Paul Wouters has entered the following ballot position for draft-ietf-dnsop-must-not-sha1-08: Yes
When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this introductory paragraph, however.) Please refer to https://www.ietf.org/about/groups/iesg/statements/handling-ballot-positions/ for more information about how to handle DISCUSS and COMMENT positions. The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dnsop-must-not-sha1/ ---------------------------------------------------------------------- COMMENT: ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Thanks for addressing my DISCUSS points and some of my comments. I have updated my ballot to Yes. I'll leave the one comment here below that didn't get incorporated in some way :) In the Operational Considerations, one could add a sentence about the difference of not supporting SHA-1 versus having a system that does not support SHA-1. The first results in an insecure validation, which is okay. The second can result in ServFail, which is not okay. Something along the lines of: When not supporting or disabling SHA-1, care should be given by implementers that the DNS software itself is made aware not to consume SHA-1. For example, disabling SHA-1 at the Operating System level could result in SHA-1 cryptographic failures within the DNS system, which would result in those zones failing, instead of the zones being treated as unsigned/insecure _______________________________________________ DNSOP mailing list -- [email protected] To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]
