Author: rjung
Date: Tue Apr 19 09:15:43 2016
New Revision: 1739875
URL: http://svn.apache.org/viewvc?rev=1739875&view=rev
Log:
Remove the explicit CRL check when verifying
certificates. The checks were already part
of the internal certification verification
since OpenSSL 0.9.7.
Backport from mod_ssl.
This fixes the remaining incompatibility with
recent OpenSSL 1.1.0 API changes.
Modified:
tomcat/native/trunk/native/src/sslutils.c
tomcat/native/trunk/xdocs/miscellaneous/changelog.xml
Modified: tomcat/native/trunk/native/src/sslutils.c
URL:
http://svn.apache.org/viewvc/tomcat/native/trunk/native/src/sslutils.c?rev=1739875&r1=1739874&r2=1739875&view=diff
==============================================================================
--- tomcat/native/trunk/native/src/sslutils.c (original)
+++ tomcat/native/trunk/native/src/sslutils.c Tue Apr 19 09:15:43 2016
@@ -287,171 +287,6 @@ int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain(SSL_CT
return n;
}
-static int ssl_X509_STORE_lookup(X509_STORE *store, int yype,
- X509_NAME *name, X509_OBJECT **obj)
-{
- X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
- int rc;
-
- ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
- X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, store, NULL, NULL);
-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
- rc = X509_STORE_get_by_subject(ctx, yype, name, *obj);
-#else
- *obj = X509_STORE_get_X509_by_subject(ctx, yype, name);
- if (*obj == NULL) {
- rc = -1;
- }
-#endif
- X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
- X509_STORE_CTX_free(ctx);
- return rc;
-}
-
-static int ssl_verify_CRL(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, tcn_ssl_conn_t *con)
-{
- X509_OBJECT *obj;
- X509_NAME *subject, *issuer;
- X509 *cert;
- X509_CRL *crl;
- EVP_PKEY *pubkey;
- int i, n, rc;
-
- /*
- * Determine certificate ingredients in advance
- */
- cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx);
- subject = X509_get_subject_name(cert);
- issuer = X509_get_issuer_name(cert);
-
- /*
- * OpenSSL provides the general mechanism to deal with CRLs but does not
- * use them automatically when verifying certificates, so we do it
- * explicitly here. We will check the CRL for the currently checked
- * certificate, if there is such a CRL in the store.
- *
- * We come through this procedure for each certificate in the certificate
- * chain, starting with the root-CA's certificate. At each step we've to
- * both verify the signature on the CRL (to make sure it's a valid CRL)
- * and it's revocation list (to make sure the current certificate isn't
- * revoked). But because to check the signature on the CRL we need the
- * public key of the issuing CA certificate (which was already processed
- * one round before), we've a little problem. But we can both solve it and
- * at the same time optimize the processing by using the following
- * verification scheme (idea and code snippets borrowed from the GLOBUS
- * project):
- *
- * 1. We'll check the signature of a CRL in each step when we find a CRL
- * through the _subject_ name of the current certificate. This CRL
- * itself will be needed the first time in the next round, of course.
- * But we do the signature processing one round before this where the
- * public key of the CA is available.
- *
- * 2. We'll check the revocation list of a CRL in each step when
- * we find a CRL through the _issuer_ name of the current certificate.
- * This CRLs signature was then already verified one round before.
- *
- * This verification scheme allows a CA to revoke its own certificate as
- * well, of course.
- */
-
- /*
- * Try to retrieve a CRL corresponding to the _subject_ of
- * the current certificate in order to verify it's integrity.
- */
-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
- obj = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (*obj));
- memset((char *)obj, 0, sizeof(*obj));
-#endif
- rc = ssl_X509_STORE_lookup(con->ctx->crl,
- X509_LU_CRL, subject, &obj);
- /* XXX obj is now OPAQUE */
- crl = obj->data.crl;
-
- if ((rc > 0) && crl) {
- /*
- * Log information about CRL
- * (A little bit complicated because of ASN.1 and BIOs...)
- */
- /*
- * Verify the signature on this CRL
- */
- pubkey = X509_get_pubkey(cert);
- rc = X509_CRL_verify(crl, pubkey);
- /* Only refcounted in OpenSSL */
- if (pubkey)
- EVP_PKEY_free(pubkey);
- if (rc <= 0) {
- /* TODO: Log Invalid signature on CRL */
- X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE);
- X509_OBJECT_free(obj);
- return 0;
- }
-
- /*
- * Check date of CRL to make sure it's not expired
- */
- i = X509_cmp_current_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl));
-
- if (i == 0) {
- /* TODO: Log Found CRL has invalid nextUpdate field */
-
- X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx,
-
X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD);
- X509_OBJECT_free(obj);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (i < 0) {
- /* TODO: Log Found CRL is expired */
- X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED);
- X509_OBJECT_free(obj);
-
- return 0;
- }
-
- X509_OBJECT_free(obj);
- }
-
- /*
- * Try to retrieve a CRL corresponding to the _issuer_ of
- * the current certificate in order to check for revocation.
- */
-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
- obj = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (*obj));
- memset((char *)obj, 0, sizeof(*obj));
-#endif
- rc = ssl_X509_STORE_lookup(con->ctx->crl,
- X509_LU_CRL, issuer, &obj);
-
- /* XXX obj is now OPAQUE */
- crl = obj->data.crl;
- if ((rc > 0) && crl) {
- /*
- * Check if the current certificate is revoked by this CRL
- */
- n = sk_X509_REVOKED_num(X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(crl));
-
- for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
- X509_REVOKED *revoked =
- sk_X509_REVOKED_value(X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(crl), i);
-
- ASN1_INTEGER *sn = X509_REVOKED_get0_serialNumber(revoked);
-
- if (!ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(sn, X509_get_serialNumber(cert))) {
- X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED);
- X509_OBJECT_free(obj);
-
- return 0;
- }
- }
-
- X509_OBJECT_free(obj);
- }
-
- return ok;
-}
-
/*
* This OpenSSL callback function is called when OpenSSL
* does client authentication and verifies the certificate chain.
@@ -469,7 +304,6 @@ int SSL_callback_SSL_verify(int ok, X509
int errdepth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx);
int verify = con->ctx->verify_mode;
int depth = con->ctx->verify_depth;
- int skip_crl = 0;
if (verify == SSL_CVERIFY_UNSET ||
verify == SSL_CVERIFY_NONE)
@@ -481,6 +315,22 @@ int SSL_callback_SSL_verify(int ok, X509
SSL_set_verify_result(ssl, X509_V_OK);
}
+ /*
+ * Expired certificates vs. "expired" CRLs: by default, OpenSSL
+ * turns X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED into a "certificate_expired(45)"
+ * SSL alert, but that's not really the message we should convey to the
+ * peer (at the very least, it's confusing, and in many cases, it's also
+ * inaccurate, as the certificate itself may very well not have expired
+ * yet). We set the X509_STORE_CTX error to something which OpenSSL's
+ * s3_both.c:ssl_verify_alarm_type() maps to SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN,
+ * i.e. the peer will receive a "certificate_unknown(46)" alert.
+ * We do not touch errnum, though, so that later on we will still log
+ * the "real" error, as returned by OpenSSL.
+ */
+ if (!ok && errnum == X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED) {
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, -1);
+ }
+
#ifdef HAVE_OCSP_STAPLING
/* First perform OCSP validation if possible */
if (ok) {
@@ -495,30 +345,18 @@ int SSL_callback_SSL_verify(int ok, X509
}
else {
int ocsp_response = ssl_verify_OCSP(ok, ctx);
- if (ocsp_response == OCSP_STATUS_OK) {
- skip_crl = 1; /* we know it is valid we skip crl evaluation */
- }
- else if (ocsp_response == OCSP_STATUS_REVOKED) {
+ if (ocsp_response == OCSP_STATUS_REVOKED) {
ok = 0 ;
errnum = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
}
else if (ocsp_response == OCSP_STATUS_UNKNOWN) {
- /* TODO: do nothing for time being, continue with CRL */
+ /* TODO: do nothing for time being */
;
}
}
}
#endif
/*
- * Additionally perform CRL-based revocation checks
- */
- if (ok && con->ctx->crl && !skip_crl) {
- if (!(ok = ssl_verify_CRL(ok, ctx, con))) {
- errnum = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
- /* TODO: Log something */
- }
- }
- /*
* If we already know it's not ok, log the real reason
*/
if (!ok) {
@@ -660,6 +498,26 @@ static int ssl_verify_OCSP(int ok, X509_
int r = OCSP_STATUS_UNKNOWN;
cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx);
+
+ if (!cert) {
+ /* starting with OpenSSL 1.0, X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert()
+ * may yield NULL. Return early, but leave the ctx error as is. */
+ return OCSP_STATUS_UNKNOWN;
+ }
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
+ else if (cert->valid && X509_check_issued(cert,cert) == X509_V_OK) {
+#else
+ /* No need to check cert->valid, because ssl_verify_OCSP() only
+ * is called if OpenSSL already successfully verified the certificate
+ * (parameter "ok" in SSL_callback_SSL_verify() must be true).
+ */
+ else if (X509_check_issued(cert,cert) == X509_V_OK) {
+#endif
+ /* don't do OCSP checking for valid self-issued certs */
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, X509_V_OK);
+ return OCSP_STATUS_UNKNOWN;
+ }
+
/* if we can't get the issuer, we cannot perform OCSP verification */
if (X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer(&issuer, ctx, cert) == 1 ) {
r = ssl_ocsp_request(cert, issuer);
@@ -668,7 +526,7 @@ static int ssl_verify_OCSP(int ok, X509_
X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED);
}
else {
- /* else we return unknown, so that we can continue with the crl */
+ /* else we return unknown */
r = OCSP_STATUS_UNKNOWN;
}
X509_free(issuer); /* It appears that we should free issuer since
Modified: tomcat/native/trunk/xdocs/miscellaneous/changelog.xml
URL:
http://svn.apache.org/viewvc/tomcat/native/trunk/xdocs/miscellaneous/changelog.xml?rev=1739875&r1=1739874&r2=1739875&view=diff
==============================================================================
--- tomcat/native/trunk/xdocs/miscellaneous/changelog.xml (original)
+++ tomcat/native/trunk/xdocs/miscellaneous/changelog.xml Tue Apr 19 09:15:43
2016
@@ -57,6 +57,12 @@
<add>
Add support for using Java keystores for certificate chains. (markt)
</add>
+ <update>
+ Remove the explicit CRL check when verifying certificates.
+ The checks were already part of the internal certification
+ verification since OpenSSL 0.9.7. Backport from mod_ssl.
+ (rjung)
+ </update>
</changelog>
</section>
<section name="Changes in 1.2.5">
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