Kyle Hamilton wrote: > I hate to say this, but this IS The Worst-Case Scenario. A CA has > gone rogue and issued certificates that violate its standards, and the > standards of the root programs that it's a part of -- it is true that > Comodo didn't /intend/ to go rogue, but it has, and we can't afford to > let it damage the greater PKI. Since every CA in the root store is > treated the same, there is no differentiation between them -- and this > means that Verisign and Comodo and Thawte and *every* CA share the > same reputation. If one goes rogue, it's exactly the same as if all > of them have gone rogue, in the eye of the end-user.
I fully agree here. That's why I support to remove the trust bit from the Comodo root CA cert immediately and make them go through the whole process of applying to be a trusted root CA. > THIS is why I want to see greater differentiation in the browser > chrome between CAs, so that one bad apple doesn't spoil the whole root > barrel. I don't think that's feasible. Nobody will be able to deal with that differentiation. That's also the reason why I think that EV certs does not help. The problem is the lack of auditing CAs and then punishing rogue CAs. Ciao, Michael. _______________________________________________ dev-tech-crypto mailing list dev-tech-crypto@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-tech-crypto
