DES -- One urgent point. I asked George to look at our correspondence to see what I was missing. He caught one thing immediately "Fitness causes selection, selection causes fitness" is not necessarily a tautology nor do i think of it as such. Its a virtuous circle, or "spiral" so long as *selection and fitness can be independently known. *
I apologise for wiring text that was open to that misinterpretation. N On Sun, Apr 5, 2026 at 5:39 AM Santafe <[email protected]> wrote: > Hi Nick, > > I’m kind of relieved that I posted “I promise I really will shut up” on > Apr 1, before Gil’s brief blast of exasperation, which I kind of get. I > think I should keep my word, as much as possible without being obnoxious. > > At the same time, thank you for taking the time to reply, including what I > actually wrote, and responding to it in-frame. > > Your two papers are attached to the later email, too, so we have them. I > will read if and as I am able. The abstracts sound like they make a much > more normal reference to the routine work that people actually do, than > many of the post-string here have (to me); so that is hopeful. > > I tried a couple of times to come up with some kind of reply, and decided > it is hopeless. There is a perfectly good language to address the problem > that, after we have identified and characterized traits, and observed that > sometimes they change frequencies in populations, we don’t generally know > at the outset whether there is something about the traits’ functions in > organisms’ lives (in their population contexts) that is eligible to be a > “cause” of that change in frequency. We would like to know, for which > traits in what settings, variations in trait parameters result in > variations in function performance that (through the vast noise of > everything else that is going on too) poke through to result in changes in > trait frequency. There are no tautologies in the statistical reduction > that defines different components of change (among which one is fitness, > though its definition is partly by convention), and there are no other > problems than the ordinary problems of functional characterization and > statistical analysis in figuring out which variations in trait parameters > and functions correlate with changes in trait frequency robustly enough to > be candidates for cause of the change in frequency. It’s all so terribly > ordinary and understandable. > > Meanwhile, you have a program: to assert that there are some tautologies > and some ambiguities etc. Therefore I understand that, since we can > observe a field of people who get from problem statements to answers, by > completely ordinary and conventional steps with standard methods, without > tautologies, whatever those people are doing is simply irrelevant to your > program. > > I will admit, so that it doesn’t just seem irritating, that at a > half-dozen points below, I am sure that you are just throwing up verbal > chaff and playing word games to try to make something that is actually > completely ordinary and orderly “look” all mangled and messed up. But it > doesn’t look that way to me. At every one of these, I trip over some > string of words that looks like complete nonsense, which doesn’t make the > idea we were on “look” like anything; it just veers away from the track of > that idea to put a word game in its place. (An example: "success causes > fitness, and that fitness causes success") It was after trying to call out > two or three of these that I realized i need to just give up. I suspect > you could follow an ordinary mathematical argument about as well as the > next guy, and you just don’t want to. Thus anything I try to reply will > just yield another round with the same form as this one. I will add to > irritating the list, which is what I wanted to cut away from doing earlier. > > > I appreciated your introduction of placeholders, and of course I am quite > open to that kind of thing. Not so open to the Chalmers kind, which is > defined as having _no_ added content from what our ordinary, understandable > language, is already doing. I don’t know why you think you see a > non-Chalmers-like placeholder here; but okay. > > So, is it the English who say: Please Proceed. > > I do hope you will be able to push through to the book you were writing. > We accumulate all these unfinished efforts, and it is a shame if they can’t > get to some safe harbor in some output. > > Eric > > > > > On Apr 4, 2026, at 14:23, Nicholas Thompson <[email protected]> > wrote: > > DES -- I hate to drag you back into our den and maul you some more but >> your last post was fascinating to me and so akin to difficulties we have >> had with Elliott Sober and difficulties I have had understanding entropy >> (ugh) that I want to pursue them with you further > > > > *--for me, “fitness” is a name given to (something like) the units (or > dimension) in which reproductive success is measured, or quantified. Not > sure “units” is quite the right term, but the point is that it’s about > defining a quantification program for observed outcomes, or the model > variables that we try to fit to them. I had taken the state of modern work > to show that this is the only actual meaning the term was ever given. * > > I am happy to have a variable with a name to represent that dimension. I > just think "fitness" is an appalling name for it. Call it selectedness. > Call it success. Just don't call it fitness or adaptedness or anything > that might confuse a reader into thinking that you have any information > about the morphological or behavioral synchrony of the organism with its > environment. The essence of D's theory is that success causes fitness, and > that fitness causes success. If one calls oneself a Darwinist it must be > because those connections between the two ideas are empirical, not logical. > > *— are you two claiming otherwise; that my supposition is not at all the > case? That there are biologists for whom there is some other meaning, > instead of or in addition to the one I gave above, about being a > measurement unit? * > > Indeed, we are > > * Something like: “fitness” is a name for “the cause of reproductive > success”. As if to say: Well, there’s this thing with the form of a name, > so there must be something it names, that is a kind of causal force > responsible for generating what we witness as reproductive success. And > since there is one name, there must be some one kind of causal force it > names.* > > Well, if we do believe that the relative success of every genetic type of > organism is systematic then it has a cause. Now I suppose that it's > possible that each instance of success has a different cause, in which we > would have reduced Darwin's theory to, "whatever causes an animal's sucess > causes its success". But I think even FW would rate that a tautology. To > escape that bind, we have to find some class of relations that leads to > success which is other than the class that leads to failure. And to be a > proper Darwinian you have to at least be able to entertain the possibility > that selection would produce something other than fitness and vice versa. > > *— to me, an interpretation like that is so bizarre, it would never have > occurred to me to that there is anyone making it. * > > Well, here we are. We stand before you. I have been making such a claim > in print for 56 years, so either I have managed to pull the wool over many > editors' and reviewr's eyes, or it has some resonance somewhere among > biologists. I hope calling it "bizarre" isn't the first step toward putting > your fingers in your ears and shrieking. > > . > *It seems very similar to taking an expression like “elan vital”, and > saying that, since it has the shape of a name, there must be something it > names. * > > Well, exactly! The example I like to use is the "dormitive virtue"..Years > ago, before the dinosaurs, Lipton and I wrote a paper in which we talked > about such expressions that purport to be explanatory but which include a > reference to the explanandum within the explanans as "recursive". (eg. > life is caused by the Life Force) The dormitive virtue was a place-holder > for what came to be known as the very specific chemical properties of > morphine. The Moliere play makes fun of people who imagine that the > assignment of a placeholder has solved the problem. We thought of these > place holders as serving to keep the goal in sight while scientists looked > for it. Science consists a lot in filling in or dividing up these place > holders. The progress in the identification of the AIDS virus is a > wonderful example. See, if tempted, Comparative Psychology and the > recursive nature of filter explanations > <https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=https%3a%2f%2fcommons.clarku.edu%2ffacultyworks%2f66%2f&c=E,1,k4G28ruXzTMikjk22fWt55DQZBrY8oTBaFPZetykCEmKkrdW7Zgm_InoVrTc91PCgHYC1XjdS7pzs2zz_HaX2PnsGuZtad3L3YiDf1g2E2bBiY5y9m0Lp_g,&typo=1> > > *To me, those are strings of words that satisfy rules of syntax and that > don’t have any semantic referents at all. They may as well be Chomsky’s > “colorless green dreams” or something. I would not have imagined that > there was anything anyone expected, beyond the working out of the mechanics > of lots of cases of how-lifecycles-play-out-in-**contexts, which can fill > out some vast taxonomy that has no singular “essence” underneath it. That > could well be my lack of empathy for how many other people think, like my > lack of empathy for their thoughts about God (along with my ignorance about > who is in the world). * > > Indeed. That would explain a lot. Please understand that I am a lifelong > unbeliever. I am not even an atheist. My family had no interest in > religion whatsoever. You might call me a religious Ignoramist. I have > never been cuffed on the ears by nuns. > > *— I guess, since there are people who continue to talk about Strong > Emergence, and Philosophical Zombies, and who sound to me much like people > who talk about God today, and maybe like people who would have talked about > Elan Vital some generations ago, I should have right away imagined this > reading of what you were writing.* > > Again, that explains a lot of our difficulties. But I beg to suggest that > there is a more generous reading. > > *the above is what you were claiming, it would explain why my long Emily > Litella-like replies seemed like a tiresome recital of what population > geneticists already do (Nick’s point that “all that would be left is > EricS’s 2a and 2b”), which everybody already knows anyway, and which isn’t > interesting and wasn’t to your point. So, were you claiming that there are > biologists operating that way*? *And are there really biologists > operating that way?y * > > Indeed there are. They are called comparative biologists, comparative > anatomists,comparative ethologists, comparative physiologists, anybody who > studies the form of classes of organisms in relation to their > circumstances. Natural design didn't get eliminated by Darwinism; it got > partially, and incompletely and in some cases wrongly explained by it. > Some effort needs to be expended in finding out the degree to which natural > design actually accounts for natural selection and vice versa. Please see > Toward > a Falsifiable Theory of Evolution > <https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=https%3a%2f%2fcommons.clarku.edu%2ffacultyworks%2f67%2f&c=E,1,uEqHnsI2N6agATrwVIuvnLowDECLxZG4KT5Za_GJiyC2lUxcNNve9iY0ZctgPVn2cXHp3MIF_4h0exfyKRO9KdPS6nCz0uerbqjb5nNIWBw,&typo=1> > > > Nick > > > > On Fri, Apr 3, 2026 at 2:17 PM Nicholas Thompson <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> DES -- I hate to drag you back into our den and maul you some more but >>> your last post was fascinting to me and so akin to difficulties we have had >>> with Elliott Sober and difficulties I have had understnding entropy (ugh) >>> that I want to pursue them with you further >> >> >> >> --for me, “fitness” is a name given to (something like) the units (or >> dimension) in which reproductive success is measured, or quantified. Not >> sure “units” is quite the right term, but the point is that it’s about >> defining a quantification program for observed outcomes, or the model >> variables that we try to fit to them. I had taken the state of modern work >> to show that this is the only actual meaning the term was ever given. >> >> — are you two claiming otherwise; that my supposition is not at all the >> case? That there are biologists for whom there is some other meaning, >> instead of or in addition to the one I gave above, about being a >> measurement unit? Something like: “fitness” is a name for “the cause of >> reproductive success”. As if to say: Well, there’s this thing with the >> form of a name, so there must be something it names, that is a kind of >> causal force responsible for generating what we witness as reproductive >> success. And since there is one name, there must be some one kind of >> causal force it names. >> >> — to me, an interpretation like that is so bizarre, it would never have >> occurred to me to that there is anyone making it. It seems very similar to >> taking an expression like “elan vital”, and saying that, since it has the >> shape of a name, there must be something it names. To me, those are >> strings of words that satisfy rules of syntax and that don’t have any >> semantic referents at all. They may as well be Chomsky’s “colorless green >> dreams” or something. I would not have imagined that there was anything >> anyone expected, beyond the working out of the mechanics of lots of cases >> of how-lifecycles-play-out-in-contexts, which can fill out some vast >> taxonomy that has no singular “essence” underneath it. That could well be >> my lack of empathy for how many other people think, like my lack of empathy >> for their thoughts about God (along with my ignorance about who is in the >> world). >> >> — I guess, since there are people who continue to talk about Strong >> Emergence, and Philosophical Zombies, and who sound to me much like people >> who talk about God today, and maybe like people who would have talked about >> Elan Vital some generations ago, I should have right away imagined this >> reading of what you were writing. >> >> If the above is what you were claiming, it would explain why my long >> Emily Litella-like replies seemed like a tiresome recital of what >> population geneticists already do (Nick’s point that “all that would be >> left is EricS’s 2a and 2b”), which everybody already knows anyway, and >> which isn’t interesting and wasn’t to your point. >> >> So, were you claiming that there are biologists operating that way? >> >> And are there really biologists operating that way? >> >> >> On Wed, Apr 1, 2026 at 5:15 AM Santafe <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> Can I ask one last question? after which I promise I really will shut up: >>> >>> The content of EricC’s note below (about the key in a lock), reflecting >>> back on things Nick said in the early posts about selection’s being a >>> tautology, which got me started digging a hole, have bothered me through >>> the night, and made me wonder if I can understand how I have been missing >>> both-of-y’all’s point. Was it something like the following:? >>> >>> — for me, “fitness” is a name given to (something like) the units (or >>> dimension) in which reproductive success is measured, or quantified. Not >>> sure “units” is quite the right term, but the point is that it’s about >>> defining a quantification program for observed outcomes, or the model >>> variables that we try to fit to them. I had taken the state of modern work >>> to show that this is the only actual meaning the term was ever given. >>> >>> — are you two claiming otherwise; that my supposition is not at all the >>> case? That there are biologists for whom there is some other meaning, >>> instead of or in addition to the one I gave above, about being a >>> measurement unit? Something like: “fitness” is a name for “the cause of >>> reproductive success”. As if to say: Well, there’s this thing with the >>> form of a name, so there must be something it names, that is a kind of >>> causal force responsible for generating what we witness as reproductive >>> success. And since there is one name, there must be some one kind of >>> causal force it names. >>> >>> — to me, an interpretation like that is so bizarre, it would never have >>> occurred to me to that there is anyone making it. It seems very similar to >>> taking an expression like “elan vital”, and saying that, since it has the >>> shape of a name, there must be something it names. To me, those are >>> strings of words that satisfy rules of syntax and that don’t have any >>> semantic referents at all. They may as well be Chomsky’s “colorless green >>> dreams” or something. I would not have imagined that there was anything >>> anyone expected, beyond the working out of the mechanics of lots of cases >>> of how-lifecycles-play-out-in-contexts, which can fill out some vast >>> taxonomy that has no singular “essence” underneath it. That could well be >>> my lack of empathy for how many other people think, like my lack of empathy >>> for their thoughts about God (along with my ignorance about who is in the >>> world). >>> >>> — I guess, since there are people who continue to talk about Strong >>> Emergence, and Philosophical Zombies, and who sound to me much like people >>> who talk about God today, and maybe like people who would have talked about >>> Elan Vital some generations ago, I should have right away imagined this >>> reading of what you were writing. >>> >>> If the above is what you were claiming, it would explain why my long >>> Emily Litella-like replies seemed like a tiresome recital of what >>> population geneticists already do (Nick’s point that “all that would be >>> left is EricS’s 2a and 2b”), which everybody already knows anyway, and >>> which isn’t interesting and wasn’t to your point. >>> >>> So, were you claiming that there are biologists operating that way? >>> >>> And are there really biologists operating that way? >>> >>> As always, I appreciate whatever patience or indulgence, >>> >>> Eric >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Mar 31, 2026, at 15:47, Eric Charles <[email protected]> >>> wrote: >>> >>> I'm a bit confused here... >>> The initial dog pile on Nick seemed (to me) to have as one of its main >>> points something like "Look, old man, once you formalize something >>> mathematically we don't need to care what any of the words might mean or >>> imply in any other context, it is just math, stop thinking that the words >>> matter!" >>> >>> And now there have been several posts by EricS, at least one by Glen, >>> and I think Marcus and Frank are in there somewhere as well, claiming that >>> the words are crucially important and we need to take them much more >>> seriously. >>> >>> So.... where does that leave us? Is everyone now onboard with >>> the metaphors mattering quite a bit? >>> >>> I'll also note that "function" can't do the work on its own to explain >>> evolution. We still need to know why some functions are favored by >>> selection and others are not. EricS seemed to indicate that we assess "fit" >>> by determining if animals are "happy".... but the metaphor of "fit" is like >>> a key in a lock. To explain evolution you need the matching of >>> form-and-function-to-a-particular-environment. That matching *sometimes* >>> increases reproductive success, and *sometimes* the traits in question are >>> hereditary. >>> >>> Population genetics combined with field research can be very powerful >>> along those lines, but the math of population genetics on its own, floating >>> out in the ether, can't do it at all. >>> >>> Best, >>> Eric >>> >>> >>> <[email protected]> >>> >>> >>> On Tue, Mar 31, 2026 at 6:10 AM Santafe <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> Hi Nick, >>>> >>>> Two smaller replies to what have become two sub-threads: >>>> >>>> > On Mar 30, 2026, at 15:42, Nicholas Thompson <[email protected]> >>>> wrote: >>>> > >>>> > DES, EPC, FW >>>> > >>>> > So far as I understand, the argument flowing from Fisher makes no >>>> claims about the kind of trait that produces reproductive success other >>>> than that it is the kind that produces reproductive success. FW, if that's >>>> not a tautology, it's a pretty tight circle. >>>> >>>> As usual, let’s decamp to more neutral ground in the hope of having an >>>> ordinary negotiation. >>>> >>>> Suppose that, in your overweening pursuit of the study of metaphor, you >>>> never noticed that there is a once/4-year gathering called The Olympics. >>>> Also never learned what any of its so-called “events” are, what they are >>>> about, how they work, and how one differs from another. My hypothetical >>>> here is meant to define a condition of having “very little prior >>>> information” about some phenomenon that we can, nonetheless, still >>>> reasonably unambiguously circumscribe. >>>> >>>> But a quick inspection shows that a subset of the participants (who all >>>> together seem to be called “athletes”) are given metal disks and stand on >>>> some kind of 3-tiered podium, while other athletes do not. Being a >>>> statistician — a skill so helpful in the study of metaphor that it was >>>> worth taking the time out to learn — you immediately recognize that this is >>>> a kind of marking that can be used to partition the athletes. Taking >>>> notice, for the first time, of some of the conversation in the society >>>> around you, who seem not nearly so devoted to metaphor and thus have time >>>> to do other things, you gather that these marked people seem to be called >>>> “winners” (or better, “medalists”, this “winning” thing is a finer >>>> sub-partition; I’ll mis-use “winner” to label the most salient marking for >>>> this little parable). It’s handy to have such a term, for use in later >>>> sentences, so they become less tedious than the ones I have been typing so >>>> far. >>>> >>>> You also note that while there is only one 3-tiered podium and >>>> metal-disk set per one “event”, there seem to be many such distinct >>>> “events”, so some kind of event name gives you a second kind of marking you >>>> can put on the athletes. Moreover, interestingly, the “event” label is >>>> again a proper partition (or at least seems to be; this one is less >>>> cut-and-dried than the observation that everyone carrying a metal disk is >>>> not someone not-carrying a metal disk, so we are wary; the event label >>>> seems to be a bit more abstract): every athlete is in some “event” set, and >>>> it appears that no athlete is in more than one of them. As with the >>>> “winners” label, you learn that there are conventionalized names for the >>>> events, and you can find a look-up table if you need one or another of >>>> them. >>>> >>>> Now, I can make a list of statements that seem to be of two different >>>> kinds (scare quotes here indicate my statisticians’ attribute labels; in my >>>> condition of very little prior knowledge, I don’t claim I have any more >>>> semantics for them than I listed above): >>>> >>>> 1. Every “winner" is someone marked as having won something. >>>> >>>> 2a. Every winner in the “gymnastics” event is shorter than the average >>>> over all the participants; >>>> >>>> 2b. Every winner in the “high jump” event is taller than the average >>>> over all the participants; >>>> >>>> … (we could presumably look for other such summary statistics that seem >>>> to be unusually regular and to carry different values in different >>>> “events”). >>>> >>>> I would say sentence 1 is “a tautology”, or close enough to it for the >>>> purpose of this negotiation. Maybe I should use EricC’s good, and slighly >>>> more flexible term, “truism”. >>>> >>>> Now you may write a protest email: But the sentences 2a, 2b, have not >>>> told me what constitutes “competition” in these “events”: “gymnastics” and >>>> “high jump”, and given me the rule book for scoring them. Okay. And they >>>> didn’t cook your dinner and do the dishes afterward either. Life is hard. >>>> And more a propos (breaking my little 4th wall here), the path to a >>>> fully-adequate “causal” theory through statistical inference is like the >>>> Road to Heaven: narrow, tortuous, and inadequate to many things one can >>>> rightly want to know. That’s what other sciences are then for. >>>> >>>> But if you claim: The sentences 2a and 2b didn’t give me _any >>>> information_ about these “events”, and couldn’t have, because they are >>>> tautologies, I would say you made an error. Of course, the real Nick would >>>> not say that, so we are all safe. >>>> >>>> The above parable is, of course, about selection. I didn’t say >>>> anything about heredity. But if I had happened to note that height is a >>>> fairly heritable trait, I could have spun out a much longer story, and >>>> defined some Bayesian-posterior conditional probabilities, which would be >>>> shown to have properties such as: the posterior probability, under various >>>> ceteris paribus conditions, for a child of a high-jump winner to turn out >>>> another high-jump winner is higher than for that child to turn out a >>>> gymnastics winner, and so forth. The amalgamation of both of those stories >>>> would go in the direction of Fisher’s fundamental theorem. It would leave >>>> out all the stuff that Fisher left out of emphasis in his mad pursuit of >>>> his covariance term as an analog to the thermodynamic 2nd law (a non-valid >>>> analogy, as it turns out to be easy to show), and that Price included >>>> didactically (and here, to EricC’s answer): that I didn’t even mention >>>> that the tall people might get drafted into wars and put into an infantry >>>> to fire rifles over tall dijks, while the short people might be drafted >>>> into Special Forces and sent on missions to attack through underground >>>> tunnels, and so the number of survivors could depend on many factors about >>>> which war their country had started, in what theater, and against what >>>> opposition, etc. These are the world of everything-else that Fisher lumped >>>> together into “deterioration of the environment”, as Steve Frank (and I >>>> think also Price) lays out. They are probably not well-analogized to >>>> “mutation”, but in genetics, mutation also goes into the same bin in the >>>> Price equation — _outside_ the term of Fisher’s fundamental theorem — as >>>> the “deterioration” effects. The accounting identity is flexible enough >>>> that we don’t need analogies to use it; we can formulate a version for >>>> whatever statistics our phenomenon-of-interest supplies. >>>> >>>> Anyway; at issue: Seriously, do we have a problem in scientific work, >>>> of people being unable to gain partial knowledge about phenomena through >>>> sentences of the kinds 2a, 2b, because they can’t tell the difference >>>> between those and sentence 1? In the world where I live, I don’t see >>>> evidence for this mistake. >>>> >>>> Eric >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> .- .-.. .-.. / ..-. --- --- - . .-. ... / .- .-. . / .-- .-. --- -. --. >>>> / ... --- -- . / .- .-. . / ..- ... . ..-. ..- .-.. >>>> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >>>> Fridays 9a-12p Friday St. Johns Cafe / Thursdays 9a-12p Zoom >>>> https://bit.ly/virtualfriam >>>> <https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=https%3a%2f%2fbit.ly%2fvirtualfriam&c=E,1,GvQhgG8mgl44zu_Tqszk_wQFcC3LBswQyBsmnoa7umwcI4cM2jGPGmAYotJwNMri0nXMbYayX6uZw5iDa5Mn0zM5Lzi9_LPGwP2Q6dG2zkm1Zw,,&typo=1> >>>> to (un)subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >>>> <https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=http%3a%2f%2fredfish.com%2fmailman%2flistinfo%2ffriam_redfish.com&c=E,1,23DEBEu6zm1j58j5JsswXw4R4hnyuhIceP4fdD1lMWDKru8V9CE3qD4-RYjtV5Jy9hfTf9uHOrhrlBi_RdYMT7jsteJtGiX2nEMNJisxFedZstuD_29M3FA,&typo=1> >>>> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ >>>> <https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=http%3a%2f%2ffriam-comic.blogspot.com%2f&c=E,1,Ec4s1UwqPKENLyqkHX4Ib_R7EzxFYgc2j7jZdKdzIhORPykt1347aKvaSNnoCQ4Arvb6m2_GLwAwKSl29d-U5DrlMczDc4AHiyyrX-KaGBCrMK9RdKapkw,,&typo=1> >>>> archives: 5/2017 thru present >>>> https://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/ >>>> <https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=https%3a%2f%2fredfish.com%2fpipermail%2ffriam_redfish.com%2f&c=E,1,wWOjZ0Q8WKeZG4U9_UBc_a11JtFDvedQPCTS8FL1Usmbm4F-EJO5IWv_Ignpmf4vTC3CO23cIKVFR_FtMZC8DWD4hyxlN0c7hdOfez8KEw,,&typo=1> >>>> 1/2003 thru 6/2021 http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/ >>>> >>> .- .-.. .-.. / ..-. --- --- - . .-. ... / .- .-. . / .-- .-. --- -. --. >>> / ... --- -- . / .- .-. . / ..- ... . ..-. ..- .-.. >>> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >>> Fridays 9a-12p Friday St. Johns Cafe / Thursdays 9a-12p Zoom >>> https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=https%3a%2f%2fbit.ly%2fvirtualfriam&c=E,1,kwN2JIDPqIj9UxOfed-aORUfsTjJO1DufRCI0ppHAlXiormfdNykgyPSWLfGlw5BiruUeiaRfbSG8W1tubwpfhSXeau4oRt3nvXTRhaRUQDZn1ezcoU,&typo=1 >>> to (un)subscribe >>> https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=http%3a%2f%2fredfish.com%2fmailman%2flistinfo%2ffriam_redfish.com&c=E,1,kQqYu7I-SVHGT_AjFnLh-XWpOng69axviT6aY8I-XQhC5yk80tH2Ke3qOfyvs8l3RCZeAkeZoIR8TnddaWkwLAXTuoc5QvUR8RvkfEpSQA4,&typo=1 >>> FRIAM-COMIC >>> https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=http%3a%2f%2ffriam-comic.blogspot.com%2f&c=E,1,Scpn5Z6qKVVYYNEU1u9CRDlFHpw1wgOZOdNM_lN_6PGv3Act07AQi7IpeyFshe33FmWkTI9CAG8DxLRlNRkf96ox2bRdyp5XC_cgCr8eGG_qVIaFKTZQtQ,,&typo=1 >>> archives: 5/2017 thru present >>> https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=https%3a%2f%2fredfish.com%2fpipermail%2ffriam_redfish.com%2f&c=E,1,NLxA-XaYLw7kDphTWfVR6urQXoJSKIwq0etxJd8ER-oc2b18abBXo9Qeee2OhAh_25GSqFBFw3JCMtIdxzYZ2dNpnjUjp4hMFRrpN814z2HxmIPhG0rfxUF-CQ,,&typo=1 >>> 1/2003 thru 6/2021 http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/ >>> >>> >>> .- .-.. .-.. / ..-. --- --- - . .-. ... / .- .-. . / .-- .-. --- -. --. >>> / ... --- -- . / .- .-. . / ..- ... . ..-. ..- .-.. >>> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >>> Fridays 9a-12p Friday St. Johns Cafe / Thursdays 9a-12p Zoom >>> https://bit.ly/virtualfriam >>> <https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=https%3a%2f%2fbit.ly%2fvirtualfriam&c=E,1,zA-G5QKVxSPBJmAMP_AJzjZBgLoWIDEwNhUXDpDE-ij5HxoUybuXHsL7hq3XSjcaie2WQdh2hKkTDoZpSv083KPYvq8qWzFQDpts4RVeb0UxKke--9Km&typo=1> >>> to (un)subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >>> <https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=http%3a%2f%2fredfish.com%2fmailman%2flistinfo%2ffriam_redfish.com&c=E,1,YuoMqhAnODFK7gL8VQKwXiuMZPGgTcNdV3JgB-s9IGxudIzKjP_2nuVrv9XASA2GmtPpabPVY1SoV_P65J8zfqHN98PEQERGPn4JY3pb&typo=1> >>> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ >>> <https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=http%3a%2f%2ffriam-comic.blogspot.com%2f&c=E,1,RTuBnYPs7aSXh6PCRgC3eltQzFenug0NrzICyO63IHxkmDRWr5as1yZl_aRfSuQdRBjUi6qNKJ8UnKmwUBClw5Wo4YjechJlRTyTQYdOsg,,&typo=1> >>> archives: 5/2017 thru present >>> https://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/ >>> <https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=https%3a%2f%2fredfish.com%2fpipermail%2ffriam_redfish.com%2f&c=E,1,-sgioWyoJ9Vy0MyLRBgl8ZQKbLOXF9VqGGTEutRE5wJioXcx3l2BEzHSM8_-tGX-WDZdF5260g7Uh0Nx9QOxyVNE4HeeRJ0JlF_paQyH75-KjEXPeg-W9RQpyVuR&typo=1> >>> 1/2003 thru 6/2021 http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/ >>> >> >> >> -- >> Nicholas S. Thompson >> Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology >> Clark University >> [email protected] >> https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson >> <https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=https%3a%2f%2fwordpress.clarku.edu%2fnthompson&c=E,1,TtGHguBztcaI183g6Goerj-O4VoUmgxpx6RFwy76dnUtcD6dMcEs2GfRLne1FYCYIv9JZQ_Qlp0DYwPIxqwUF0P5yyaODACw5wXNyxIS_4NA3OoABA1XdQ,,&typo=1> >> https://substack.com/@monist >> <https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=https%3a%2f%2fsubstack.com%2f%40monist&c=E,1,mMVE-osMfLMKveVRGsDNOLbCQxE2gtCfa9lLV-tXT5ooNLpQD3mqsdWZrYkDx7mKJDcf7XYJbAAs76SMkAt7fhk6zh8pI_xm2uaiDg2olbukzFktpA,,&typo=1> >> > > > -- > Nicholas S. Thompson > Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology > Clark University > [email protected] > https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson > <https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=https%3a%2f%2fwordpress.clarku.edu%2fnthompson&c=E,1,2XwwB39XAWBxm8sZIiJJtQaGopoq86JnxTvN46gGqo6aH0noWqqKl_l7rB_k-DozfW1XYaJks5IPwIsYhgQEFcMMYaST1TtrgzyaPODraxU,&typo=1> > https://substack.com/@monist > <https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=https%3a%2f%2fsubstack.com%2f%40monist&c=E,1,svFJjYNZT04uLonFV0yujfOyRi6wCR5qc-O348ai4iwT5_F08j6oi7TW8PPCmquF6PKjGNjXrIdHlZlDzzHj1-5A3toxXWZa5j7dj8mSyCtOtir_evUN4QOA5A,,&typo=1> > .- .-.. .-.. / ..-. --- --- - . .-. ... / .- .-. . / .-- .-. --- -. --. / > ... --- -- . / .- .-. . / ..- ... . ..-. ..- .-.. > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Fridays 9a-12p Friday St. Johns Cafe / Thursdays 9a-12p Zoom > https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=https%3a%2f%2fbit.ly%2fvirtualfriam&c=E,1,1Yj3oXBfXU9FL5YgY7_61lUY6S944YYnB3lhy68u4K0zPI0_lLJl4_qjp8pcYomUasPvoVenzsSlxfJNtZS8lkb_ALVAI9XA-ws_REd_mBz6DeUH5u3xUKaLb4A,&typo=1 > to (un)subscribe > https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=http%3a%2f%2fredfish.com%2fmailman%2flistinfo%2ffriam_redfish.com&c=E,1,0_T3p9FRn72Wb576gUkbP3yykjXY0kTI-AElcl-eqAWYU5womwJJ5TSlBwcpkYmObXMkPxa-cqkpKy04LnwF9q_s1uc78x2KFJsgvxP6LOgk5twjJd_wXnHKPa0S&typo=1 > FRIAM-COMIC > https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=http%3a%2f%2ffriam-comic.blogspot.com%2f&c=E,1,9_aFoYc8LEBvlTRa6JAb15n0L4Hhp9lNSuX13T_IT-91Oq1jkfJ6EgnCAuLWMPdqpP-KDjnAUT7o3BnwzAIHxkvOxLzAfkPL3aSIq7ro&typo=1 > archives: 5/2017 thru present > https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=https%3a%2f%2fredfish.com%2fpipermail%2ffriam_redfish.com%2f&c=E,1,lMJPwQ_tUH-IPBwp6f2KXYAEarkDc0KOAA6TwZdPbWwifDQprErklE2-hCs5OWhc1DmB88QWKxpEPkPKXWnNOWMIFzI2Nsv2-XLYgRhUcGlyR_J5clz3J8k1pQ,,&typo=1 > 1/2003 thru 6/2021 http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/ > > > .- .-.. .-.. / ..-. --- --- - . .-. ... / .- .-. . / .-- .-. --- -. --. / > ... --- -- . / .- .-. . / ..- ... . ..-. ..- .-.. > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Fridays 9a-12p Friday St. Johns Cafe / Thursdays 9a-12p Zoom > https://bit.ly/virtualfriam > to (un)subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ > archives: 5/2017 thru present > https://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/ > 1/2003 thru 6/2021 http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/ > -- Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology Clark University [email protected] https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson https://substack.com/@monist
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