Thorsten Becker wrote, On 2008-07-23 03:38: > One problem I have with the current implementation > is: A user gets a big warning about an unknown and untrusted > certificate. In the next step, he can add an exception. That process is > a bit difficult. And it should be difficult. I totally agree with that. > But if you go through the process of adding an exception (and don't > think about it, as the average "Joe User" most likely does), the > exception is stored permanently. You won't get a warning the next time > you visit the site.
That's on purpose. > I think the solution that Jean-Marc outlined above would make some > sense: It would make it a bit easier to visit certain sites, but disturb > permanently if someone visits a site that has no trust anchor in firefox. There's a great deal of evidence, and consensus in the UI and security community, that UI error/warning dialogs that are easily dismissed condition users to dismiss them without thinking. Users who do it often enough actually reach a point where they are no longer consciously aware that they're experiencing the dialog, nor that they're actively dismissing it. When that happens, the error dialog loses all value. It might as well not exist, because it has no effect. The fact that people are now noticing the dialogs, and reacting to them, means that the UI change is having at least some of the desired effect. It's making people pay attention to the dialogs. It's a sad fact that many people simply refuse to believe, or are incapable of believing, that there could be any downside to overriding all such errors, and will go to any length to do so. But that doesn't mean we should stop trying. _______________________________________________ dev-tech-crypto mailing list dev-tech-crypto@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-tech-crypto
