On Sun, Jun 18, 2023 at 06:12:27AM +0000, Geoff Huston wrote: > >> The BCP algorithm is ECDSAP256SHA256(13). This is both more secure and > >> more compact than RSA. It is in wide use: > >> > >> https://stats.dnssec-tools.org/ > >> https://stats.dnssec-tools.org/#/?dnssec_param_tab=0 > >> > >> Today, out of 22,010,850 known signed zones, the number with algorithm > >> 14 KSKs is 9,982,219 or just over 45%.
[ Apologies on the typo, that should also have been 13 not 14. ] Some days later, the total signed with algorithm 13 has crossed 10 million. > The last time I looked at the capabilities of validators in recursive > resolvers > comparing levels of support for RSA and ECDSA P256 SHA256 was in November 2021 > (https://www.potaroo.net/ispcol/2021-11/ecdsa.html) A more recent internal study shows negligible differences in validation rates between RSA(8) and ECDSA (13), the expected/unexpected success/failure rates are effectively the same. Any validating resolver that supports only RSA would be unable to validate 90 TLDs and ~45% of signed zones (10.04 million out of 22.45 million). At this point there should be no concerns about support for ECDSA P-256. If anything, given e.g. recent "crypto policies" in RedHat systems, there are now potential problems with RSA validation for the remaining pockets of zones signed with algorithms 5 and 7 (~20k and ~127k zones respectively). -- Viktor. _______________________________________________ dns-operations mailing list [email protected] https://lists.dns-oarc.net/mailman/listinfo/dns-operations
