On 28.12.2008 14:23, Ian G wrote:
[1] disclosure, I work as an auditor
So, Ian, what are you trying to tell us? We can't yank roots. We can't
rely on audits. How are we supposed to restore and ensure proper
operation of the system?
Obviously, just trusting CAs blindly and hoping for the best doesn't work.
Not even an interested, security-conscious user can just walk into a CA
and verify their operations, so they *have* to rely on us.
Being able to yank roots, and relying on the auditor to verify and
ensure that the actual, day-to-day operations follow the documented
processes, and reading the process document to verify that it meets the
requirements of our policy and our user's needs, is fundamental to the
whole SSL thingy. Otherwise it's useless snake-oil, which harms users
who rely on it - on *us* (Mozilla).
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