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GLOBAL FUTURES BULLETIN #87
---01 Jul, 1999--- ISSN
1328-5157
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Institute for Global Futures Research (IGFR).
P.O. Box 263E, Earlville, QLD 4870, Australia.
E-mail: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>.
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This bulletin is for the use of IGFR members and GFB subscribers
only and is not to be re-posted.
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INDEX
. Environmental exodus
. On environmental refugees
. Erratum
. Extent of migrant flows (Migrant flows - Part 2)
. Global warming and Ice Ages
*
*
ENVIRONMENTAL EXODUS
Jennifer Kent
Some of your data regarding our work on projections and estimates
for environmental refugees (GFB #86 [1] ) was a little inaccurate.
In particular 'Myers and Kent estimated 200m refugees from rising
seas by 2010!' In fact, this projection was for 2050.
The projection of environmental refugees was 50 million by 2010 and
at least 200 million by 2050, including [2]:
Bangladesh 26m
China 73m
Egypt 12m
India 20m
Island States 1m
ag dis areas* 50m
Total 182m
* agriculturally dislocated areas
We thus estimated a total by 2050 of 182 million. There will possibly
also be 4m environmental refugees in Indonesia, 6-11m in Nigeria,
and 20m in Vietnam. Total, '212 million, or say, as a conservative
minimal figure, 200 million.' [3]
(Note - there is a slight inconsistency with Table IX.1 stating a total
of 173m which was a typographical error. Please interpret this as
182m).
This also explains 'the apparent discrepancy of Myers' tentative
projections 200m from rising seas by 2010 and 150m total
environmental refugees by 2050.' [4] The 200m refers to 2050,
(Myers and Kent 1995) which is an *upward revision* of estimates of
150m in 1993 [5].
*
[1] 'Environmental refugees' Global Futures Bulletin #86, 15 June
1999
[2] Myers N, Kent J, 'Environmental exodus - an emergent crisis in
the global arena', Climate Institute, Washington DC, 1995 p143-148
[3] Myers N, Kent J p149
[4] 'Environmental refugees' op cit
[5] Myers, Norman Bioscience no43 pp752-761 1993
*
{3. climate change; 24. disaster}
*
*
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ON ENVIRONMENTAL REFUGEES
Janet Swain
Further to your recent article on environmental refugees [1], the 1999
World Disasters Report mentions that 1998 was the first year that, at
25 million, the level of environmental refugees exceeded those
displaced by war.
It also noted that
- 40 of the world's 50 fastest growing cities are in earthquake zones
- 96% of deaths from natural disasters occur in developing countries
- 10 million people live in low-lying coastal areas prone to flooding.
*
[1] 'Environmental refugees' Global Futures Bulletin #86, 15 June 99
*
COMMENT
In our review of environmental refugees, the effects of earthquakes
were not mentioned.
The anthropogenic components of 'natural' disasters need to be
considered. While earthquakes may be considered 'natural', the
decision to build cities in earthquake-prone areas is not. Likewise, a
significant component of global warming, climate change,
desertification, and rising seas would not be considered 'natural', but
rather 'anthropogenic'.
If we assume the ratio of people in developing to developed countries
as 5:1, one would expect 80% of deaths from natural disasters to
occur in the developing world. At 96%, a person in the developing
world is five times as likely to die in a natural disaster as a person in
the developed world. This is due in part to inferior infrastructure,
preparedness, emergency services, and poverty generally.
10 million people prone to coastal flooding is substantially different
from the possible 200 million at risk suggested by Norman Myers [1],
indicating a dramatic increase by 2050 in areas at risk due to rising
seas and climate change.
It is imperative to acknowledge the potential for compounding
factors. The low-lying delta region in Bangladesh is a classic
example.
- flooding is primarily due to high rates of siltation due to soil
erosion, deforestation etc upriver.
- flooding is likely to be exacerbated by climate change - climate
extremes which can intensify monsoon rains.
- flooding can be exacerbated yet further by rising sea levels.
- poverty in the region both induces relatively high birth rates, and
limits the capacity of communities to deal with the increasing threat
of fatal flooding.
*
[1] Myers, Norman; Jennifer Kent 'Environmental Exodus' Climate
Institute 1995 p143-148
*
{24. disaster}
*
*
*
ERRATUM
In 'Environmental refugees' (GFB#86) it was quoted 'Estimates
suggest 100-400 million environmental refugees could result from
global-warming induced rising seas and resultant permanent
flooding..' This estimate range should also have included refugees
from global-warming induced drought.
*
*
*
MIGRANT FLOWS - (PART 2)
EXTENT OF MIGRANT FLOWS
Total number of international migrants is estimated at 125m,
refugees at 20m, and internal migrants at 1 billion.
*Guestimates* of total flows of migrants/an globally 1999 (million):
to developed to developing total
labour migrants (6mo+) 1.0m* 0.5m 1.5m
undocumented 0.75 1.25 2.0m
official 1.6m 0.4m 2.0m
total 2.85m 2.15m 5.5m
* majority between EU countries
The total number of international refugees is estimated at 20 million.
The total flow of the number of new refugees varies considerably
from year to year - possibly averaging 0.5m/an to developed
countries, and 1.0m/an to developing countries ?
There are an estimated 31 million medium to longterm refugees
originating *within* countries (internally displaced) [1]:
Africa 16m
Asia 7m
Europe 5m
South America 3m
Annual official migrant intake ('000s) [2]
1996 ratio to population peak
Germany 708 (1:118) 1208 (1992)
Canada 226 (1:134) 256 (1993)
Australia 99 (1:186) 145 (1989)
UK 216 (1:270) 206 (1995)
US 916 (1:299) 1827 (1991)
Japan 228 (1:348) 267 (1992)
France 74 (1:794) 116 (1992)
For the majority of OECD countries, official migrant intake peaked
in the early 1990s.
Statistics on migrant inflow can be deceiving because they overlook
migrant outflow. For example, in 1996 Germany had an inflow of
708,000, but an outflow of 559,000, leaving a net increase of only
149,000.
In the EU, a large % of migrants are from other EU countries (esp.
Lux. and Belgium). In the UK, the top two source countries are the
US (20%) and Australia (12%) and another 20% from South Africa
(mainly white), NZ, and Canada. (An Indian would have 1/2000 the
chance of gaining residency in UK as an Australian).
Net migration/an as % of pop. and natural pop. increase %1996 [3]
net mig. nat pop increase total pgrate*
New Zealand 1.2 0.8 2.0 (1.09)
Luxembourg 0.9 0.45 1.35 (1.07)
Canada 0.8 0.55 1.35 (0.85)
Australia 0.63 0.7 1.33 (1.06)
Germany 0.5 -0.2 0.3 (0.27)
US 0.3 0.55 0.85 (0.79)
Switzerland 0.2 0.28 0.48 (0.67)
France 0.12 0.34 0.46 (0.33)
UK 0.08 0.18 0.26 (0.09)
Japan -0.05 0.22 0.17 (0.22)
*pgrate - official population growth rate 1995-2000, UN Population
Div. Note that these projections do not seem to correlate with either
'natural population increase' or 'total'.
% migrant population to total (1996) [4]
Luxembourg 34.1 (mostly EU origin)
Australia 21.7 (26% NZ, UK)
Switzerland 19.0 (60% EU)
Canada 16.7
Germany 8.9
France 6.3 (1990)
Sweden 6.0
US 4.7 (1990) (10.0 [5])
UK 3.4
Italy 2.0
Japan 1.1
(Note major discrepancy in data for US)
In 1998 there were ~35 million foreign workers (labour migrants),
and growing at almost 1 million/an [6].
A report for 1993 suggests illegal or undocumented migrants made
up the largest component of migrants :
Migrants - (people not living in country of birth) 1993 (millions) [7]
labour migrants 25-30m
undocumented 30m
refugees 18.2m
other 24m
total 97-102m
(Note - the above refers to totals, not flows/an)
Undocumented migrants to developed countries represent approx 25-
35% of all migrants to those countries [8], and may total around
750,000 people annually.
The destination of the majority of undocumented migrants is
developing countries (not, as one might presume, developed
countries).
The number of illegal/undocumented migrants to the US was
estimated at 200,000/an in 1991 [9]. Half of these were from China.
Current estimates are 250-300,000/an [10].
Estimates of the current number of illegal/undocumented migrants to
Europe are 300-500,000/an [11].
In 1980 there were 20,000 asylum seekers (applying for refugee
status) in Europe. This figure had climbed to 560,000 by 1992 [12].
Of the 340,000 Bosnians who fled to Germany in the mid 1990s,
~250,000 have now returned or resettled elsewhere [13].
There were an estimated 20 million political refugees in 1994,
increasing from six million in 1978 [14].
Asylum seekers ('000s) [15]
1987 1992 1997
Australia 11.4 16.2 7.7
Canada 35.0 37.7 23.9
Europe 172.0 684.0 280.6
US 26.1 104.0 79.8
total 244.5 841.9 392.4
Note: perhaps only one third of these were granted refugee status, and
this ratio is decreasing due to more restrictive criteria [16].
The table reflects surges in asylum seekers resulting from armed
conflict (eg Balkans) increasing migrant/refugee flows by 25% or
more.
(PART 3 of Migrant Flows - next issue, Global Futures Bulletin #88)
*
[1] Stalker, Peter 'The work of strangers' International Labor
Organisation 1994, cited in New Internationalist Sept 1999, p18
[2] 'Trends in International Migration' SOPEMI Annual Report
1998, OECD
[3] 'Trends in International Migration' op cit p25
[4] 'Trends in International Migration' op cit p224
[5] The Economist 'Workers of the world' Vol 345 No 8041
[6] International Labor Organisation www.ilo.org
[7] Lohrmann, Reinhard 'The need for enhanced international
cooperation in addressing environmental issues' Intergovernmental
Negotiating Committee for the Convention on Desertification (INCD)
Spain Feb 1994.
[8] Schatzer, Peter 'International migration: issues and policies' UN
Economic Commission for Europe, Budapest 1998
[9] Papdemetriou, Demetrious 'International migration in North
America' UN Population Fund, Geneva 1991.
[10] Schatzer, Peter op cit
[11] Schatzer, Peter op cit
[12] Meissner, Doris 'Managing Migrations' Foreign Policy No 86
1992, pp66-85.
[13] Schatzer, Peter op cit
[14] 'Refugees increasing' Global Futures Bulletin #3 Jan 01, 1996
[15] 'Trends in International Migration' SOPEMI Annual Report
1998, OECD p223
[16] 'Trends in International Migration' op cit p22
*
{23. global parameters, scenarios, new dimensions}
*
*
*
GLOBAL WARMING AND ICE AGES
High profile scientist Nigel Calder warned in 1975 'The threat of a
new ice age must now stand alongside nuclear war as a likely source
of wholesale death and misery for mankind' [1]. It was thought that
the new ice age would be brought on by pollution which blocked
sunlight.
Despite the trend toward greenhouse gas-induced global warming, it
appears Earth is also at the beginning of a new Ice Age (natural
cycle). This begs many questions such as:
- what causes Ice Ages ?
- what is the rate of the alleged impending Ice Age compared to the
rate of anthropogenic global warming ?
- are Ice Ages to be regarded as catastrophic regarding biodiversity,
or do they actually stimulate biodiversity ? (in the long run).
- would Deep Ecologists recommend humankind adapt to the long
cycles of Ice Ages, or should we consider climate control measures
(such as controlled greenhouse mechanisms) to avert an impending
Ice Age ?
- to what extent do Ice Ages impact on climate change ?
We must remember that Ice Ages take thousands of years to complete
a cycle while anthropogenic global warming is taking place on a
timescale of 100-200 years, more than negating the effects of an
impending Ice Age, and probably too fast for many ecosystems to
adapt.
Forests in Canada are significantly more diverse than forests in
northern Europe. It is thought that this is because the previously
diverse northern European forests were less able to recover (migrate
back) after glaciation because the Alps constituted a barrier. This has
implications for GHG-induced climate change today, and the survival
prospects for habitats migrating toward the poles and to higher
elevations.
There are currently suggestions that global warming may be due to a
factor two increase in the strength of the sun's magnetic field over the
past 100 years [2]. Eugene Parker of the University of Chicago
suggests it could account for both global warming and increased CO2
atmospheric concentration, and suggests more research must be done
'before embarking on drastic, perilous and perhaps misguided plans
for global action' [3].
Although there is a correlation between increased solar magnetism
and the strength of solar radiation reaching Earth, a precise
mechanism that would cause global warming and increased CO2
concentration is unknown. According to Occam's Razor, models that
address obvious possible causes (eg anthropogenic emissions) are
more likely to be valid than models that involve obscure possible
causes.
It is as if all the models and evidence regarding global warming due
to anthropogenic CO2 emissions were being discarded or ignored.
'Perilous' from Parker's point of view refers to estimated costs to
implement CO2 reduction programs, and the impact this may have
on the economy (US, world economy).
While Parker describes CO2 emission cuts as 'perilous', advocates
would cite the Precautionary Principle and 'No Regrets' principle -
that 'no cuts' is likely to be the riskier option.
For example, weather-related damage is said to have reached record
levels in 1998 of US$92b, up from the previous record of US$60b in
1996. A conservative estimate might ascribe US$30b to global
warming. A number of the world's largest insurance and reinsurance
companies now take the position that CO2 emissions need to be
stabilised. (Note, one would have to factor in both inflation and an
expected increase in the costs of weather-related damage in
accordance with rising GDP or expanded infrastructure).
Emission reduction advocates suggest that such programs should not
be regarded as a 'cost' but an 'investment' in reducing waste and
stimulating new energy-saving technologies, which will pay off in the
medium term future (10-20 yrs), and would deliver the economy in a
better state than a 'no cuts' or 'minimal cuts' policy.
If, indeed, increased solar magnetism and solar radiation were
responsible for CO2 concentration and global warming, it may be
even more imperative to reduce anthropogenic emissions to minimise
any exacerbation ! One wonders whether we could be so unlucky as
to have this natural phenomenon occuring (solar magnetic-induced
global warming) in the last 100 years, presumably the first time since
420,000 bp (before present) when CO2 concentration was last at the
current level of 365ppm.
It is necessary to watch for studies that undermine the political will to
stabilise CO2 emissions, which may be distortions of fact and
generated by vested corporate and political interests. On the
otherhand we must encourage free scientific inquiry that may
challenge the consensus.
Ice Ages (glacial epochs) bp - before present
- 2.5b-570m yrs bp Proterozoic period witnessed a number of
Ice Ages (each lasting 20-50m yrs ?)
- 570m yrs bp Infracambrian period (lasting 20-50m yrs)
- 438-505m yrs bp Ordovician period (lasting 20-50m yrs)
- 280m yrs bp between Late Carboniferous and Early
Permian epochs (lasting 10m yrs)
- 1.6m - 10,000 yrs bp Pleistocene epoch with four main Ice Ages,
possibly up to 14 lesser period so of
glaciaton.
16thC - 19th C ad Little Ice Age peaking in 1750
Four main ice ages of the Pleistocene epoch:
- Gunz/Nebraska 2 - 1.3 m yrs bp
- Mindel/Kansas
- Riss/Illinois
- Wurm/Wisconsin 110,000-20,000 yrs bp
Low sea levels due to glaciation allowed intercontinental migration of
species including humans.
For the last 2m years, Ice Ages or glacial epochs, can be considered
the norm. We are now in a relatively warm interglacial period. The
last interglacial (warm) period lasted only 20,000 years.
World climate prior to the Pleistocene epoch (1.6m yrs bp - 10,000
yrs bp) was mostly free of snow and ice even at the poles. The
climate of the last 1.6m years appears to be an anomally, with
relatively rapid fluctuations.
Mean global temperature during Ice Ages (peak glaciation) are 5
degrees C below present, which is 10 degrees below ancient norms.
A drop of 4 degrees C global mean temperature is said to be sufficient
to trigger an Ice Age [4].
[Causes of Ice Ages and CO2 macrohistory in next issue GFB #88].
*
[1] New Scientist 1975 cited in Global Futures Bulletin #5 01 Feb
1996.
[2] Rutherford Appleton Laboratory, Oxford, UK
[3] BBC Online, 03 June 1999.
[4] 'Global warming and energy' Global Futures Bulletin #3 01 Jan
1996
*
{3. climate change}
*
*
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The Global Futures Bulletin is produced by the Institute for Global
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Global Futures Bulletin #87
Institute for Global Futures Research (IGFR) Sat, 10 Jul 1999 11:58:00 -0700
