#36257: Path Traversal Uncontrolled data used in path expression
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               Reporter:  odaysec        |          Owner:  odaysec
                   Type:  Uncategorized  |         Status:  assigned
              Component:  Packaging      |        Version:  5.1
               Severity:  Normal         |       Keywords:
           Triage Stage:  Unreviewed     |      Has patch:  0
    Needs documentation:  0              |    Needs tests:  0
Patch needs improvement:  0              |  Easy pickings:  0
                  UI/UX:  0              |
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https://github.com/django/django/blob/ef6a83789b310a441237a190a493c9586a4cb260/django/views/static.py#L60-L60

 Accessing files using paths constructed from user-controlled data can
 allow an attacker to access unexpected resources. This can result in
 sensitive information being revealed or deleted, or an attacker being able
 to influence behavior by modifying unexpected files.

 **## POC**
 In the first vulnerable, a file name is read from an HTTP request and then
 used to access a file. However, a malicious user could enter a file name
 that is an absolute path, such as `"/etc/passwd"`.

 In the second example, it appears that the user is restricted to opening a
 file within the `"user"` home directory. However, a malicious user could
 enter a file name containing special characters. the string
 `"../../../etc/passwd"` will result in the code reading the file located
 at `"/server/static/images/../../../etc/passwd"`, which is the system's
 password file. This file would then be sent back to the user, giving them
 access to all the system's passwords. Note that a user could also use an
 absolute path here, since the result of
 `os.path.join("/server/static/images/", "/etc/passwd")` is
 `"/etc/passwd"`.

 the path used to access the file system is normalized before being checked
 against a known prefix. This ensures that regardless of the user input,
 the resulting path is safe.

 ```js
 {{{
 import os.path
 from flask import Flask, request, abort

 app = Flask(__name__)

 @app.route("/user_picture1")
 def user_picture1():
     filename = request.args.get('p')
     # BAD: This could read any file on the file system
     data = open(filename, 'rb').read()
     return data

 @app.route("/user_picture2")
 def user_picture2():
     base_path = '/server/static/images'
     filename = request.args.get('p')
     # BAD: This could still read any file on the file system
     data = open(os.path.join(base_path, filename), 'rb').read()
     return data

 @app.route("/user_picture3")
 def user_picture3():
     base_path = '/server/static/images'
     filename = request.args.get('p')
     #GOOD -- Verify with normalised version of path
     fullpath = os.path.normpath(os.path.join(base_path, filename))
     if not fullpath.startswith(base_path):
         raise Exception("not allowed")
     data = open(fullpath, 'rb').read()
     return data
 }}}
 ```

 **## References**
 - https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Path_Traversal
 - http://werkzeug.pocoo.org/docs/utils/#werkzeug.utils.secure_filename
 - CWE-22
 - CWE-23
 - CWE-36
 - CWE-73
 - CWE-99
-- 
Ticket URL: <https://code.djangoproject.com/ticket/36257>
Django <https://code.djangoproject.com/>
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