Ian G wrote:
Most will be upgrading anyway since Microsoft is planning on expunging all root certs less than 2k from their trusted list. I suspect that the remaining ones are either CA's that only operation in FF/Opra world, or are inactive. I don't know of any of the former that aren't actively looking to eventually get into the Microsoft root store as well...Are we going to enforce a 2048-bit root requirement after Dec 31, 2010 (per NIST non-classified recommendation)? If so, we need to get the Digital Signature Trust Co Global CAs to update.I would vote against following NIST on this. But it would be a reasonable thing to send a message to the appropriate CAs and ask them to consider upgrading.
For firefox no. In theory Thunderbird could have email messages that pre-date the expiration of the CA's.The DSTCA X1 and DSTCA X2 CAs (page 3, bottom) have already expired in 2008. Are they going to be removed?If there is no semantic difference, I guess they should be?
The CA's themselves are not an issue if we want to get rid of MD-5. There are 2 CA's on the list that are signed by MD-2 and turning off MD-2 did not affect those. NSS accepts root certs as is and does not need to validate their signatures. Turning off MD-5 is only an issue for intermediates and end user certificated signed by MD-5. Also, having root cert signed by MD-5 means that there is a ready availablity of MD-5 signed hashes so if MD-5 ever becomes vulnerable to 2nd pre-image attacks our only protection would be to turn MD-5 off in the browser (which wouldn't affect the Root cert, but would affect intermediates and end user certificates).We've already had discussion why MD5 on the root isn't worrisome or bothersome. I'm assuming that there are no attributes of the certificate which contains the trust anchor which are actually checked, and that the trust-bits are effectively set on the key included in the certificate itself?The annoying thing is that with MD5 in the cert, NSS can't "get rid of MD5". But, maybe that isn't an issue anyway.
bob
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