FYI:

Estonia has WPKI, eID keys on SIM cards, a SIM application triggered
via OTA messages.

This is often suggested as either an overall replacement or additional
method for cases when browser based PKI (SSL+server conf+signature
plugins/applets) miserably fails, for whatever reason.

Unfortunately it often fails for either technical or usability
reasons, because for historical reasons, in Estonia the picture is
messy with several bits and pieces on different platforms and
browsers, which changes with either OS or browser updates and require
re-installation of the client software to make it work again. It is
also messy because of the "freedom" of every web site owner to choose
the components he likes - everyone can roll their own applets for
example, that all behave differently on different platforms for
example, or play with SSLVerifyClient mod_ssl option.

WPKI on the other hand Just Works, the same way, with all browsers, on
all platforms, without any additional software. And there is just a
single  culprit to blame when things fail - the GSM operator, unlike
smart cards where one sometimes has to explain why the fscked up OS X
10.5 PC/SC stack causes a useless "ssl_handshake_failure_alert" page
in Firefox and that closing the browser (to clear the SSL cache) and
re-plugging your reader and smart card helps.

There are also downsides: mID (mobile-ID) is not as universal and
available to application developers as it is a server2server
application which requires a subscription deal and costs money with
every transaction. eID smart cards on the other hand are free to use,
offer better end-to-end security and cost no extra money per
transaction.

The problem is that SSL, which has some very nice properties from
security point of view,  is not suitable for an end user friendly
authentication mechanism on the web. It is a nice technical mechanism
that is buried deep in the protocol stack for already many years,
designed by security technologists and programmers, and now "exposed"
to users because *technically* smart cards fit in that framework.
Loading PKCS#11 modules to make things work? Whaaat? It can be
mitigated by extensions and installers, but hey... A user on some
forum in Estonia suggested a really nice "it is possible with
software" solution: "why don't you already build a browser-like
application that would work on all platforms and would contain all the
necessary software to make it work ???"

Which would be indeed a much easier to maintain solution with
predictable usability, instead of providing "bits and pieces",
plugins, framweworks and what not to please the
USB/CCID/expresscard/pcmcia/PCSC/PKCS#11/CryptoAPI/tokend/applet/plugin/firefox/IE/Opera/Chrome/whatnot
monster.

Ask anyone who deals with interaction design about what they think of
smart cards and browser usability and then count the used swear
words...


-- 
Martin Paljak
http://martin.paljak.pri.ee
GSM:+3725156495




2009/10/8 Ian G <i...@iang.org>:
> On 07/10/2009 22:17, Anders Rundgren wrote:
>>
>> I don't believe that client certificates in PCs will ever become
>> mainstream since
>> credential mobility and distribution issues have proved to be
>> insurmountable; not
>> technically but politically.
>>
>> However, in mobile phones at least the mobility issue is solved
>> (phone=token) which
>> is also the reason why useful distribution schemes will start there as
>> well.
>>
>> Since phones also have limited screen resources, PKI GUI improvement is
>> also called for.  Certificates will most likely be represented as cards
>> through an
>> image that either is embedded in the certificate (PKIX) or be supplied as
>> a
>> separate attribute during provisioning (KeyGen2).
>>
>> Will this one day reach the PC?  No, you will still use the phone as the
>> token
>> (and token selector/executor) while the PC crypto will be bypassed.  NFC
>> does the connection together with Wi-Fi.
>
>
> Hmmm!  Interesting thoughts.
>
> iang
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