"Serge E. Hallyn" <[email protected]> writes:

> Changelog:
>       Dec 8: Fixed bug in my check_kill_permission pointed out by
>              Eric Biederman.
>
> To test:
>       1. Test killing tasks as usual.  No change.
>       2. Clone a new user namespace without a new pidns.
>          a. You CAN kill -CONT tasks in your thread group but outside
>             your user ns.
>          b. You can NOT otherwise kill tasks outside your user_ns.
>          c. Inside your new userns, signal semantics are as normal
>             with respect to userids, CAP_KILL, and thread groups.
>
> Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <[email protected]>
> ---
>  kernel/signal.c |   27 ++++++++++++++++++++++-----
>  1 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/kernel/signal.c b/kernel/signal.c
> index 4e3cff1..677025c 100644
> --- a/kernel/signal.c
> +++ b/kernel/signal.c
> @@ -635,6 +635,27 @@ static inline bool si_fromuser(const struct siginfo 
> *info)
>               (!is_si_special(info) && SI_FROMUSER(info));
>  }
>  
> +static inline int kill_ok_by_cred(struct cred *cred, struct cred *tcred)
> +{
Nit: You should just pass in the target task here.
Making it abundantly clear where current and tcred come from.
ns_capable implicitly uses current which is a little surprising
when everything else is being passed in, but makes perfect sense
in this context.

> +     if (cred->user->user_ns != tcred->user->user_ns) {
> +             /* userids are not equivalent - either you have the
> +                capability to the target user ns or you don't */
> +             if (ns_capable(tcred->user->user_ns, CAP_KILL))
> +                     return 1;
> +             return 0;
> +     }
> +
> +     /* same user namespace - usual credentials checks apply */
> +     if ((cred->euid ^ tcred->suid) &&
> +         (cred->euid ^ tcred->uid) &&
> +         (cred->uid  ^ tcred->suid) &&
> +         (cred->uid  ^ tcred->uid) &&
> +         !ns_capable(tcred->user->user_ns, CAP_KILL))
> +             return 0;
> +
> +     return 1;
> +}
> +
>  /*
>   * Bad permissions for sending the signal
>   * - the caller must hold the RCU read lock
> @@ -659,11 +680,7 @@ static int check_kill_permission(int sig, struct siginfo 
> *info,
>       cred = current_cred();
>       tcred = __task_cred(t);
>       if (!same_thread_group(current, t) &&
> -         (cred->euid ^ tcred->suid) &&
> -         (cred->euid ^ tcred->uid) &&
> -         (cred->uid  ^ tcred->suid) &&
> -         (cred->uid  ^ tcred->uid) &&
> -         !capable(CAP_KILL)) {
> +         !kill_ok_by_cred(cred, tcred)) {
>               switch (sig) {
>               case SIGCONT:
>                       sid = task_session(t);
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