DO NOT REPLY TO THIS EMAIL, BUT PLEASE POST YOUR BUG· RELATED COMMENTS THROUGH THE WEB INTERFACE AVAILABLE AT <http://issues.apache.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=40222>. ANY REPLY MADE TO THIS MESSAGE WILL NOT BE COLLECTED AND· INSERTED IN THE BUG DATABASE.
http://issues.apache.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=40222 ------- Additional Comments From [EMAIL PROTECTED] 2006-12-26 11:31 ------- (In reply to comment #1) > Are you sure the same session is indeed carried over? I thought we'd > implemented the opposite (new session when moving from HTTP to HTTPS), quite > purposefully for security, as far back as Tomcat 3.x. See for example Yes, I am sure. The problem can be demonstrated like this: 1) Using HTTP, go to an insecure page which assigns a JSESSIONID (eg. any JSF page) 2) Notice the JSESSIONID (which can be sniffed on the network by man-in-the-middle) 3) Go to an authenticated HTTPS page (eg. via form-based login). Look at the "secure data". The JSESSIONID is still the same! 4) From another computer, write the URL of the authenticated page including the JSESSIOND obtained in step 2 above. Bingo - the hacker is in! In order to circumvent the problem, we had to insert code into the login page which invalidates previously assigned session, loosing all session info. An easy fix in Tomcat would be to change (or append) the JSESSIONID upon switching from HTTP to HTTPS. Switching from HTTPS to HTTP is already forbidden as you mention, which is correct. Tomas -- Configure bugmail: http://issues.apache.org/bugzilla/userprefs.cgi?tab=email ------- You are receiving this mail because: ------- You are the assignee for the bug, or are watching the assignee. --------------------------------------------------------------------- To unsubscribe, e-mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED] For additional commands, e-mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
