GitHub user adnanhemani added a comment to the discussion: Security Concern: Vended Credentials — Credential Delegation Violation & Workload Identity Binding
@RB-ETArch - I'm not sure I understand what you mean by this. If the client (e.g. Spark) is the one that is fetching its own STS token since you are not using Polaris' vended credentials, then the client itself is in charge of requesting whatever credentials it wants from a token broker service like STS. In that case, it is your client that must be set up to downscope the credentials as per the request that it is in charge of making; Polaris is no longer involved. In the case of a compromised Spark node (like you've mentioned in your original message as an attack vector), any downscoping of credentials in this model is practically useless, as user-defined code running on that compromised node can go grab the whole set of permissions per any IAM roles or policies that node is capable of using. This is exactly why credential vending in Iceberg REST Catalogs (IRC) are powerful and are widely used - the client effectively can only get the set of credentials that the IRC allows it, rather than needing to set each client up with extremely specific IAM roles/policies (which is also quite hard to do in a multi-tenant environment). GitHub link: https://github.com/apache/polaris/discussions/3972#discussioncomment-16203949 ---- This is an automatically sent email for [email protected]. To unsubscribe, please send an email to: [email protected]
