On 2024-01-23 5:21, Dan Carpenter wrote:
Hello Felix Kuehling,
The patch 1819200166ce: "drm/amdkfd: Export DMABufs from KFD using
GEM handles" from Aug 24, 2023 (linux-next), leads to the following
Smatch static checker warning:
drivers/dma-buf/dma-buf.c:729 dma_buf_get()
warn: fd used after fd_install() 'fd'
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_amdkfd_gpuvm.c
809 static int kfd_mem_export_dmabuf(struct kgd_mem *mem)
810 {
811 if (!mem->dmabuf) {
812 struct amdgpu_device *bo_adev;
813 struct dma_buf *dmabuf;
814 int r, fd;
815
816 bo_adev = amdgpu_ttm_adev(mem->bo->tbo.bdev);
817 r = drm_gem_prime_handle_to_fd(&bo_adev->ddev,
bo_adev->kfd.client.file,
818 mem->gem_handle,
819 mem->alloc_flags &
KFD_IOC_ALLOC_MEM_FLAGS_WRITABLE ?
820 DRM_RDWR : 0, &fd);
^^^
The drm_gem_prime_handle_to_fd() function does an fd_install() and
returns the result as "fd".
821 if (r)
822 return r;
823 dmabuf = dma_buf_get(fd);
^^
Then we do another fget() inside dma_buf_get(). I'm not an expert,
but this looks wrong. We can't assume that the dmabuf here is the
same one from drm_gem_prime_handle_to_fd() because the user could
change it after the fd_install(). I suspect drm_gem_prime_handle_to_fd()
should pass the dmabuf back instead.
We had several CVEs similar to this such as CVE-2022-1998.
That CVE is a system crash. I don't think that can happen here. It's
true that user mode can close the fd. But then dma_buf_get would return
an error that we'd catch with "WARN_ON_ONCE(IS_ERR(dmabuf))" below.
It's possible that a different DMABuf gets bound to the fd by a
malicious user mode. That said, we're treating this fd as if it had come
from user mode. dma_buf_get and the subsequent check on the dmabuf
should be robust against any user mode messing with the file descriptor
in the meantime.
Regards,
Felix
824 close_fd(fd);
825 if (WARN_ON_ONCE(IS_ERR(dmabuf)))
826 return PTR_ERR(dmabuf);
827 mem->dmabuf = dmabuf;
828 }
829
830 return 0;
831 }
regards,
dan carpenter
