Hi Med,

Thank you very much for your detailed feedback.

On 10/1/25 17:50, [email protected] wrote:
Both the issue and proposed approach are well explained. I only have few minor 
comments. I sent you a PR with some nits: 
https://github.com/peterthomassen/draft-ietf-dnsop-cds-consistency/pull/5/files 
<https://github.com/peterthomassen/draft-ietf-dnsop-cds-consistency/pull/5/files>.

Thanks, merged.

# Make idnits happy

Please add the following to the abstract:

NEW:

This document updates RFC 7344 and RFC 7477.

Done (via your PR).

# Background reading

CURRENT:

    Readers are expected to be familiar with DNSSEC, including [RFC4033],
    [RFC4034], [RFC4035], [RFC6781], [RFC7344], [RFC7477], and [RFC8901].

(1) This smells like a normative dependency on all these specs, but there 
RFC6781 and RFC8901 are provided as informative.

To fully understand the document (including its justifying arguments), 
familiarity with these last two documents is needed, but they are not 
normatively relevant for the specification. So I think the current wording is 
correct.

(2) Any reason why RFC 9364 is not cited here rather than pointing to these 
individual RFCs?

Yes, because one only needs to be familiar with the aspects of DNSSEC mentioned 
above, but for example not with RFC 7646 or RFC 9276, which both are listed in 
9364. That said, I don't feel strongly at all and will be happy to change it if 
you prefer.

# Restating an existing behavior, not defining a new one

In Section 1:

OLD:

    At the same
    time, applying an automated delegation update "MUST NOT break the
    current delegation" ([RFC7344], Section 4.1), i.e., it MUST NOT
    hamper availability or validatability of the Child's resolution.

NEW:

    At the same
    time, applying an automated delegation update "MUST NOT break the
    current delegation" ([RFC7344], Section 4.1), i.e., it must not
    hamper availability or validatability of the Child's resolution.

Also, same in Section 3.1

OLD:

    In other words, CDS/CDNSKEY records at the Child zone apex MUST be
    fetched directly from each (reachable) authoritative server as
    determined by the delegation's NS record set.

NEW:

    In other words, CDS/CDNSKEY records at the Child zone apex must be
    fetched directly from each (reachable) authoritative server as
    determined by the delegation's NS record set.

Agree, and also done (via your PR).

Reading this I realize that the case of CDS/CDNSKEY "delete" signals (RFC 8078 Section 6) 
is covered ("Specifically, it MUST NOT delete" in Section 3), but I think it should also 
be covered explicitly in Section 3.1. So I've added:

OLD
   Parent, and ensure that each key referenced in any of the received
   answers is also referenced in all other received responses.

NEW
   Parent, and ensure that each key referenced in any of the received
   answers is also referenced in all other received responses, or that
   responses consistently indicate a request for removal of the entire
   DS RRset ([RFC8078], Section 6).

... and in the next paragraph (which you quoted above), I changed at the end:

OLD
   considered inconsistent.

NEW
   considered inconsistent.  Similarly, the state MUST be considered
   inconsistent if there is a CDS or CDNSKEY response that indicates a
   removal request for the DS RRset whereas another response indicates
   no change (NODATA) or a DS update.

This is a no-op clarification, so I'll assume it is fine unless I hear 
otherwise.

# Update to RFC 7344

The spec extends the acceptance rule list, but does not change any other part 
of 7344. I suggest  to make that explicit:

OLD:

    This list is extended with the consistency requirements defined in
    this document.

NEW:

    This list is extended with the consistency requirements defined in
    this document. This document does not modify any other part of [RFC7344].

Done (via your PR).

# Configuration knobs/Operational Considerations (Section 3)

CURRENT:

    A retry schedule with exponential
    back-off is RECOMMENDED (such as after 5, 10, 20, 40, ... minutes).

In your PR, you changed this to "e.g., after 5, 10, 20, or 40 minutes". I accepted the 
"e.g.,", but disagree with the "or", as this is an example of a sequence of retries 
retries with exponential back-off, and not a list of alternatives of intervals.

I guess this should be a configurable parameter. Can say so. This would be 
aligned with the similar provisions in the Operational Considerations of 
RFC7477.

All kinds of things can be configurable, and we usually don't say that, so I'd rather not say it 
here. However, if you prefer, would it would for your if we added "(configurable)" before 
"retry schedule"?

Also,

CURRENT:

    To accommodate transient inconsistencies (e.g. replication delays),
    the Parental Agent MAY retry the full process

whether this is retried or not should be controlled using a knob. Indicating 
whether the retry is enabled or disabled by default may be worth to mention.

I feel the same here about configuration statements as above. Also, how can it 
be that it should be done a certain way when it is MAY?

However, if you really want this, how about the following:

OLD
   To accommodate transient inconsistencies (e.g., replication delays),
   the Parental Agent MAY retry the full process, repeating all queries.
   A schedule with exponential back-off is RECOMMENDED.

NEW
   To accommodate transient inconsistencies (e.g., replication delays),
   implementations MAY be configurable to undertake a retry the full
   process, repeating all queries (suggested default: enabled).
   A schedule withexponential back-off is RECOMMENDED.

Idem for this one:

CURRENT:

    A schedule with exponential back-off is RECOMMENDED.

I guess the schedule should be a configurable parameter.

True, although I don't think we need to repeat that here if we say it above 
when we first talk about exponential back-off. Do you think?

# Not an absolute requirement

OLD:

    Existing requirements for ensuring integrity remain in effect.  In
    particular, DNSSEC signatures MUST be requested and validated for all
    queries unless otherwise noted.

NEW:

    Existing requirements for ensuring integrity remain in effect.  In
    particular, DNSSEC signatures SHOULD be requested and validated for all
    queries unless otherwise noted.

No, it is an absolute requirement for the queries talked about in this 
document, which are:

- CSYNC: RFC 7477 Section 2 (last paragraph) prescribes validation

- CDS/CDNSKEY:
    * for updates: RFC 7344 Section 6.2 says "MUST check the publication rules from Section 
4.1", which says that these RRsets "MUST be signed with a key that is represented in both 
the current DNSKEY and DS RRsets", so this is a validation requirement
    * for bootstrapping: RFC 9615 Section 4.2 requires validation

The above quote does not affect any other queries (the first paragraph of that containing 
section says that these are "requirements that apply equally to CDS/CDNSKEY and 
CSYNC", not to anything else).

# References

Please use the exact titles of these references:

OLD

    [LAME1]    Akiwate, G., Jonker, M., Sommese, R., Foster, I., Voelker,
               G. M., Savage, S., Claffy, K., and ACM, "Unresolved
               Issues", Proceedings of the ACM Internet Measurement
               Conference, DOI 10.1145/3419394.3423623, 27 October 2020,
               <http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3419394.3423623>.

               ACM, "Risky BIZness", Proceedings of the 21st ACM Internet
               Measurement Conference, DOI 10.1145/3487552.3487816, 2
               November 2021,
               <http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3487552.3487816>.

NEW:

    [LAME1]    Akiwate, G., Jonker, M., Sommese, R., Foster, I., Voelker,
               G. M., Savage, S., Claffy, K., and ACM, "Unresolved Issues: 
Prevalence, Persistence, and Perils of Lame Delegations", Proceedings of the ACM 
Internet Measurement
               Conference, DOI 10.1145/3419394.3423623, 27 October 2020,
               <http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3419394.3423623>.

    [LAME2]    Akiwate, G., Savage, S., Voelker, G. M., Claffy, K C, and
               ACM, "Risky BIZness: risks derived from registrar name 
management", Proceedings of the 21st ACM Internet
               Measurement Conference, DOI 10.1145/3487552.3487816, 2
               November 2021,
               <http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3487552.3487816>.

Done.

I'll await your response before I submit a new revision. Meanwhile, you can look at 
the combined above changes using this diff: 
https://author-tools.ietf.org/api/iddiff?doc_1=draft-ietf-dnsop-cds-consistency-08&url_2=https://raw.githubusercontent.com/peterthomassen/draft-ietf-dnsop-cds-consistency/refs/heads/main/draft-ietf-dnsop-cds-consistency-09.txt

Best,
Peter

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