Peter Wemm <peter <at> wemm.org> writes: > ... > There is no way to interfere because it is done outside of user space > entirely, **after** the file has been copied out of the file system. > You can do whatever you like to the file, but it has no effect because > all the relocation is done in a private kernel copy. > ...
What if attack code (broadly understood) is part of module code, and is based on either or both of: - hidden (as to meaning and reloc targets) arrangement of relocations needed - has an ability of (self) activation during load/link and *relocations* process already under the privilege of the kernel ? Is that possible at all ? Would there be any protection against it (except giving up relocations as an enabling vehicle) ? jb _______________________________________________ [email protected] mailing list http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-stable To unsubscribe, send any mail to "[email protected]"
