Mike, I agree that the English/Western European industrial revolution was
unique among transformations (which, I would suggest is a better word than
revolution). I would also agree that what the medieval monks did was quite
different. They fitted the watermill and windmill into the existing
economic system without disturbing the system's general functioning. Their
society remained an essentially (late) feudal society, though fitted with a
few well placed machines which lightened the general burden of work.
The impacts of the watermill and windmill were, I believe, limited because
they brought about no major change in the resources available to society,
and perhaps also because the dominant ethic of the time was something like
staying out of harm's way, trying to keep what little you had, and leading a
godly life. It was best not to be obvious and push things. Wonders were
rather suspect at the time, and if you had something as technologically
marvelous as a water mill, you kept it to yourself. If others wanted to
copy it, that was fine, but you wouldn't try to flog it on them. And I'm
not so sure that technology really fascinated medieval people. They were
into building cathedrals, not machines.
(As for the poor Cathers, they managed to lead a godly life, but were of
course neither able to stay out of harm's way nor keep what they had.)
Other transformations were also quite limited. One thinks of the
transformation from hunting and gathering to agriculture, which must have
taken place sporadically here and there over hundreds of years if not
thousands as the game ran out. It would have intensified into a true
transformation when (if one believes Jane Jacobs) cities grew at trade
nodes, and larger populations needed to be fed. Landes argues that the
Chinese converted to intense rice-based agriculture when early warlords
needed large populations from which to draw their armies.
The industrial revolution experienced by Western Europe was based on a
tremendous and very rapid escalation of available resources which followed
from the discoveries and colonizations of the 16th, 17th and 18th Centuries.
Gold from South America, slaves from Africa, sugar from the Indies, cotton
from the American colonies, fish, furs and timber from what is now Canada,
spices from India, and vast new export markets, all represented an enormous
increase in the wealth of European powers. By the 19th Century, based on
the plunder of previous centuries, Europe had become a very different place,
wealthy and globally dominant. Then it became the turn of the United States
and Canada. In both countries, the opening of the west is story of pure
plunder. The United States used its military might to drive Indians off
their lands. In Canada we were more gentle, but to make way for the wheat
economy and the exploitation of resources such as oil, almost the entire
west (including the Mackenzie Valley) came under Indian treaty in a short
half century from 1871 to 1921.
Which leaves us with the question of where we can go from here. I believe
I've already made the argument that, try as it might, much of the world has
nowhere to go except perhaps downward. Though the rich world provides
foreign aid, I can't see it unplundering itself. I once did some arithmetic
which suggested that, to make a real difference in equalizing global
incomes, people in the rich world would have to take very drastic cuts in
income. About all that would do is make the whole world poor. We would all
go back to medieval times.
Ed
>Hi Ed,
>
> I agree with the role of plunder and greed in the English Industrial
> Revolution. They played a role. But it has not been true of all
> industrial revolutions. There was no plundering and greed in the medieval
> European industrial revolution. The driving actors were a religious order
> (the Cistercians) and a group of religous fanatics who thought that only
> the afterlife was real (the Cathars or Albigensians). I am not aware of
> greed and plunder in the medieval Chinese industrial revolution either.
> The Neoconfucianists had lot in common with the Cathars - a pretty austere
> lot, like the nonconformist protestants who drove the English Industrial
> Revolution of the 18th century.
>
> So, I return to my point - industrial revolutions have occurred in widely
> differing cultures and societies which did not share all of the
> characteristics of England in the 18th century, except the ones I
mentioned
> - warmer climate, agricultural revolution, ideology of perfection.
>
> Mike
>
> >Hi Mike,
> >
> >Let me try to restate my argument. Economic growth requires certain basic
> >conditions. I would not pretend to know what all of these are, but
stability
> >and the possibility of upward mobility would, I suspect, be among them. I
> >would also include the existence of capital; not only capital itself, but
> >the financial infrastructure through which capital can be mobilized. You
> >mention three other possibles in your comparison between England and
Korea,
> >namely improvements in agricultural technology, a warming climate and a
> >perfectionist ideology. The presence of "outgroups" such as the Jews or
> >Chinese may or may not be a factor.
> >
> >These factors were not lacking in China, Korea and Taiwan. These were
well
> >organized and, in some important respects, progressive, societies before
> >Europeans came with their gunboats.
> >
> >What I believe was historically unique about western Europe was both an
> >insatiable curiosity and an overwhelming greed. It is highly probable
that
> >the Chinese navigated the west coast of the Americas well before
Europeans
> >found the east coast. But that is all the Chinese did, navigate. They did
> >not set up colonies and plunder the lands they found. They didn't feel
they
> >had to. China was complete in itself. Colonizing and plundering the "New
> >World" was left to the Europeans, and the Chinese, the Koreans and many
> >other "complete in themselves" peoples ultimately paid dearly for it.
> >
> >In finding the New World, Europeans found treasure, which is how the
> >Mercantilist thinkers of the time saw it. The prosperity of Europe prior
to
> >the industrial revolution and in the early phases of industrialization
was
> >largely based on plunder. Plunder abroad plus plunder at home, such as
the
> >enclosures, generated the resources for industrialization. Once the
> >industrial revolution took off, it generated its own capital, and the
> >colonies, their products and their markets were then less needed. The
> >colonial powers of Europe relaxed their grip. What you have now is a
> >non-European world which consists of countries which have lost much of
what
> >they had, in which people are fighting for the few scraps which are left
> >(Africa), and countries which were able to retain much of what they had,
and
> >to adopt some of Europe's capability for plunder and accumulation (China,
> >Korea, Southeast Asia).
> >
> >Is it possible to have another era of explosive growth such as took place
in
> >Europe and North America during the past five hundred years? Perhaps in
the
> >rich world, but not likely in the poor. In the poor world there are far
too
> >many people and far too few resources. There is far too little wealth,
and
> >those who have it want to hold onto it, investing it in safe havens
outside
> >of the country.
> >
> >I spent a month in Jamaica recently, a country which gained independence
> >with the highest of hopes in 1962 and which, by global standards, is
still
> >relatively well off. But now you can almost feel it grinding down.
Roads,
> >hospitals, schools and public institutions in general are deteriorating,
and
> >there is not much that can be done to repair them. Anyone with an
education
> >wants to leave, and even the uneducated want to do so. Why? With nearly
> >three million people living on a mountainous island the size of Prince
> >Edward Island there is simply not enough for people to do. Many people
have
> >found a role in the drug trade. Jamaica has become a major transshipment
> >point for drugs for drugs moving from South America to the US. Others
make
> >a living as hold-up men and petty criminals. There simply are no
> >alternatives.
> >
> >By now you must be wondering if I see any possibilities at all. I am
> >thinking about it. I tend to reject grand scale solutions such as mass
> >education. For much of the world it is not affordable even if it were
> >acceptable. Pouring concrete across rivers, as the World Bank has done
or
> >trying to bail out corrupt and leaky regimes such as the IMF has, does
not
> >seem to have worked very well either. However, what I have seen in a few
> >rather grim and grimy places is the ability of people to look after
> >themselves as long as their circumstances don't become totally desperate.
A
> >little seed money, strategically placed, can make a big difference, as
can
> >building a community center around which people can organize activities
for
> >themselves and their children.
> >
> >Sorry about being so long winded, and best regards.
> >
> >Ed
> >
> >PS. I hope I'm still not being too much of a moving target or too post
hoc
> >ergo propter hoc in my arguments. I know that I tend to stretch things a
> >little, hoping people won't notice. I'm putting this on the list so that
> >others can beat me about the head and shoulders if they feel like it.
> >
> >> Hi Ed,
> >>
> >> We seem to have a moving target here. I entered this discussion on
your
> >> statement that English conditions that produced trade unionism were
> >unique.
> >> You gave reasons how other areas of the world differed in ways that
made
> >it
> >> unlikely for trade unions to emerge. I replied that the conditions you
> >> described in the other areas as inimical to trade union development
were
> >> also typical of the English environment in the early days of trade
> >unionism
> >> there.
> >>
> >> Now you seem to be talking about prospects for stability and
prosperity.
> >>
> >> RE: the Asian tigers etc and your statement that "presumably they must
> >have
> >> had the right conditions historically or how could they have got where
> >they
> >> are, is a post hoc ergo propter hoc argument and is therefore not
> >> acceptable. England was not under the occupation of a foreign power
for
> >> much of the modern period, like Korea was. Korea had no out group like
> >the
> >> Jews or non-conformists in Europe to provide a development yeast (nor
like
> >> the expatriate Chinese in Malaysia and Indonesia). Thailand has no
> >> outgroup of this kind either. Any past commercial traditions they
might
> >> have built on were extinguished by the Dutch, English, Spanish and
> >> Portuguese in the 16th and 17th centuries. (The Europeans basically
> >sailed
> >> in and used their cannon to usurp existing, native commercial and
trading
> >> systems - see McNeill). Yet they all underwent phenomenal economic and
> >> social development in little more than a generation. It took England
at
> >> least six. Relying on the idea of constants in conditions for
successful
> >> economic development goes against the evidence.
> >>
> >> Looking at the history of industrialism, it is interesting to note that
in
> >> cultures as different as those of medieval China and medieval Europe,
> >> commercial and industrial cultures with a sense of progress could
emerge
> >> (see Gimpel and McNeill). They had little of the factors commonly
thought
> >> to be essential to the English Industrial Revolution of the 18th
century.
> >> The only things they shared in common were improvements in agricultural
> >> technology, a warming climate and a perfectionist ideology. Everything
> >> else about them was different.
> >>
> >> Thus it seems that commercialism and industrialism can arise in a
variety
> >> of social and cultural circumstances, that the constants are relatively
> >few
> >> in number and can take varied forms e.g progressive ideology came from
> >> quite different sources - Cistercian monasticism in medieval Europe,
> >> Neo-confucianism in Medieval China and Protestant non-conformism in
Modern
> >> England.
> >>
> >> As to education, you can change that in a generation, as Europeans did
in
> >> the 19th century. Not for everyone, to begin with, but for enough to
make
> >> a difference. And with computer communications you could do it a lot
> >> quicker and without the huge capital outlay the Europeans found
necessary.
> >> India has trained a cadre of nuclear scientists capable of designing a
> >bomb
> >> in two generations and a cadre of computer engineers and programmers
(who
> >> wrote much of the code for the Soviet space program, I have heard) in
one.
> >> Numerically it has a huge middle class which one can unfancifully
compare
> >> with the English commercial and industrial class of the 17th and 18th
> >> centuries in its capacity to leaven the national loaf with notions of
> >> progress and social progressivism. Sure, it has a class ridden
society,
> >> but so did England (still does) and backward elements (the English had
the
> >> Highland Scots and the Irish, still living a medieval lifestyle into
this
> >> century in the form of the crofters. Highland armies invaded England
> >three
> >> times in the early modern period. It was their emigration to the
Canadian
> >> Maritimes and the persistence of that culture that has much to do with
> >that
> >> areas inability to transition successfully into the industrial way of
> >life.)
> >>
> >> Africa had Great Zimbabwe and Timbuktu - thriving medieval, commercial,
> >> urban cultures. I don't see any reason why they can't do it again now
> >that
> >> the Europeans are off their backs.
> >>
> >> Mike
> >>
> >> >Mike, the difference between us may be that I see the glass as half
> >empty.
> >> >The industrial revolution required a tremendous build up of capital
but
> >also
> >> >a tremendous build up of labour. Because it was so heavily involved
in
> >the
> >> >new processes of production, and because of the fluidity of society
> >compared
> >> >with, say, feudal society, labour was able to move into a position to
> >demand
> >> >a larger share of the rapidly growing product. I would argue that in
> >> >Canada, the US and western Europe, it was able to get this share
because,
> >> >ultimately, its demands did not diminish the wealth of the
capitalists.
> >> >Everyone's wealth grew.
> >> >
> >> >Various trade-offs and saw-offs occurred. Workers recognized that
they
> >had
> >> >an interest in keeping the machine going and bought into the system.
It
> >> >became a system of common, not opposed, interests. The political
process
> >> >became liberal and democratized, able to smooth out such rough spots
as
> >> >continued to exist, etc.
> >> >
> >> >You mention Taiwan, South Korea and China. I would see Taiwan and
South
> >> >Korea as already part of the rich world and China as getting there.
> >They
> >> >appear to have undergone radical transformations, but I'm not sure
they
> >were
> >> >all that radical. The seeds for what they were able to accomplish
were
> >> >probably already there, much like they were in 18th Century England
and
> >19th
> >> >Century Germany. The same is probably true of other parts of Asia;
for
> >> >example, the "Tigers" which have lost some of their teeth, but which
are
> >now
> >> >growing them back.
> >> >
> >> >However, I don't much possibility of the same kinds of things
happening
> >in
> >> >much of the rest of Asia or in Sub-Saharan Africa. The conditions are
> >> >simply not there or, if they are, the politics are simply too
repressive
> >or
> >> >too chaotic to permit them to flourish. As I mentioned in a previous
> >> >posting, India strikes me as being too rigid. There is simply not
enough
> >> >wealth to go around, so those who have it cling to it tenaciously,
using
> >> >ancient and venerable systems of caste and inter-ethnic and
> >inter-religious
> >> >rivalries to buttress their positions. It is a system so tied in
knots
> >that
> >> >any mobility is virtually impossible. Sub-Saharan Africa is simply
too
> >> >poor, too chaotic and too violent. One can blame much of this on
> >European
> >> >colonialism, but whether it was that or something indigenous doesn't
> >really
> >> >matter when we are dealing with peoples chances of having better lives
in
> >> >the world of today.
> >> >
> >> >I don't really see the prospect of tremendous technological change
> >forcing
> >> >tremendous social and economic change. Unlike the technological
change
> >that
> >> >took place 200 years ago, technological change today is essentially
> >labour
> >> >eliminating. It means that one person and a computer can now do the
work
> >of
> >> >six people a few decades ago. Participation in the use of such
> >technology
> >> >requires a much higher level of education than was needed for machines
> >that
> >> >produced textiles or even automobiles. If the poor world were to use
> >such
> >> >technology as a basis for growth, a much higher investment in
education
> >> >would be needed, and this would not likely be affordable even if it
were
> >> >seen as politically desirable by the governing elites. Peace, order
and
> >> >good government would also be needed, and this is something that is
not
> >> >abundant in much of the world.
> >> >
> >> >So, I'm pessimistic, but supported by some evidence that the rich are
> >> >getting richer and the poor are falling behind.
> >> >
> >> >Ed
> >> >
> >> >> Ed,
> >> >>
> >> >> The more you describe what you believe to have been the situation
> >> >> historically in Europe, the more I see parallels in contemporay East
> >Asia,
> >> >> India and Latin America. Tremendous technological change forcing
> >> >> tremendous economic and social change, and, instead of the
philosophes
> >the
> >> >> Modern people in their own countries and what they see of the West
on
> >the
> >> >> TV screens. And political elites going with the flow - see the coup
in
> >> >> Asia, the political changes in South Korea and Taiwan and, of
course,
> >the
> >> >> Deng Zaoping reforms in China.
> >> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
>
>
>
