Please review the following proposal and discuss issues on this thread. Alan's review pointed out the following
Section 2.1.1 says: > TLS 1.3 introduced the Post-Handshake KeyUpdate > message which is not useful and not expected in EAP-TLS. > Q: What does it mean that the message is "not expected"? This seems > like a source of implementation-defined behavior, which experience > shows has been a source of interoperability and security issues. This does seem to require some more specification. Here is a proposal. "TLS 1.3 introduced the Post-Handshake KeyUpdate message which is not useful and not expected in EAP-TLS. Implementations SHOULD NOT send a KeyUpdate message. If a KeyUpdate message is received then an implementation SHOULD ignore the message and it SHOULD NOT send a KeyUpdate message in response." I think this is better than "implementations MUST NOT send this message and MUST fail upon reception". The problem here is that the EAP TLS implementation may not have control over this behavior. Thanks, Joe
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