On 11/16/2007 1:19 AM, Eddy Nigg (StartCom Ltd.) wrote:
> Nelson Bolyard wrote:
>> I agree that the questions you asked are the important ones to be
>> answered.  And I think Mozilla should require that the answers come
>> straight from the auditor/accreditor, and NOT from the CA itself,
>> as accepting papers from the CA provides too much temptation to forge
>> such documents.
>>
>> But, How does paper improve this?
>>   
> Paper is easier to handle from the legal point of view. If if it's 
> forged, one can prove even exactly that as well in a court much easier...
>> Is it a matter is persistence, i.e. that Mozilla can rely on the papers
>> even if the auditor's web site goes down?
>> I would rather rely on a page from the auditor's web site than from
>> papers received from the CA, purporting to be from the auditor!
>>   
> As I tried to explain initially:
> 
> Who: The company and responsible person(s) which signed the audit 
> (Something which can be verified with very little effort).
> When: When was the audit performed and and signed.
> Where:Where was the audit performed and signed.
> What: What does it all include...
> 
> Usually all the above is provided in the attestation by the auditor. And 
> most software (+browser) vendors require CAs to send in real paper. I 
> think Mozilla is the exception here. BTW, also the auditor web site can 
> go down at some point, leaving Mozilla with absolutely nothing...
> 

Somehow, I thought we were entering an era of electronic notaries and
signatures.  See, for example,
<http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-bin/displaycode?section=gov&group=00001-01000&file=1-26>
and <http://www.sos.ca.gov/digsig/digsig.htm> for how California has
been handling electronic signatures by government agencies for a few
years.

-- 
David E. Ross
<http://www.rossde.com/>

Natural foods can be harmful:  Look at all the
people who die of natural causes.
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