commit: e71df7341cdaa0a4cc2aeff56496ce1724b921d2 Author: Wes Cilldhaire <wes <AT> sol1 <DOT> com <DOT> au> AuthorDate: Mon Feb 5 01:07:25 2018 +0000 Commit: Patrice Clement <monsieurp <AT> gentoo <DOT> org> CommitDate: Mon Feb 5 21:50:03 2018 +0000 URL: https://gitweb.gentoo.org/repo/gentoo.git/commit/?id=e71df734
net-nds/389-ds-base: patch against CVE-2017-15135 in 1.3.6.8. * Patch and revbump to 1.3.6.8 to address CVE-2017-15135 * Update copyright line in all versions for 2018 Bug: https://bugs.gentoo.org/645706 Acked-by: wibrown <AT> redhat.com Package-Manager: Portage-2.3.20, Repoman-2.3.6 Closes: https://github.com/gentoo/gentoo/pull/7078 net-nds/389-ds-base/389-ds-base-1.3.5.19.ebuild | 2 +- ....3.6.8.ebuild => 389-ds-base-1.3.6.8-r1.ebuild} | 4 +- net-nds/389-ds-base/389-ds-base-9999.ebuild | 2 +- ...-base-1.3.6-backport-invalid-password-mig.patch | 376 +++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 381 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/net-nds/389-ds-base/389-ds-base-1.3.5.19.ebuild b/net-nds/389-ds-base/389-ds-base-1.3.5.19.ebuild index 6fddd0315a5..e36a909ca91 100644 --- a/net-nds/389-ds-base/389-ds-base-1.3.5.19.ebuild +++ b/net-nds/389-ds-base/389-ds-base-1.3.5.19.ebuild @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -# Copyright 1999-2017 Gentoo Foundation +# Copyright 1999-2018 Gentoo Foundation # Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2 EAPI=5 diff --git a/net-nds/389-ds-base/389-ds-base-1.3.6.8.ebuild b/net-nds/389-ds-base/389-ds-base-1.3.6.8-r1.ebuild similarity index 96% rename from net-nds/389-ds-base/389-ds-base-1.3.6.8.ebuild rename to net-nds/389-ds-base/389-ds-base-1.3.6.8-r1.ebuild index 6fddd0315a5..0232cdec1d4 100644 --- a/net-nds/389-ds-base/389-ds-base-1.3.6.8.ebuild +++ b/net-nds/389-ds-base/389-ds-base-1.3.6.8-r1.ebuild @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -# Copyright 1999-2017 Gentoo Foundation +# Copyright 1999-2018 Gentoo Foundation # Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2 EAPI=5 @@ -53,6 +53,8 @@ src_prepare() { # as per 389 documentation, when 64bit, export USE_64 use amd64 && export USE_64=1 + epatch "${FILESDIR}/389-ds-base-1.3.6-backport-invalid-password-mig.patch" + eautoreconf append-lfs-flags diff --git a/net-nds/389-ds-base/389-ds-base-9999.ebuild b/net-nds/389-ds-base/389-ds-base-9999.ebuild index 463fd580d5d..046375125af 100644 --- a/net-nds/389-ds-base/389-ds-base-9999.ebuild +++ b/net-nds/389-ds-base/389-ds-base-9999.ebuild @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -# Copyright 1999-2017 Gentoo Foundation +# Copyright 1999-2018 Gentoo Foundation # Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2 EAPI=5 diff --git a/net-nds/389-ds-base/files/389-ds-base-1.3.6-backport-invalid-password-mig.patch b/net-nds/389-ds-base/files/389-ds-base-1.3.6-backport-invalid-password-mig.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..b4ba70a2fb5 --- /dev/null +++ b/net-nds/389-ds-base/files/389-ds-base-1.3.6-backport-invalid-password-mig.patch @@ -0,0 +1,376 @@ +From cefec5714cf0fdec4aa582a5fe020ef80d6024cd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: William Brown <[email protected]> +Date: Thu, 18 Jan 2018 11:27:58 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH] Ticket bz1525628 1.3.6 backport - invalid password migration + causes unauth bind + +Bug Description: Slapi_ct_memcmp expects both inputs to be +at LEAST size n. If they are not, we only compared UP to n. + +Invalid migrations of passwords (IE {CRYPT}XX) would create +a pw which is just salt and no hash. ct_memcmp would then +only verify the salt bits and would allow the authentication. + +This relies on an administrative mistake both of allowing +password migration (nsslapd-allow-hashed-passwords) and then +subsequently migrating an INVALID password to the server. + +Fix Description: slapi_ct_memcmp now access n1, n2 size +and will FAIL if they are not the same, but will still compare +n bytes, where n is the "longest" memory, to the first byte +of the other to prevent length disclosure of the shorter +value (generally the mis-migrated password) + +https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1525628 + +Author: wibrown + +Review by: ??? +--- + .../bz1525628_ct_memcmp_invalid_hash_test.py | 56 ++++++++++++++++++++ + ldap/servers/plugins/pwdstorage/clear_pwd.c | 4 +- + ldap/servers/plugins/pwdstorage/crypt_pwd.c | 4 +- + ldap/servers/plugins/pwdstorage/md5_pwd.c | 36 ++++++------- + ldap/servers/plugins/pwdstorage/sha_pwd.c | 18 +++++-- + ldap/servers/plugins/pwdstorage/smd5_pwd.c | 60 +++++++++++----------- + ldap/servers/slapd/ch_malloc.c | 36 +++++++++++-- + ldap/servers/slapd/slapi-plugin.h | 2 +- + 8 files changed, 155 insertions(+), 61 deletions(-) + create mode 100644 dirsrvtests/tests/suites/password/bz1525628_ct_memcmp_invalid_hash_test.py + +diff --git a/dirsrvtests/tests/suites/password/bz1525628_ct_memcmp_invalid_hash_test.py b/dirsrvtests/tests/suites/password/bz1525628_ct_memcmp_invalid_hash_test.py +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..2f38384 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/dirsrvtests/tests/suites/password/bz1525628_ct_memcmp_invalid_hash_test.py +@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ ++# --- BEGIN COPYRIGHT BLOCK --- ++# Copyright (C) 2018 Red Hat, Inc. ++# All rights reserved. ++# ++# License: GPL (version 3 or any later version). ++# See LICENSE for details. ++# --- END COPYRIGHT BLOCK --- ++# ++ ++import ldap ++import pytest ++import logging ++from lib389.topologies import topology_st ++from lib389._constants import PASSWORD, DEFAULT_SUFFIX ++ ++from lib389.idm.user import UserAccounts, TEST_USER_PROPERTIES ++ ++logging.getLogger(__name__).setLevel(logging.DEBUG) ++log = logging.getLogger(__name__) ++ ++def test_invalid_hash_fails(topology_st): ++ """When given a malformed hash from userpassword migration ++ slapi_ct_memcmp would check only to the length of the shorter ++ field. This affects some values where it would ONLY verify ++ the salt is valid, and thus would allow any password to bind. ++ ++ :id: 8131c029-7147-47db-8d03-ec5db2a01cfb ++ :setup: Standalone Instance ++ :steps: ++ 1. Create a user ++ 2. Add an invalid password hash (truncated) ++ 3. Attempt to bind ++ :expectedresults: ++ 1. User is added ++ 2. Invalid pw hash is added ++ 3. Bind fails ++ """ ++ log.info("Running invalid hash test") ++ ++ # Allow setting raw password hashes for migration. ++ topology_st.standalone.config.set('nsslapd-allow-hashed-passwords', 'on') ++ ++ users = UserAccounts(topology_st.standalone, DEFAULT_SUFFIX) ++ user = users.create(properties=TEST_USER_PROPERTIES) ++ user.set('userPassword', '{CRYPT}XX') ++ ++ # Attempt to bind. This should fail. ++ with pytest.raises(ldap.INVALID_CREDENTIALS): ++ user.bind(PASSWORD) ++ with pytest.raises(ldap.INVALID_CREDENTIALS): ++ user.bind('XX') ++ with pytest.raises(ldap.INVALID_CREDENTIALS): ++ user.bind('{CRYPT}XX') ++ ++ log.info("PASSED") ++ +diff --git a/ldap/servers/plugins/pwdstorage/clear_pwd.c b/ldap/servers/plugins/pwdstorage/clear_pwd.c +index b9b362d..050e60d 100644 +--- a/ldap/servers/plugins/pwdstorage/clear_pwd.c ++++ b/ldap/servers/plugins/pwdstorage/clear_pwd.c +@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ clear_pw_cmp( const char *userpwd, const char *dbpwd ) + * However, even if the first part of userpw matches dbpwd, but len !=, we + * have already failed anyawy. This prevents substring matching. + */ +- if (slapi_ct_memcmp(userpwd, dbpwd, len_dbp) != 0) { ++ if (slapi_ct_memcmp(userpwd, dbpwd, len_user, len_dbp) != 0) { + result = 1; + } + } else { +@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ clear_pw_cmp( const char *userpwd, const char *dbpwd ) + * dbpwd to itself. We have already got result == 1 if we are here, so we are + * just trying to take up time! + */ +- if (slapi_ct_memcmp(dbpwd, dbpwd, len_dbp)) { ++ if (slapi_ct_memcmp(dbpwd, dbpwd, len_dbp, len_dbp)) { + /* Do nothing, we have the if to fix a coverity check. */ + } + } +diff --git a/ldap/servers/plugins/pwdstorage/crypt_pwd.c b/ldap/servers/plugins/pwdstorage/crypt_pwd.c +index dfd5af9..5fcff13 100644 +--- a/ldap/servers/plugins/pwdstorage/crypt_pwd.c ++++ b/ldap/servers/plugins/pwdstorage/crypt_pwd.c +@@ -56,13 +56,13 @@ crypt_close(Slapi_PBlock *pb __attribute__((unused))) + int + crypt_pw_cmp( const char *userpwd, const char *dbpwd ) + { +- int rc; ++ int32_t rc; + char *cp; + PR_Lock(cryptlock); + /* we use salt (first 2 chars) of encoded password in call to crypt() */ + cp = crypt( userpwd, dbpwd ); + if (cp) { +- rc= slapi_ct_memcmp( dbpwd, cp, strlen(dbpwd)); ++ rc = slapi_ct_memcmp(dbpwd, cp, strlen(dbpwd), strlen(cp)); + } else { + rc = -1; + } +diff --git a/ldap/servers/plugins/pwdstorage/md5_pwd.c b/ldap/servers/plugins/pwdstorage/md5_pwd.c +index b279946..2e1c472 100644 +--- a/ldap/servers/plugins/pwdstorage/md5_pwd.c ++++ b/ldap/servers/plugins/pwdstorage/md5_pwd.c +@@ -30,13 +30,13 @@ + int + md5_pw_cmp( const char *userpwd, const char *dbpwd ) + { +- int rc=-1; +- char * bver; +- PK11Context *ctx=NULL; +- unsigned int outLen; +- unsigned char hash_out[MD5_HASH_LEN]; +- unsigned char b2a_out[MD5_HASH_LEN*2]; /* conservative */ +- SECItem binary_item; ++ int32_t rc = -1; ++ char *bver; ++ PK11Context *ctx = NULL; ++ unsigned int outLen; ++ unsigned char hash_out[MD5_HASH_LEN]; ++ unsigned char b2a_out[MD5_HASH_LEN * 2]; /* conservative */ ++ SECItem binary_item; + + ctx = PK11_CreateDigestContext(SEC_OID_MD5); + if (ctx == NULL) { +@@ -51,17 +51,17 @@ md5_pw_cmp( const char *userpwd, const char *dbpwd ) + PK11_DigestFinal(ctx, hash_out, &outLen, sizeof hash_out); + PK11_DestroyContext(ctx, 1); + +- /* convert the binary hash to base64 */ +- binary_item.data = hash_out; +- binary_item.len = outLen; +- bver = NSSBase64_EncodeItem(NULL, (char *)b2a_out, sizeof b2a_out, &binary_item); +- /* bver points to b2a_out upon success */ +- if (bver) { +- rc = slapi_ct_memcmp(bver,dbpwd, strlen(dbpwd)); +- } else { +- slapi_log_err(SLAPI_LOG_PLUGIN, MD5_SUBSYSTEM_NAME, +- "Could not base64 encode hashed value for password compare"); +- } ++ /* convert the binary hash to base64 */ ++ binary_item.data = hash_out; ++ binary_item.len = outLen; ++ bver = NSSBase64_EncodeItem(NULL, (char *)b2a_out, sizeof b2a_out, &binary_item); ++ /* bver points to b2a_out upon success */ ++ if (bver) { ++ rc = slapi_ct_memcmp(bver, dbpwd, strlen(dbpwd), strlen(bver)); ++ } else { ++ slapi_log_err(SLAPI_LOG_PLUGIN, MD5_SUBSYSTEM_NAME, ++ "Could not base64 encode hashed value for password compare"); ++ } + loser: + return rc; + } +diff --git a/ldap/servers/plugins/pwdstorage/sha_pwd.c b/ldap/servers/plugins/pwdstorage/sha_pwd.c +index 5f41c5b..c9db896 100644 +--- a/ldap/servers/plugins/pwdstorage/sha_pwd.c ++++ b/ldap/servers/plugins/pwdstorage/sha_pwd.c +@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ sha_pw_cmp (const char *userpwd, const char *dbpwd, unsigned int shaLen ) + char userhash[MAX_SHA_HASH_SIZE]; + char quick_dbhash[MAX_SHA_HASH_SIZE + SHA_SALT_LENGTH + 3]; + char *dbhash = quick_dbhash; +- struct berval salt; ++ struct berval salt = {0}; + PRUint32 hash_len; + unsigned int secOID; + char *schemeName; +@@ -120,10 +120,20 @@ sha_pw_cmp (const char *userpwd, const char *dbpwd, unsigned int shaLen ) + } + + /* the proof is in the comparison... */ +- if ( hash_len >= shaLen ) { +- result = slapi_ct_memcmp( userhash, dbhash, shaLen ); ++ if (hash_len >= shaLen) { ++ /* ++ * This say "if the hash has a salt IE >, OR if they are equal, check the hash component ONLY. ++ * This is why we repeat shaLen twice, even though it seems odd. If you have a dbhast of ssha ++ * it's len is 28, and the userpw is 20, but 0 - 20 is the sha, and 21-28 is the salt, which ++ * has already been processed into userhash. ++ * The case where dbpwd is truncated is handled above in "invalid base64" arm. ++ */ ++ result = slapi_ct_memcmp(userhash, dbhash, shaLen, shaLen); + } else { +- result = slapi_ct_memcmp( userhash, dbhash + OLD_SALT_LENGTH, hash_len - OLD_SALT_LENGTH ); ++ /* This case is for if the salt is at the START, which only applies to DS40B1 case. ++ * May never be a valid check... ++ */ ++ result = slapi_ct_memcmp(userhash, dbhash + OLD_SALT_LENGTH, shaLen, hash_len - OLD_SALT_LENGTH); + } + + loser: +diff --git a/ldap/servers/plugins/pwdstorage/smd5_pwd.c b/ldap/servers/plugins/pwdstorage/smd5_pwd.c +index 2e9d195..f6b4bb4 100644 +--- a/ldap/servers/plugins/pwdstorage/smd5_pwd.c ++++ b/ldap/servers/plugins/pwdstorage/smd5_pwd.c +@@ -52,35 +52,37 @@ smd5_pw_cmp( const char *userpwd, const char *dbpwd ) + /* + * Decode hash stored in database. + */ +- hash_len = pwdstorage_base64_decode_len(dbpwd, 0); +- if ( hash_len >= sizeof(quick_dbhash) ) { /* get more space: */ +- dbhash = (char*) slapi_ch_calloc( hash_len + 1, sizeof(char) ); +- if ( dbhash == NULL ) goto loser; +- } else { +- memset( quick_dbhash, 0, sizeof(quick_dbhash) ); +- } +- +- hashresult = PL_Base64Decode( dbpwd, 0, dbhash ); +- if (NULL == hashresult) { +- slapi_log_err(SLAPI_LOG_PLUGIN, SALTED_MD5_SUBSYSTEM_NAME, +- "smd5_pw_cmp: userPassword \"%s\" is the wrong length " +- "or is not properly encoded BASE64\n", dbpwd ); +- goto loser; +- } +- +- salt.bv_val = (void*)(dbhash + MD5_LENGTH); /* salt starts after hash value */ +- salt.bv_len = hash_len - MD5_LENGTH; /* remaining bytes must be salt */ +- +- /* create the hash */ +- memset( userhash, 0, sizeof(userhash) ); +- PK11_DigestBegin(ctx); +- PK11_DigestOp(ctx, (const unsigned char *)userpwd, strlen(userpwd)); +- PK11_DigestOp(ctx, (unsigned char*)(salt.bv_val), salt.bv_len); +- PK11_DigestFinal(ctx, userhash, &outLen, sizeof userhash); +- PK11_DestroyContext(ctx, 1); +- +- /* Compare everything up to the salt. */ +- rc = slapi_ct_memcmp( userhash, dbhash, MD5_LENGTH ); ++ hash_len = pwdstorage_base64_decode_len(dbpwd, 0); ++ if (hash_len >= sizeof(quick_dbhash)) { /* get more space: */ ++ dbhash = (char *)slapi_ch_calloc(hash_len + 1, sizeof(char)); ++ if (dbhash == NULL) ++ goto loser; ++ } else { ++ memset(quick_dbhash, 0, sizeof(quick_dbhash)); ++ } ++ ++ hashresult = PL_Base64Decode(dbpwd, 0, dbhash); ++ if (NULL == hashresult) { ++ slapi_log_err(SLAPI_LOG_PLUGIN, SALTED_MD5_SUBSYSTEM_NAME, ++ "smd5_pw_cmp: userPassword \"%s\" is the wrong length " ++ "or is not properly encoded BASE64\n", ++ dbpwd); ++ goto loser; ++ } ++ ++ salt.bv_val = (void *)(dbhash + MD5_LENGTH); /* salt starts after hash value */ ++ salt.bv_len = hash_len - MD5_LENGTH; /* remaining bytes must be salt */ ++ ++ /* create the hash */ ++ memset(userhash, 0, sizeof(userhash)); ++ PK11_DigestBegin(ctx); ++ PK11_DigestOp(ctx, (const unsigned char *)userpwd, strlen(userpwd)); ++ PK11_DigestOp(ctx, (unsigned char *)(salt.bv_val), salt.bv_len); ++ PK11_DigestFinal(ctx, userhash, &outLen, sizeof userhash); ++ PK11_DestroyContext(ctx, 1); ++ ++ /* Compare everything up to the salt. */ ++ rc = slapi_ct_memcmp(userhash, dbhash, MD5_LENGTH, MD5_LENGTH); + + loser: + if ( dbhash && dbhash != quick_dbhash ) slapi_ch_free_string( (char **)&dbhash ); +diff --git a/ldap/servers/slapd/ch_malloc.c b/ldap/servers/slapd/ch_malloc.c +index 52ccb64..66cb692 100644 +--- a/ldap/servers/slapd/ch_malloc.c ++++ b/ldap/servers/slapd/ch_malloc.c +@@ -343,8 +343,8 @@ slapi_ch_smprintf(const char *fmt, ...) + + /* Constant time memcmp. Does not shortcircuit on failure! */ + /* This relies on p1 and p2 both being size at least n! */ +-int +-slapi_ct_memcmp( const void *p1, const void *p2, size_t n) ++int32_t ++slapi_ct_memcmp(const void *p1, const void *p2, size_t n1, size_t n2) + { + int result = 0; + const unsigned char *_p1 = (const unsigned char *)p1; +@@ -354,9 +354,35 @@ slapi_ct_memcmp( const void *p1, const void *p2, size_t n) + return 2; + } + +- for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) { +- if (_p1[i] ^ _p2[i]) { +- result = 1; ++ if (n1 == n2) { ++ for (size_t i = 0; i < n1; i++) { ++ if (_p1[i] ^ _p2[i]) { ++ result = 1; ++ } ++ } ++ } else { ++ const unsigned char *_pa; ++ const unsigned char *_pb; ++ size_t nl; ++ if (n2 > n1) { ++ _pa = _p2; ++ _pb = _p2; ++ nl = n2; ++ } else { ++ _pa = _p1; ++ _pb = _p1; ++ nl = n1; ++ } ++ /* We already fail as n1 != n2 */ ++ result = 3; ++ for (size_t i = 0; i < nl; i++) { ++ if (_pa[i] ^ _pb[i]) { ++ /* ++ * If we don't mutate result here, dead code elimination ++ * we remove for loop. ++ */ ++ result = 4; ++ } + } + } + return result; +diff --git a/ldap/servers/slapd/slapi-plugin.h b/ldap/servers/slapd/slapi-plugin.h +index d37bc63..2c5c4ce 100644 +--- a/ldap/servers/slapd/slapi-plugin.h ++++ b/ldap/servers/slapd/slapi-plugin.h +@@ -5859,7 +5859,7 @@ char * slapi_ch_smprintf(const char *fmt, ...) + * \param n length in bytes of the content of p1 AND p2. + * \return 0 on match. 1 on non-match. 2 on presence of NULL pointer in p1 or p2. + */ +-int slapi_ct_memcmp( const void *p1, const void *p2, size_t n); ++int32_t slapi_ct_memcmp(const void *p1, const void *p2, size_t n1, size_t n2); + + /* + * syntax plugin routines +-- +1.8.3.1 +
