http://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=46097
--- Comment #25 from Jeffrey Walton <noloader at gmail dot com> 2010-10-22 05:52:07 UTC --- Created attachment 22112 --> http://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/attachment.cgi?id=22112 Test for Load/Unload Crash Attached is a test program similar to the program posted on http://gcc.gnu.org/ml/gcc-help/2010-10/msg00272.html. This program was modified and ignores shared objects which were known to crash on a load/unload sequence so the audit could be completed. In total, over ***250*** libraries failed the simple load/unload test. An alarming number of security libraries made the list. What if those security libraries were being used by SELinux and an attacker knew he could take out the subsystem because the development team or packager did not RTFM and observe ODR? I deeply and sincerely believe that software authors and packagers need GCC's help on this. RTFM is not cutting it. Jeffrey Walton /usr/lib/debug/lib/libcrypto.so.0.9.8 /usr/lib/debug/lib/libssl.so.0.9.8 /usr/lib/debug/usr/lib/libcrypto++.so.8.0.0 /usr/lib/debug/usr/lib/ssl/engines/lib4758cca.so /usr/lib/debug/usr/lib/ssl/engines/libaep.so /usr/lib/debug/usr/lib/ssl/engines/libatalla.so /usr/lib/debug/usr/lib/ssl/engines/libcapi.so /usr/lib/debug/usr/lib/ssl/engines/libchil.so
