Le vendredi 25 avril 2014 21:09:58 UTC+2, Martin Paljak a écrit :
> On Fri, Apr 25, 2014 at 4:59 PM, Erwann Abalea <eaba...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > AKI is only a helper for certificate path building.
> > It's mandatory for CAs to issue certificates with matching keyIdentifiers
> > (issued.AKI.keyIdentifier = issuer.SKI), but it's not mandatory for relying
> > parties to verify that the values match.
>
>
> While I might agree to the reasoning behind why it doesn't matter, I
> don't see why a cautious implementation (not to call it *paranoid*
> which might have a different meaning to some) does not *check* what
> others are *required to do*. And do that *by default*. Not doing it
> under some more relaxed conditions ("export cipher" anyone ?).
Priorities. Let them first do their mandatory duties, and *then* add some
paranoid checks.
Took a quick look at the code, it looks like KU/EKU checks is ok,
BasicConstraints checks are weirdly done, NameConstraints checks are hard to
follow, CertificatePolicies checks is a joke. I now notice that I didn't see
date checks (I may have missed it). Init part of the validation code follows
RFC5280 algorithm, but that's all.
Revocation checking is done by OCSP only.
And there's a LOT of magic values everywhere; I noticed them first for OID
comparisons, but there's little to no use of an ASN.1/DER parser (IIRC, there's
already 2 implementations in NSS).
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