Long file, but may be of interest to some.
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Date: Tue, 6 Jan 1998 17:03:16 -0800 (PST)
From: Sid Shniad <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: LABOR-L <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
Progressive Economists' Network <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Social Europe?
LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE November 1997
TAMING THE UNIONS
The mirage of a social Europe
The European Council's extraordinary meeting on employment, to be held
on 21 November, will provide a good indication of the way the European
community is taking shape. This meeting was arranged at the Amsterdam
summit in June as a special favour to Lionel Jospin, in return for an
assurance that he would accept the budgetary stability pact: a meeting that�
is not required to produce results, in exchange for a firm commitment to
toe the Bonn line on the budget.
The French government has nevertheless taken the courageous step of
opting for a 35-hour week by the year 2000. The announcement has been
greeted with horror by employers and the right-wing opposition, but the
measure is part of an attempt to fight unemployment. Officially, this now�
stands at three million, but a disturbing report just published (1) puts th�
e
real number out of work or working part-time at seven million. In the rest�
of Europe, Mr Jospin's brave decision has so far met with no response
except in Italy, where Romano Prodi's centre-left government has also
undertaken to introduce a 35-hour week in 2001, in return for support
from the Communist Refoundation Party.
Elsewhere, reducing the working week means part-time work. In the
Netherlands, for example, 37.3% of the workforce is employed part-time.
There, as in the United Kingdom, this means that the official unemployment�
figures do not reflect the real scale of the problem. Any suggestion of a�
reduction in working hours without a commensurate drop in wages is
received at best with serious reservations and at worst with outright
condemnation by most European Union governments, and with implacable
hostility by the employers' organisations and in financial circles. The
remedies for unemployment adopted almost everywhere and recommended
by the European Commission are altogether different. They can be summed
up in one word: flexibility. Flexibility in wages, in working conditions, i�
n
systems of social protection. But not in salaries paid to top executives or�
returns on investments.
Once this policy is accepted, the economy, the currency and the fate of the�
working population will all be market-led and run on autopilot, to use a
favourite Bundesbank formula. If this approach is confirmed at the
Luxembourg summit, we shall know that the European social community is
destined to remain a poor relation in the new Europe and, incidentally, tha�
t
Mr Jospin was sold a pup at Amsterdam.
In the face of this neoliberal consensus on a new version of the iron rule,�
the counter-offensives mounted by the employees' organisations appear
somewhat primitive. The top people's trade unionism practised by the
European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) in Brussels is no substitute
for coordinated social struggle among the member states.
(1) Henry Guaino, Robert Castel, Jean-Paul Fitoussi, Jacques Freyssinet,
"Ch�mage, le cas fran�ais", a report from the General Commission for th�
e
Plan submitted on 20 October 1997.
B.C.
by CORINNE GOBIN
*The European Union establishment is becoming increasingly vocal on the
subject of employment. To prove that it is just as much on their minds as�
the single currency and the budgetary stability pact, the heads of state an�
d
government of the Fifteen decided at the Amsterdam European Council on
16 and 17 June 1997 to hold an extraordinary meeting in Luxembourg on
21 November to consider the problem. The moment the summit was
announced, a number of them, including the Belgian prime minister, Jean-
Luc Dehaene, hastened to forestall any possible misunderstanding. The
European leaders, he said, were simply going to "talk" about employment.
Governments could not create jobs by decree. The most they could do was
provide the framework for business and industry to create them. The same
was true at European level and he had always maintained that it was not
really a good idea to hold a special summit on employment. It would
merely raise hopes that were bound to be disappointed (1).
When the Amsterdam European Council "reaffirms the importance it
attaches to employment", workers have every reason to be suspicious. The
sole objective, fast becoming an obsession, is to increase "flexibility",�
leaving employers free to offer insecure and ill-paid jobs instead of good�
ones. True, one of the Union's objectives under the Treaty of Amsterdam is�
"to promote a high level of employment" but another, more important one
is to encourage "a high degree of competitiveness and convergence of
economic performance". It has nothing to say about the quality of the
employment to be "promoted" or about stability, social protection or
guaranteeing work-related social rights. On the contrary! It states that th�
e
workforce must be "adaptable" and the labour markets capable of reacting
quickly to economic change. The resolution adopted at that summit
recommends that, to encourage the "creation of more jobs ... social
security schemes should be modernised ... and systems of taxation and
social protection adjusted to promote employment".
And the reality behind these seemingly innocuous phrases? Deregulation of�
all work-related social rights, docking employees' indirect earnings in the�
form of employers' social security contributions which are to go back into�
the employers' pockets and, eventually, reducing social security to the bar�
e
minimum required for subsistence. The policy document issued by the
European Commission on 1 October in preparation for the extraordinary
European Council meeting in Luxembourg is absolutely clear on the
subject. It is entirely preoccupied with "flexibility", "employability",
"mobility", part-time working and -- as the crowning touch -- reorganising�
education to meet the "needs" of the labour market.
Democratic "deconstruction"
Thus, in the name of employment, the Community authorities are
continuing to pursue the very economic policies that for more than twenty�
years have been responsible for creating a large pool of unemployment,
destroying the security and unity of the workforce, reducing the power of�
the unions in Europe and offering investors huge incentives, to the
detriment of wage-earners. This ultra-conservative campaign has carried all�
before it. The process of dismantling democracy, tried out initially in the�
member states in the form of austerity plans and orchestrated in masterly�
fashion at European level in the 1985 plan for the internal market, has
encountered no genuine, concerted opposition from the workers'
organisations.
And yet the idea of establishing trade union structures on a European scale�
goes back a long way, to 1945 and the period of post-war reconstruction.
The unions were deeply affected by the conflicts of the cold war, notably�
the issue of whether Europe should accept American aid under the
Marshall Plan. Opinion was divided and attitudes to the plans for a
European community were largely subsumed into the wider context of the
fight for or against communism. For the leaders of the communist unions
these plans represented a political and economic attack on the Soviet
Union, while the social democrat and Christian democrat union leaders saw�
them as an instrument for improving the workers' standard of living and
dissuading them from any revolutionary ideas they might harbour. They
also thought the Community would pave the way for a stable democracy in
which the non-communist unions would enjoy a privileged position as the
recognised voice of labour in negotiations with the political authorities. �
In
their eyes, therefore, the building of Europe would be closely linked with�
democracy.
Whenever a new supra-national or European institution was established,
the social democrat and Christian democrat wings of the union movement
both sent permanent representatives to the new institutions. Examples were�
the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), a
forerunner of the OECD, set up to administer the Marshall plan; the
Benelux Economic Union; the Ruhr Control Area; the European
Productivity Agency; the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC).
This pattern was to be repeated in 1958 when the six original member
states established the European Economic Community. However, the union
leaders were soon to realise that another ethos was at work in this
organisation. Their privileged position as negotiators was no longer
recognised by most of the new European politicians and they were to be
increasingly excluded from the decision-making process established by the�
Treaty of Rome, under which the Council of Ministers was responsible for
the day-to-day running of Community affairs. Their aim was now to
recover lost ground (2) by combining their forces to better effect on a
Western European scale.
The result was the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), founded
in 1973 and originally comprising all the social democrat unions of Western�
Europe, very soon to be joined by their Christian democrat counterparts
and even by the communist unions, as they gradually distanced themselves
from Moscow. The ETUC operated a very open recruitment policy,
accepting many of the organisations representing more specialised groups
and, after 1995, unions from a number of Eastern European countries. Its
membership now extends to 61 national confederations from 28 countries,
as well as 14 European federations representing different sectors. The last�
major body to remain outside the organisation is the largest French union,�
the Conf�d�ration g�n�rale du travail (CGT), which has been vetoed �
by the
other French unions. The ETUC can thus claim to represent, through the
national unions, some 54 million individual members.
This regional organisation, run on a more or less unitarian basis, is certa�
inly
a step forward for European and international trade unionism, which has
too often been divided, but it is clear that it has not yet succeeded in
shifting the balance of forces in the European Union, which is still tipped�
in
favour of the employers and the policy-makers. Nor has it stopped the
gradual erosion of union power at national level. Why is this?
Out of touch at the top
Trade unionism as practised in the European community is still very much a�
matter for the leaders and experts. It operates at the top, and no serious�
attempt has so far been made to mobilise the international membership at
grass roots level. This is still very much in the realms of virtual reality�
(3).
Union leaders prided themselves on the privileged position they enjoyed in�
their own countries and imagined that things would be the same in a wider�
political arena. They saw themselves as the personal embodiment of union
power and thought they could single-handedly avoid the need to carry on
the struggle in several countries at once.
As a result, European trade unionism amounted to no more than a series of�
mini-embassies to the EEC and then to the Union institutions. The unions
developed a symbiotic relationship with this new environment and the
prevailing technocratic ethos in Brussels and Luxembourg, where all
business was conducted between top people and experts. They failed to
establish the necessary links between the various levels of the national
union hierarchy and the European organisation and made no attempt to
foster in the workforce an active sense of themselves as Europeans. It was�
felt that the spread of European works councils in firms with
establishments in more than one country could, in time, encourage the
emergence of an active transnational movement.
Thus, for almost forty years, union representatives in the centres of power�
where Community decisions are taken have been working in complete
political isolation. There were no European political parties as such and t�
his
deprived them of the political links that had proved so essential at nation�
al
level. Cut off from the grass roots and with no transnational reference
points to guide them, they gradually -- to a greater or lesser extent --
absorbed the ideology of the Eurocrats. The process was accelerated by the�
rising wave of neoliberal ideas within the social democrat and Christian
democrat parties. An additional factor over the last ten years or so has be�
en
the European union movement's growing financial dependence on the
Community institutions. Jacques Delors played a key role in this new
development during his ten-year term as president of the Commission
(1985-1994).
Political power in Europe is essentially technocratic. As soon as states ha�
ve
reached an agreement in the Council of Ministers, the European authorities�
use their administrative powers to defuse any potential conflict.
Government is no longer concerned with people but with things, and
debate is replaced by discussion of technical rules. All the natural outlet�
s
for social conflict are blocked by the irresistible advance of the joint
management culture. This is what is happening in the European Parliament,�
where the procedure of co-decision with the Council in various areas is
steadily undermining the separation of powers.
The same process is at work in the methods used to consult the unions.
They are, in fact, being told how to think. The "European social dialogue",�
so dear to Mr Delors, has therefore served mainly to persuade union
leaders over a period of ten years gradually to accept the constraints of t�
he
market -- in other words, to embrace the policies of austerity,
competitiveness, privatisation and flexibility. This is what social partner�
ship
(4) means at European level.
In June 1997 the ETUC ratified a framework agreement with the European
employers' representatives on part-time work. The union succeeded in
getting the principle of non-discrimination between the conditions of
employment of full-time and part-time employees incorporated into the
agreement. But at what a cost! Both parties are required to do all they can�
to promote part-time work. In these circumstances, even if the principle of�
non-discrimination was established, it would only make sense if it was
applied right across the board, that is to say if it included social securi�
ty
rights. But these are entirely a matter for the member states and any
decision taken in the Council of Ministers must be unanimous!
The systematic encouragement of part-time work -- with pay to match --
undoubtedly contributes to the impoverishment of workers. It also consigns�
to oblivion the unions' hard-won status, achieved by more than a century of�
struggle, as agents in the redistribution of wealth. If working hours were�
reduced with no loss of wages, employers would be obliged to pay their
workers more and their shareholders less. Can the unions afford to allow
themselves to be reduced to the position of overseeing the impoverishment�
of the workforce? (5) Within the ETUC, the delegates of the Netherlands
and Italian unions and the French CFDT are the most vociferous supporters�
of the new flexible trade unionism.
Ever since the Treaty of Rome was signed forty years ago, the European
trade union movement has been awaiting the advent of a European social
community. The ETUC is convinced that the construction of a European
community must be for the good in the end, no matter how hard the road
may be, and is giving qualified support to EMU (Economic and Monetary
Union). But it is also seeking a review of the priorities, to ensure that t�
he
social aspects of European affairs are given as much time and attention as�
the economic and financial aspects. Its original commitment to the building�
of Europe has constantly inhibited its union reflexes whenever collective�
rights were challenged by the grand plan for an ultra-liberal Europe. So, t�
he
private sector has been able to take over with impunity, and without any
significant opposition from the unions in areas of the public sector where�
the profit motive had been held in check to ensure that each individual
could exercise his full rights as a citizen.
It is hopelessly naive to imagine that a little social oasis could one day �
be
created in a desert dominated by market forces and free trade. Already
EMU, with its criteria and management methods, together with the
budgetary stability pact signed in Amsterdam, is having the same impact in�
Europe as structural adjustment plans in the third world. It is keeping the�
workforce in order.
A social Europe is inextricably bound up with the struggle for democratic�
government. In all the countries of Europe, social rights were gradually
recognised at the end of the 19th century after a long struggle for effecti�
ve
political democracy. In the same way, a democratic Europe cannot be built�
by soft talk and tinkering with the treaties.
* Researcher at the Institute for European Studies at the Free University o�
f
Brussels, where she submitted a thesis in 1996 on the history of relations�
between the trade unions and the European Community authorities from
1958-91.
(1) Le Soir, Brussels, 21-22 June 1997.
(2) The unions had in fact exercised considerable influence in the ECSC but�
their power in the member states was effectively eroded when political
authority passed from the states to the Community and then to the Union.
(3) Could the Renault-Vilvorde affair be the first sign of transnational
mobilisation? See Corinne Gobin and Jean-Marie Pernot, "Le syndicalisme
europ�en : ce grand inconnu", Politique, La Revue, no 5, July-September�
1997.
(4) The Commission's recognition of the unions as partners is highly
ambiguous. They are increasingly being consulted as experts in social
matters and not as the official representatives of social and political cla�
ims.
(5) A substantial collective reduction in working hours with no loss of
wages was one of the ETUC's key claims in 1976.
Translated by Barbara Wilson
