NULL, 0); + + /* + * Retreive the tag + */ +- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(&c->ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG, c->tag_len, buf); ++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(c->ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG, c->tag_len, buf); + + /* + * Increase encryption length by desired tag size +@@ -347,14 +354,14 @@ err_status_t aes_gcm_openssl_decrypt (aes_gcm_ctx_t *c + /* + * Set the tag before decrypting + */ +- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(&c->ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG, c->tag_len, ++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(c->ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG, c->tag_len, + buf + (*enc_len - c->tag_len)); +- EVP_Cipher(&c->ctx, buf, buf, *enc_len - c->tag_len); ++ EVP_Cipher(c->ctx, buf, buf, *enc_len - c->tag_len); + + /* + * Check the tag + */ +- if (EVP_Cipher(&c->ctx, NULL, NULL, 0)) { ++ if (EVP_Cipher(c->ctx, NULL, NULL, 0)) { + return (err_status_auth_fail); + } + +--- a/crypto/cipher/aes_icm_ossl.c 2018-06-11 07:46:00 UTC ++++ b/crypto/cipher/aes_icm_ossl.c +@@ -144,6 +144,14 @@ err_status_t aes_icm_openssl_alloc (cipher_t **c, int + } + memset(icm, 0x0, sizeof(aes_icm_ctx_t)); + ++ icm->ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); ++ if (icm->ctx == NULL) { ++ crypto_free(icm); ++ crypto_free(*c); ++ *c = NULL; ++ return err_status_alloc_fail; ++ } ++ + /* set pointers */ + (*c)->state = icm; + +@@ -173,7 +181,6 @@ err_status_t aes_icm_openssl_alloc (cipher_t **c, int + + /* set key size */ + (*c)->key_len = key_len; +- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&icm->ctx); + + return err_status_ok; + } +@@ -195,7 +202,7 @@ err_status_t aes_icm_openssl_dealloc (cipher_t *c) + */ + ctx = (aes_icm_ctx_t*)c->state; + if (ctx != NULL) { +- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx->ctx); ++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx->ctx); + /* decrement ref_count for the appropriate engine */ + switch (ctx->key_size) { + case AES_256_KEYSIZE: +@@ -257,8 +264,6 @@ err_status_t aes_icm_openssl_context_init (aes_icm_ctx + debug_print(mod_aes_icm, "key: %s", octet_string_hex_string(key, c->key_size)); + debug_print(mod_aes_icm, "offset: %s", v128_hex_string(&c->offset)); + +- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&c->ctx); +- + switch (c->key_size) { + case AES_256_KEYSIZE: + evp = EVP_aes_256_ctr(); +@@ -276,7 +281,7 @@ err_status_t aes_icm_openssl_context_init (aes_icm_ctx + break; + } + +- if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&c->ctx, evp, ++ if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(c->ctx, evp, + NULL, key, NULL)) { + return err_status_fail; + } else { +@@ -304,7 +309,7 @@ err_status_t aes_icm_openssl_set_iv (aes_icm_ctx_t *c, + + debug_print(mod_aes_icm, "set_counter: %s", v128_hex_string(&c->counter)); + +- if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&c->ctx, NULL, ++ if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(c->ctx, NULL, + NULL, NULL, c->counter.v8)) { + return err_status_fail; + } else { +@@ -326,12 +331,12 @@ err_status_t aes_icm_openssl_encrypt (aes_icm_ctx_t *c + + debug_print(mod_aes_icm, "rs0: %s", v128_hex_string(&c->counter)); + +- if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&c->ctx, buf, &len, buf, *enc_len)) { ++ if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(c->ctx, buf, &len, buf, *enc_len)) { + return err_status_cipher_fail; + } + *enc_len = len; + +- if (!EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&c->ctx, buf, &len)) { ++ if (!EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(c->ctx, buf, &len)) { + return err_status_cipher_fail; + } + *enc_len += len; +--- a/crypto/hash/hmac_ossl.c 2018-06-11 07:45:39 UTC ++++ b/crypto/hash/hmac_ossl.c +@@ -65,8 +65,6 @@ err_status_t + hmac_alloc (auth_t **a, int key_len, int out_len) + { + extern auth_type_t hmac; +- uint8_t *pointer; +- HMAC_CTX *new_hmac_ctx; + + debug_print(mod_hmac, "allocating auth func with key length %d", key_len); + debug_print(mod_hmac, " tag length %d", out_len); +@@ -76,21 +74,43 @@ hmac_alloc (auth_t **a, int key_len, int out_len) + return err_status_bad_param; + } + +- /* allocate memory for auth and HMAC_CTX structures */ +- pointer = (uint8_t*)crypto_alloc(sizeof(HMAC_CTX) + sizeof(auth_t)); +- if (pointer == NULL) { ++/* OpenSSL 1.1.0 made HMAC_CTX an opaque structure, which must be allocated ++ using HMAC_CTX_new. But this function doesn't exist in OpenSSL 1.0.x. */ ++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L || (defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x2070000fL) ++ { ++ /* allocate memory for auth and HMAC_CTX structures */ ++ uint8_t* pointer; ++ HMAC_CTX *new_hmac_ctx; ++ pointer = (uint8_t*)crypto_alloc(sizeof(HMAC_CTX) + sizeof(auth_t)); ++ if (pointer == NULL) { ++ return err_status_alloc_fail; ++ } ++ *a = (auth_t*)pointer; ++ (*a)->state = pointer + sizeof(auth_t); ++ new_hmac_ctx = (HMAC_CTX*)((*a)->state); ++ ++ HMAC_CTX_init(new_hmac_ctx); ++ } ++ ++#else ++ *a = (auth_t*)crypto_alloc(sizeof(auth_t)); ++ if (*a == NULL) { + return err_status_alloc_fail; + } + ++ (*a)->state = HMAC_CTX_new(); ++ if ((*a)->state == NULL) { ++ crypto_free(*a); ++ *a = NULL; ++ return err_status_alloc_fail; ++ } ++#endif ++ + /* set pointers */ +- *a = (auth_t*)pointer; + (*a)->type = &hmac; +- (*a)->state = pointer + sizeof(auth_t); + (*a)->out_len = out_len; + (*a)->key_len = key_len; + (*a)->prefix_len = 0; +- new_hmac_ctx = (HMAC_CTX*)((*a)->state); +- HMAC_CTX_init(new_hmac_ctx); + + /* increment global count of all hmac uses */ + hmac.ref_count++; +@@ -106,11 +126,19 @@ hmac_dealloc (auth_t *a) + + hmac_ctx = (HMAC_CTX*)a->state; + ++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L || (defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x2070000fL) + HMAC_CTX_cleanup(hmac_ctx); + + /* zeroize entire state*/ + octet_string_set_to_zero((uint8_t*)a, + sizeof(HMAC_CTX) + sizeof(auth_t)); ++ ++#else ++ HMAC_CTX_free(hmac_ctx); ++ ++ /* zeroize entire state*/ ++ octet_string_set_to_zero((uint8_t*)a, sizeof(auth_t)); ++#endif + + /* free memory */ + crypto_free(a); +--- a/crypto/include/aes_gcm_ossl.h 2018-06-11 07:46:09 UTC ++++ b/crypto/include/aes_gcm_ossl.h +@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ + typedef struct { + int key_size; + int tag_len; +- EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; ++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX* ctx; + cipher_direction_t dir; + } aes_gcm_ctx_t; + +--- a/crypto/include/aes_icm_ossl.h 2018-06-11 07:46:00 UTC ++++ b/crypto/include/aes_icm_ossl.h +@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ typedef struct { + v128_t counter; /* holds the counter value */ + v128_t offset; /* initial offset value */ + int key_size; +- EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; ++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX* ctx; + } aes_icm_ctx_t; + + err_status_t aes_icm_openssl_set_iv(aes_icm_ctx_t *c, void *iv, int dir); +--- a/crypto/include/sha1.h 2017-08-01 11:57:38 UTC ++++ b/crypto/include/sha1.h +@@ -56,8 +56,6 @@ + #include <openssl/evp.h> + #include <stdint.h> + +-typedef EVP_MD_CTX sha1_ctx_t; +- + /* + * sha1_init(&ctx) initializes the SHA1 context ctx + * +@@ -72,6 +70,12 @@ typedef EVP_MD_CTX sha1_ctx_t; + * + */ + ++/* OpenSSL 1.1.0 made EVP_MD_CTX an opaque structure, which must be allocated ++ using EVP_MD_CTX_new. But this function doesn't exist in OpenSSL 1.0.x. */ ++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L || (defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x2070000fL) ++ ++typedef EVP_MD_CTX sha1_ctx_t; ++ + static inline void sha1_init (sha1_ctx_t *ctx) + { + EVP_MD_CTX_init(ctx); +@@ -88,7 +92,33 @@ static inline void sha1_final (sha1_ctx_t *ctx, uint32 + unsigned int len = 0; + + EVP_DigestFinal(ctx, (unsigned char*)output, &len); ++ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(ctx); + } ++ ++#else ++ ++typedef EVP_MD_CTX* sha1_ctx_t; ++ ++static inline void sha1_init (sha1_ctx_t *ctx) ++{ ++ *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); ++ EVP_DigestInit(*ctx, EVP_sha1()); ++} ++ ++static inline void sha1_update (sha1_ctx_t *ctx, const uint8_t *M, int octets_in_msg) ++{ ++ EVP_DigestUpdate(*ctx, M, octets_in_msg); ++} ++ ++static inline void sha1_final (sha1_ctx_t *ctx, uint32_t *output) ++{ ++ unsigned int len = 0; ++ ++ EVP_DigestFinal(*ctx, (unsigned char*)output, &len); ++ EVP_MD_CTX_free(*ctx); ++} ++#endif ++ + #else + #include "datatypes.h" + diff --git a/net-libs/libsrtp/files/libsrtp-1.6.0-openssl-aem_gcm-key.patch b/net-libs/libsrtp/files/libsrtp-1.6.0-openssl-aem_gcm-key.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..c85e3750a1b --- /dev/null +++ b/net-libs/libsrtp/files/libsrtp-1.6.0-openssl-aem_gcm-key.patch @@ -0,0 +1,83 @@ +Backport of https://github.com/cisco/libsrtp/commit/1acba569915d8124b627a29dd5e3500332618eac + +--- a/crypto/cipher/aes_gcm_ossl.c 2018-06-10 18:51:02 UTC ++++ b/crypto/cipher/aes_gcm_ossl.c +@@ -187,22 +187,28 @@ err_status_t aes_gcm_openssl_dealloc (cipher_t *c) + */ + err_status_t aes_gcm_openssl_context_init (aes_gcm_ctx_t *c, const uint8_t *key) + { ++ const EVP_CIPHER *evp; ++ + c->dir = direction_any; + +- /* copy key to be used later when CiscoSSL crypto context is created */ +- v128_copy_octet_string((v128_t*)&c->key, key); ++ debug_print(mod_aes_gcm, "key: %s", octet_string_hex_string(key, c->key_size)); + +- if (c->key_size == AES_256_KEYSIZE) { +- debug_print(mod_aes_gcm, "Copying last 16 bytes of key: %s", +- v128_hex_string((v128_t*)(key + AES_128_KEYSIZE))); +- v128_copy_octet_string(((v128_t*)(&c->key.v8)) + 1, +- key + AES_128_KEYSIZE); ++ switch (c->key_size) { ++ case AES_256_KEYSIZE: ++ evp = EVP_aes_256_gcm(); ++ break; ++ case AES_128_KEYSIZE: ++ evp = EVP_aes_128_gcm(); ++ break; ++ default: ++ return (err_status_bad_param); ++ break; + } + +- debug_print(mod_aes_gcm, "key: %s", v128_hex_string((v128_t*)&c->key)); ++ if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(&c->ctx, evp, NULL, key, NULL, 0)) { ++ return (err_status_init_fail); ++ } + +- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&c->ctx); +- + return (err_status_ok); + } + +@@ -214,8 +220,6 @@ err_status_t aes_gcm_openssl_context_init (aes_gcm_ctx + err_status_t aes_gcm_openssl_set_iv (aes_gcm_ctx_t *c, void *iv, + int direction) + { +- const EVP_CIPHER *evp; +- + if (direction != direction_encrypt && direction != direction_decrypt) { + return (err_status_bad_param); + } +@@ -223,19 +227,7 @@ err_status_t aes_gcm_openssl_set_iv (aes_gcm_ctx_t *c, + + debug_print(mod_aes_gcm, "setting iv: %s", v128_hex_string(iv)); + +- switch (c->key_size) { +- case AES_256_KEYSIZE: +- evp = EVP_aes_256_gcm(); +- break; +- case AES_128_KEYSIZE: +- evp = EVP_aes_128_gcm(); +- break; +- default: +- return (err_status_bad_param); +- break; +- } +- +- if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(&c->ctx, evp, NULL, (const unsigned char*)&c->key.v8, ++ if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(&c->ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, + NULL, (c->dir == direction_encrypt ? 1 : 0))) { + return (err_status_init_fail); + } +--- a/crypto/include/aes_gcm_ossl.h 2017-08-01 11:57:38 UTC ++++ b/crypto/include/aes_gcm_ossl.h +@@ -52,7 +52,6 @@ + #include <openssl/aes.h> + + typedef struct { +- v256_t key; + int key_size; + int tag_len; + EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; diff --git a/net-libs/libsrtp/files/libsrtp-1.6.0-openssl-aem_icm-key.patch b/net-libs/libsrtp/files/libsrtp-1.6.0-openssl-aem_icm-key.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..1c2cf3ff205 --- /dev/null +++ b/net-libs/libsrtp/files/libsrtp-1.6.0-openssl-aem_icm-key.patch @@ -0,0 +1,113 @@ +Backport of https://github.com/cisco/libsrtp/commit/fb954450198c832c96b4191fcef3a1b9e2d15d8b + +--- a/crypto/cipher/aes_icm_ossl.c 2018-06-10 20:33:16 UTC ++++ b/crypto/cipher/aes_icm_ossl.c +@@ -235,6 +235,8 @@ err_status_t aes_icm_openssl_dealloc (cipher_t *c) + */ + err_status_t aes_icm_openssl_context_init (aes_icm_ctx_t *c, const uint8_t *key, int len) + { ++ const EVP_CIPHER *evp; ++ + /* + * set counter and initial values to 'offset' value, being careful not to + * go past the end of the key buffer +@@ -252,30 +254,35 @@ err_status_t aes_icm_openssl_context_init (aes_icm_ctx + c->offset.v8[SALT_SIZE] = c->offset.v8[SALT_SIZE + 1] = 0; + c->counter.v8[SALT_SIZE] = c->counter.v8[SALT_SIZE + 1] = 0; + +- /* copy key to be used later when CiscoSSL crypto context is created */ +- v128_copy_octet_string((v128_t*)&c->key, key); ++ debug_print(mod_aes_icm, "key: %s", octet_string_hex_string(key, c->key_size)); ++ debug_print(mod_aes_icm, "offset: %s", v128_hex_string(&c->offset)); + +- /* if the key is greater than 16 bytes, copy the second +- * half. Note, we treat AES-192 and AES-256 the same here +- * for simplicity. The storage location receiving the +- * key is statically allocated to handle a full 32 byte key +- * regardless of the cipher in use. +- */ +- if (c->key_size == AES_256_KEYSIZE ++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&c->ctx); ++ ++ switch (c->key_size) { ++ case AES_256_KEYSIZE: ++ evp = EVP_aes_256_ctr(); ++ break; + #ifndef SRTP_NO_AES192 +- || c->key_size == AES_192_KEYSIZE ++ case AES_192_KEYSIZE: ++ evp = EVP_aes_192_ctr(); ++ break; + #endif +- ) { +- debug_print(mod_aes_icm, "Copying last 16 bytes of key: %s", +- v128_hex_string((v128_t*)(key + AES_128_KEYSIZE))); +- v128_copy_octet_string(((v128_t*)(&c->key.v8)) + 1, key + AES_128_KEYSIZE); ++ case AES_128_KEYSIZE: ++ evp = EVP_aes_128_ctr(); ++ break; ++ default: ++ return err_status_bad_param; ++ break; + } + +- debug_print(mod_aes_icm, "key: %s", v128_hex_string((v128_t*)&c->key)); +- debug_print(mod_aes_icm, "offset: %s", v128_hex_string(&c->offset)); ++ if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&c->ctx, evp, ++ NULL, key, NULL)) { ++ return err_status_fail; ++ } else { ++ return err_status_ok; ++ } + +- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&c->ctx); +- + return err_status_ok; + } + +@@ -286,7 +293,6 @@ err_status_t aes_icm_openssl_context_init (aes_icm_ctx + */ + err_status_t aes_icm_openssl_set_iv (aes_icm_ctx_t *c, void *iv, int dir) + { +- const EVP_CIPHER *evp; + v128_t nonce; + + /* set nonce (for alignment) */ +@@ -298,25 +304,8 @@ err_status_t aes_icm_openssl_set_iv (aes_icm_ctx_t *c, + + debug_print(mod_aes_icm, "set_counter: %s", v128_hex_string(&c->counter)); + +- switch (c->key_size) { +- case AES_256_KEYSIZE: +- evp = EVP_aes_256_ctr(); +- break; +-#ifndef SRTP_NO_AES192 +- case AES_192_KEYSIZE: +- evp = EVP_aes_192_ctr(); +- break; +-#endif +- case AES_128_KEYSIZE: +- evp = EVP_aes_128_ctr(); +- break; +- default: +- return err_status_bad_param; +- break; +- } +- +- if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&c->ctx, evp, +- NULL, c->key.v8, c->counter.v8)) { ++ if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&c->ctx, NULL, ++ NULL, NULL, c->counter.v8)) { + return err_status_fail; + } else { + return err_status_ok; +--- a/crypto/include/aes_icm_ossl.h 2017-08-01 11:57:38 UTC ++++ b/crypto/include/aes_icm_ossl.h +@@ -70,7 +70,6 @@ + typedef struct { + v128_t counter; /* holds the counter value */ + v128_t offset; /* initial offset value */ +- v256_t key; + int key_size; + EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; + } aes_icm_ctx_t; diff --git a/net-libs/libsrtp/files/libsrtp-1.6.0-openssl-hmac.patch b/net-libs/libsrtp/files/libsrtp-1.6.0-openssl-hmac.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..c9973f214fc --- /dev/null +++ b/net-libs/libsrtp/files/libsrtp-1.6.0-openssl-hmac.patch @@ -0,0 +1,254 @@ +Backport of https://github.com/cisco/libsrtp/commit/5781341d99cd286a1f3d164e0576c2e837a444b7 + +--- a/crypto/hash/hmac_ossl.c 2017-08-01 11:57:38 UTC ++++ b/crypto/hash/hmac_ossl.c +@@ -46,11 +46,12 @@ + #include <config.h> + #endif + +-#include "hmac.h" ++#include "auth.h" + #include "alloc.h" + #include <openssl/evp.h> ++#include <openssl/hmac.h> + +-#define HMAC_KEYLEN_MAX 20 ++#define SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE 20 + + /* the debug module for authentiation */ + +@@ -65,26 +66,18 @@ hmac_alloc (auth_t **a, int key_len, int out_len) + { + extern auth_type_t hmac; + uint8_t *pointer; +- hmac_ctx_t *new_hmac_ctx; ++ HMAC_CTX *new_hmac_ctx; + + debug_print(mod_hmac, "allocating auth func with key length %d", key_len); + debug_print(mod_hmac, " tag length %d", out_len); + +- /* +- * check key length - note that we don't support keys larger +- * than 20 bytes yet +- */ +- if (key_len > HMAC_KEYLEN_MAX) { +- return err_status_bad_param; +- } +- + /* check output length - should be less than 20 bytes */ +- if (out_len > HMAC_KEYLEN_MAX) { ++ if (out_len > SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE) { + return err_status_bad_param; + } + +- /* allocate memory for auth and hmac_ctx_t structures */ +- pointer = (uint8_t*)crypto_alloc(sizeof(hmac_ctx_t) + sizeof(auth_t)); ++ /* allocate memory for auth and HMAC_CTX structures */ ++ pointer = (uint8_t*)crypto_alloc(sizeof(HMAC_CTX) + sizeof(auth_t)); + if (pointer == NULL) { + return err_status_alloc_fail; + } +@@ -96,8 +89,8 @@ hmac_alloc (auth_t **a, int key_len, int out_len) + (*a)->out_len = out_len; + (*a)->key_len = key_len; + (*a)->prefix_len = 0; +- new_hmac_ctx = (hmac_ctx_t*)((*a)->state); +- memset(new_hmac_ctx, 0, sizeof(hmac_ctx_t)); ++ new_hmac_ctx = (HMAC_CTX*)((*a)->state); ++ HMAC_CTX_init(new_hmac_ctx); + + /* increment global count of all hmac uses */ + hmac.ref_count++; +@@ -109,19 +102,15 @@ err_status_t + hmac_dealloc (auth_t *a) + { + extern auth_type_t hmac; +- hmac_ctx_t *hmac_ctx; ++ HMAC_CTX *hmac_ctx; + +- hmac_ctx = (hmac_ctx_t*)a->state; +- if (hmac_ctx->ctx_initialized) { +- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&hmac_ctx->ctx); +- } +- if (hmac_ctx->init_ctx_initialized) { +- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&hmac_ctx->init_ctx); +- } ++ hmac_ctx = (HMAC_CTX*)a->state; + ++ HMAC_CTX_cleanup(hmac_ctx); ++ + /* zeroize entire state*/ + octet_string_set_to_zero((uint8_t*)a, +- sizeof(hmac_ctx_t) + sizeof(auth_t)); ++ sizeof(HMAC_CTX) + sizeof(auth_t)); + + /* free memory */ + crypto_free(a); +@@ -133,113 +122,65 @@ hmac_dealloc (auth_t *a) + } + + err_status_t +-hmac_init (hmac_ctx_t *state, const uint8_t *key, int key_len) ++hmac_init (HMAC_CTX *state, const uint8_t *key, int key_len) + { +- int i; +- uint8_t ipad[64]; ++ if (HMAC_Init_ex(state, key, key_len, EVP_sha1(), NULL) == 0) ++ return err_status_auth_fail; + +- /* +- * check key length - note that we don't support keys larger +- * than 20 bytes yet +- */ +- if (key_len > HMAC_KEYLEN_MAX) { +- return err_status_bad_param; +- } +- +- /* +- * set values of ipad and opad by exoring the key into the +- * appropriate constant values +- */ +- for (i = 0; i < key_len; i++) { +- ipad[i] = key[i] ^ 0x36; +- state->opad[i] = key[i] ^ 0x5c; +- } +- /* set the rest of ipad, opad to constant values */ +- for (; i < sizeof(ipad); i++) { +- ipad[i] = 0x36; +- ((uint8_t*)state->opad)[i] = 0x5c; +- } +- +- debug_print(mod_hmac, "ipad: %s", octet_string_hex_string(ipad, sizeof(ipad))); +- +- /* initialize sha1 context */ +- sha1_init(&state->init_ctx); +- state->init_ctx_initialized = 1; +- +- /* hash ipad ^ key */ +- sha1_update(&state->init_ctx, ipad, sizeof(ipad)); +- return (hmac_start(state)); ++ return err_status_ok; + } + + err_status_t +-hmac_start (hmac_ctx_t *state) ++hmac_start (HMAC_CTX *state) + { +- if (state->ctx_initialized) { +- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&state->ctx); +- } +- if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy(&state->ctx, &state->init_ctx)) { ++ if (HMAC_Init_ex(state, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL) == 0) + return err_status_auth_fail; +- } else { +- state->ctx_initialized = 1; +- return err_status_ok; +- } ++ ++ return err_status_ok; + } + + err_status_t +-hmac_update (hmac_ctx_t *state, const uint8_t *message, int msg_octets) ++hmac_update (HMAC_CTX *state, const uint8_t *message, int msg_octets) + { + debug_print(mod_hmac, "input: %s", + octet_string_hex_string(message, msg_octets)); + +- /* hash message into sha1 context */ +- sha1_update(&state->ctx, message, msg_octets); ++ if (HMAC_Update(state, message, msg_octets) == 0) ++ return err_status_auth_fail; + + return err_status_ok; + } + + err_status_t +-hmac_compute (hmac_ctx_t *state, const void *message, ++hmac_compute (HMAC_CTX *state, const void *message, + int msg_octets, int tag_len, uint8_t *result) + { +- uint32_t hash_value[5]; +- uint32_t H[5]; ++ uint8_t hash_value[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; + int i; ++ unsigned int len; + + /* check tag length, return error if we can't provide the value expected */ +- if (tag_len > HMAC_KEYLEN_MAX) { ++ if (tag_len > SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE) { + return err_status_bad_param; + } + + /* hash message, copy output into H */ +- sha1_update(&state->ctx, message, msg_octets); +- sha1_final(&state->ctx, H); ++ if (HMAC_Update(state, message, msg_octets) == 0) ++ return err_status_auth_fail; + +- /* +- * note that we don't need to debug_print() the input, since the +- * function hmac_update() already did that for us +- */ +- debug_print(mod_hmac, "intermediate state: %s", +- octet_string_hex_string((uint8_t*)H, sizeof(H))); ++ if (HMAC_Final(state, hash_value, &len) == 0) ++ return err_status_auth_fail; + +- /* re-initialize hash context */ +- sha1_init(&state->ctx); ++ if (len < tag_len) ++ return err_status_auth_fail; + +- /* hash opad ^ key */ +- sha1_update(&state->ctx, (uint8_t*)state->opad, sizeof(state->opad)); +- +- /* hash the result of the inner hash */ +- sha1_update(&state->ctx, (uint8_t*)H, sizeof(H)); +- +- /* the result is returned in the array hash_value[] */ +- sha1_final(&state->ctx, hash_value); +- + /* copy hash_value to *result */ + for (i = 0; i < tag_len; i++) { +- result[i] = ((uint8_t*)hash_value)[i]; ++ result[i] = hash_value[i]; + } + + debug_print(mod_hmac, "output: %s", +- octet_string_hex_string((uint8_t*)hash_value, tag_len)); ++ octet_string_hex_string(hash_value, tag_len)); + + return err_status_ok; + } +@@ -248,7 +189,7 @@ hmac_compute (hmac_ctx_t *state, const void *message, + /* begin test case 0 */ + + uint8_t +- hmac_test_case_0_key[HMAC_KEYLEN_MAX] = { ++ hmac_test_case_0_key[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE] = { + 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, + 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, + 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b +@@ -260,7 +201,7 @@ uint8_t + }; + + uint8_t +- hmac_test_case_0_tag[HMAC_KEYLEN_MAX] = { ++ hmac_test_case_0_tag[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE] = { + 0xb6, 0x17, 0x31, 0x86, 0x55, 0x05, 0x72, 0x64, + 0xe2, 0x8b, 0xc0, 0xb6, 0xfb, 0x37, 0x8c, 0x8e, + 0xf1, 0x46, 0xbe, 0x00 +--- a/crypto/include/hmac.h 2017-08-01 11:57:38 UTC ++++ b/crypto/include/hmac.h +@@ -53,10 +53,6 @@ typedef struct { + uint8_t opad[64]; + sha1_ctx_t ctx; + sha1_ctx_t init_ctx; +-#ifdef OPENSSL +- int ctx_initialized; +- int init_ctx_initialized; +-#endif + } hmac_ctx_t; + + err_status_t diff --git a/net-libs/libsrtp/libsrtp-1.6.0-r1.ebuild b/net-libs/libsrtp/libsrtp-1.6.0-r1.ebuild new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..9b3f9a9952b --- /dev/null +++ b/net-libs/libsrtp/libsrtp-1.6.0-r1.ebuild @@ -0,0 +1,90 @@ +# Copyright 1999-2018 Gentoo Authors +# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2 + +EAPI=7 + +inherit autotools multilib-minimal + +DESCRIPTION="Open-source implementation of the Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP)" +HOMEPAGE="https://github.com/cisco/libsrtp"; +SRC_URI="https://github.com/cisco/${PN}/archive/v${PV}.tar.gz -> ${P}.tar.gz" + +LICENSE="BSD" +SLOT="0/1" +KEYWORDS="~alpha ~amd64 ~arm ~arm64 ~hppa ~ia64 ~ppc ~ppc64 -sparc ~x86 ~x86-fbsd ~ppc-macos ~x64-macos ~x86-macos" +IUSE="aesicm console debug doc libressl openssl static-libs syslog test" + +RDEPEND=" + openssl? ( + !libressl? ( dev-libs/openssl:0=[${MULTILIB_USEDEP}] ) + libressl? ( dev-libs/libressl:0=[${MULTILIB_USEDEP}] ) + ) +" +DEPEND="${RDEPEND}" + +DOCS=( CHANGES README TODO ) + +MULTILIB_WRAPPED_HEADERS=( + /usr/include/srtp/config.h +) +PATCHES=( + "${FILESDIR}/${PN}-pcap-automagic-r0.patch" + "${FILESDIR}/${P}-openssl-hmac.patch" + "${FILESDIR}/${P}-openssl-aem_icm-key.patch" + "${FILESDIR}/${P}-openssl-aem_gcm-key.patch" + "${FILESDIR}/${P}-openssl-1.1.patch" +) + +src_prepare() { + default + + # test/rtpw.c is using /usr/share/dict/words assuming it exists + # using test/rtpw.c guaratees the file exists in any case + sed -i -e "s:/usr/share/dict/words:rtpw.c:" test/rtpw.c || die + + mv configure.in configure.ac || die + eautoreconf +} + +multilib_src_configure() { + # stdout: default error output for messages in debug + # kernel-linux: breaks the build + # gdoi: disabled by upstream and breaks the build + # pcap: seems to be test-only + ECONF_SOURCE=${S} \ + econf \ + --enable-stdout \ + --disable-kernel-linux \ + --disable-gdoi \ + --disable-pcap \ + $(use_enable aesicm generic-aesicm) \ + $(use_enable console) \ + $(use_enable debug) \ + $(use_enable openssl) \ + $(use_enable syslog) +} + +multilib_src_compile() { + use static-libs && emake ${PN}.a + emake shared_library + use test && emake test +} + +multilib_src_test() { + # work-around tests that do not like out-of-source builds + cp "${S}"/test/{getopt_s,rtpw}.c "${BUILD_DIR}"/test/ || die + + LD_LIBRARY_PATH="${BUILD_DIR}" emake -j1 runtest + + # Makefile.in has '$(testapp): libsrtp.a' + if use !static-libs; then + rm libsrtp.a || die + fi +} + +multilib_src_install_all() { + # libsrtp.pdf can also be generated with doxygen + # but it would be a waste of time as an up-to-date version is built + use doc && DOCS+=( doc/*.txt doc/${PN}.pdf ) + einstalldocs +}
