I have updated the "Acceptable remediation" section of
https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA/Audit_Letter_Validation#Intermediate_Certificates
as follows.

I will greatly appreciate your review and input on this.

~~
Acceptable remediation:
Remediation may include one of the following when a non-technically-constrained intermediate certificate is missing from an audit statement. Note that Mozilla's Root Store Policy says: "If the CA has a currently valid audit report at the time of creation of the certificate, then the new certificate MUST appear on the CA's next periodic audit reports."

- Have your auditor issue a revised report that includes the intermediate certificate. -- This will not be an acceptable remediation if the certificate has been in existence for past audit periods. -- This is an acceptable remediation when the certificate is self-signed and has the same Subject and SPKI as other certificates listed in the audit statement. For example, this can happen when Mozilla includes one version of a root certificate, but another version of the root certificate can be part of a valid chain constructed as: leaf --> untrusted root --> trusted root.

- Revoke the intermediate certificate in accordance with Mozilla's Root Store Policy. -- If your CA decides not to revoke the certificate within the timeline specified by section 4.9 of the BRs, then that is another incident, which must be addressed in a separate Incident Report.

- If the intermediate certificate is technically capable but not intended for TLS issuance, and revocation is not imminent, you may request that Mozilla add it to OneCRL by adding a comment to the Bugzilla bug with the request and sending email to Mozilla. Note: While adding the certificate to OneCRL satisfies Mozilla's expectations for remediation, it may not satisfy other root store programs. You are advised to seek their guidance on this issue.
~~

Thanks,
Kathleen
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