On 12/15/2013 05:20 AM, sworddrag...@gmail.com wrote: > Thanks for the detailed answer. > >> 1. my disk encryption keys > > I'm on ecrypfs so this should be fine. > > >> 2. my OS user account passphrase > > Luckily they are hashed on my Linux system. > > >> 3. my SSH keys >> 4. my GPG keys > > As they are normally in the home directory they are protected by ecryptfs. > > > So this makes at least my system most vulnerable by a cold boot attack.
Ok - what I was saying before is that, in the event of a cold boot attack (attacker seizes your running system), many of these items will be decrypted in memory at that time and thus ecryptfs will not protect them. For example, your disk encryption keys are held decrypted in memory, otherwise your computer would not be able to to read/write the disk. If you use user agents (gpg-agent or ssh-agent), they often typically cache decrypted keys for some interval after successful authentication so you don't have to type your passphrase every time. > > Just to go sure: As I know if security.ask_for_password is set to 1 Firefox > will always ask for the master password. I'm assuming now Firefox does > overwrite it in the memory too immediately after it was entered and Firefox > could (not) find the needed username/password entries. Or am I wrong? Sorry, I do not know. Use the source, Luke! -- dev-tech-crypto mailing list dev-tech-crypto@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-tech-crypto
