Gunter Van de Velde has entered the following ballot position for draft-ietf-dnsop-must-not-sha1-06: No Objection
When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this introductory paragraph, however.) Please refer to https://www.ietf.org/about/groups/iesg/statements/handling-ballot-positions/ for more information about how to handle DISCUSS and COMMENT positions. The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dnsop-must-not-sha1/ ---------------------------------------------------------------------- COMMENT: ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Thanks for this write up. It reads and explains the reasoning well. The idnits tool spawns some messages. I have a single idnit observation on this draft. 74 RRSIG and Delegation Signer (DS) records, for example. Since then, 75 multiple other algorithms with stronger cryptographic strength are 76 now widely available for DS records and for DNSKEY and RRSIG records. 77 Readers are encouraged to consider switching to one of the 78 recommended algorithms listed in the [DNSKEY-IANA] and [DS-IANA] 79 tables, respectively. GV> I am not that familiar with DNSSEC and had to lookup DNSKEY and RRSIG records reference. Could a reference (rfc4034) be explicitly added for these? Potentially when more familiar with these technologies it is obvious and are well known records through. Be well, G/ _______________________________________________ DNSOP mailing list -- [email protected] To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]
