On Tue, Jul 26, 2011 at 1:30 PM, Brian Smith <bsm...@mozilla.com> wrote:
> Mozilla would like to expose a secure PRNG (basically, a wrapper around 
> PK11_GenerateRandom) to JavaScript content:
> https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=440046
>
> There is some agreement that we should maintain separate PRNG state for each 
> origin (roughly: domain name), and that all those states should be separate 
> from the PRNG state used internally. PK11_GenerateRandom currently shares the 
> PRNG state across all callers. Does anybody disagree about this separation 
> being necessary?

I just want to note my objection to this proposal before I forget
again.  I won't repeat the arguments given by Nelson Bolyard and Marsh
Ray.

Wan-Teh Chang
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