-----Original Message-----
From: Jay Hanson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: Futurework <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Date: Friday, July 31, 1998 10:04 PM
Subject: Re: BUT WHAT DOES IT MEAN?
>Let's pretend for a moment, that we had the resources to minimize global
>human suffering. What would we do?
>
>I would expect to see at least three different groups of effort:
>
>#1. A "scientific" group attempts to understand the way things are. (This
>is the kind of stuff I like to think about.)
>
>#2. A "normative" group works on ideology. (This is the kind of stuff Brad
>likes to think about.)
>
>#3. A "tactical" group utilizes the product of the other two to formulate
an
>action plan.
>
>Jay
I find Jay Hanson's position a bit contradictory. On the one hand, he argues
that we are all going to hell in a handbasket, and yet, on the other, he
suggests the involvement of "systems scientists" in the analysis of "the big
picture" and the development of of an action plan that would save "whole
enchilada". During my career, I have been involved in several "big picture"
social and environmental impact studies, and would suggest that there is
absolutely nothing less frustrating than trying to understand "big
pictures". No matter how objective one tries to be, one always approaches
the "picture" with preconceived notions, perspectives and illusions. To
undertake the analysis with some efficiency, one starts by distinguishing
the really important things from the unimportant, only to find, half way
through, that the important isn't important and the unimportant or
unexpected is. Meanwhile, one is dealing with an enormously complex moving
picture into which new events are forever intruding themselves.
But having said that, I would agree with Jay's main point: that we are
pushing against the limits of the Earth's ability to sustain us, a point
which many have made, including an economist, Herman Daly.
We are not the first people to have pushed up against the limits of
sustainability. Many peoples have done so, but when this has happened in
the past people have usually always found another place to go. If people
depleted their water table, they might have died, but if they were strong
enough, they would simply have take over someone else's water table and have
them die instead. This is no longer possible. We are all using a common
water table now.
I for one have serious doubts about our ability to remain confined within
our ecological limits. We are an imperfect animal, not nearly as rational
as some would like us to be. There are too many of us now, and we are
greedy and self-serving. And as Jay and many others have pointed out, we
are moving from an energy surplus to an energy deficit position too rapidly.
In my opinion, the problem has already shifted from how we might be
contained to what might happen if we are not.
We may, in fact, already be getting an early taste of what the
unsustainability of our industrial culture could mean. The Asian Miracle is
unraveling. People who just a year ago were reasonably well off are now
poor and in many cases destitute. Solutions which cannot possibly work in
the longer run are being applied in some desperation; for example, attempts
to prop up Russia and other failing economies by massive transfers of funds
via the IMF. There is a pessimism abroad which suggests that people are
subconsciously if not consciously aware that there is something very wrong
in the global basement. We no longer believe in things the way we used to
(or, perhaps more accurately, we no longer have our sustaining illusions).
Even "big picture" analysis could probably not tell us whether we are
already in a downward spiral, but let us for a moment consider what chain of
events might materialize if we were. What might "winding-down" mean? One
possibility is that it could mean the life- boat effect made real - an
increasing concentration of wealth in the few very rich countries which
could continue to afford the increasing costs of energy as supplies begin to
dwindle, and an increasing impoverishment of the rest of the world. A shift
in global distribution is already happening. The distribution of income
between rich and poor nations is already highly unequal and is becoming less
equal. UN data reveal that, between 1985 and 1995 the rich world's share of
global GNP grew from 78.9 percent to 81.2 percent, while the poor world's
share shrank accordingly. I doubt very much that this trend is reversible.
It may even accelerate as economic conditions in Asia, eastern Europe and
Africa worsen more rapidly than conditions in a few rich countries improve -
if indeed they do improve. What might the distribution be by, say, 2020?
Will the rich world then have 90% of global GNP? And, of course, the rich
world is not homogeneous. A relatively few people would have a
disproportionate share of that 90%.
The specter that emerges is reminiscent of Poe's story of the last of the
wealthy aristocracy holing up in a heavily fortified castle to escape the
plague. They were having one helluva party until the plague snuck in and got
them. Our position is not quite like this yet, but if we continue on the
present course, we could shut down. Step by step, little by little, the
lights would go out. This would not happen to us of course, it would happen
to Asians, Russians, Africans and Latin Americans - and to our great
grandchildren.
This is a very bleak picture. Its bleakness is probably the main reason for
our failure to confront it - better to party, like Poe's aristocrats.
Perhaps the only sane view one can take in the face of it is that even if
our industrial culture fails, humanity will continue. Even though Poe's
aristocrats and one third of Europe died during the Fourteenth Century
plague, people regrouped, rebuilt, and got on with their lives.
Ed Weick
