On 08. 09. 21 11:12, Ruben van Staveren via dns-operations wrote:
Last month or so I saw two domains, postnl.nl <http://postnl.nl> and
minjenv.nl <http://minjenv.nl>, return incomplete NSEC3 records where
existing records where omitted from the Type Bit Maps.
This caused strange intermittent failures when a resolver was used that
implements aggressive use of DNSSEC validated cache (RFC8198, 4 years
old), e.g powerdns recursor 4.5.x.
e.g., the minjenv has a mx record, but it is not listed in the NSEC3
you’ll get if you query for the non existent A/AAAA record (only NS SOA
RRSIG DNSKEY NSEC3PARAM) causing mail delivery failures until the TTL
expires. postnl.nl <http://postnl.nl> has A/AAAA, but the NSEC3 seen for
a nonexistent query only has NS SOA MX TXT RRSIG DNSKEY NSEC3PARAM
It is not as such to contact the dns operators and persuade them to
upgrade/fix their software used for DNSSEC signing, but more as should
we do more analysis of this phenomenon and even have a dns flag day
before even more resolvers and operators are going to implement RFC8198?
There might be an issue by deliberately exploiting this and make
websites/mail unreachable.
Your estimate is correct, it's an old issue with F5 load balancers:
https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K00724442
It's an security issue and affected parties should patch their systems.
Detailed description of the problem can be found e.g. here:
https://en.blog.nic.cz/2019/07/10/error-in-dnssec-implementation-on-f5-big-ip-load-balancers/
--
Petr Špaček
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