Gyan Doshi:
> Avoids overreading the box and ingesting absurd values into stts_data
> ---
> libavformat/mov.c | 5 +++++
> 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/libavformat/mov.c b/libavformat/mov.c
> index 2aed6e80ef..5a7209837f 100644
> --- a/libavformat/mov.c
> +++ b/libavformat/mov.c
> @@ -2935,6 +2935,11 @@ static int mov_read_stts(MOVContext *c, AVIOContext
> *pb, MOVAtom atom)
> avio_rb24(pb); /* flags */
> entries = avio_rb32(pb);
>
> + if (atom.size < 8 + (int64_t)entries*8) {
> + av_log(c->fc, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Truncated STTS box for st %d.\n",
> c->fc->nb_streams-1);
> + return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
> + }
> +
> av_log(c->fc, AV_LOG_TRACE, "track[%u].stts.entries = %u\n",
> c->fc->nb_streams-1, entries);
>
>
This might fix the issue with the fuzzer sample Michael gave you, but
what would stop the fuzzer (or a malicious adversary) from simply using
a gigantic atom size?
- Andreas
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