When it comes to key material, it's an outstanding idea to err on the side of caution.
Does anyone actually require this feature in a non-debug build? If not, then it's completely unreasonable to leave it in such builds, even if it's not the weakest link and even if it doesn't break compliance. --Falcon Darkstar Momot --Security Consultant, Leviathan Security Group On 16/07/2014 16:37, Robert Relyea wrote: > On 07/16/2014 07:31 AM, Jonathan Schulze-Hewett wrote: >> Does having this enabled violate the FIPS 140 requirements on >> exposing key materials in the clear? > > No, because the key logging fails if you are in FIPS mode (It used the > PK11_ExtractKeyValue() to get the key, which will return an error in > FIPS mode. > > In general, it's pretty difficult for anything in the SSL layer to > actually foil FIPS because FIPS is implemented in softoken itself. > > bob >> >> Sincerely, >> Jonathan >> >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: dev-tech-crypto >> [mailto:dev-tech-crypto-bounces+schulze-hewett=infoseccorp....@lists.mozilla.org] >> On Behalf Of Ryan Sleevi >> Sent: Tuesday, July 15, 2014 6:12 PM >> To: mozilla's crypto code discussion list >> Subject: Re: SSLKEYLOGFILE always enabled >> >> On Tue, July 15, 2014 1:11 pm, Tom Ritter wrote: >>> Is having it in by default useful enough to outweigh the risk? >>> >>> When the Dual_EC_DRBG news stories were blowing it, it was revealed >>> that you could switch to it by just changing the Windows Registry. >>> It's a Windows-supported backdoor - no malicious code needs to stay >>> running on your system - just flip that bit, and delete yourself. >>> After that, you're all set. >>> >>> Similarly, having this feature provided by default seems like it >>> provides a very easy, supported way to extract sensitive key data to >>> the filesystem or some other covert channel - without invalidating >>> package signatures, hashes of libraries or binaries, etc. >>> >>> Don't get me wrong, it's invaluable to be able to use it for >>> debugging, but I question to need to have it enabled by default... >>> >>> -tom >> Either you control your machine, or you do not. Either the OS provides >> robust controls, or it does not. >> >> If an attacker has physical access to your machine and can set this, >> or if >> an attacker can control your operating environment such that the >> environment variable is set, it's all over. This is no different than >> malware hijacking your browser of choice and hooking the API calls - >> which >> we do see for both Firefox and Chrome. >> >> Now, we can talk about grades of attacks, and finer nuances, but for a >> debug bit that has to be set client side, it really seems a no-op, >> and for >> which common sense would suggest is not a reasonable threat model. >> > > > >
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