At this point it seems unlikely that I will have time to fix this for Firefox 54, so most-likely it will be Firefox 55.
--BDS On Tue, Feb 14, 2017 at 8:54 PM, 段垚 <duan...@ustc.edu> wrote: > Seems I failed to convince you to change the plan. > > So the last question is: when will this happen? > > > > 在 2017/2/15 2:54, Till Schneidereit 写道: > >> On Tue, Feb 14, 2017 at 12:00 PM, 段垚 <duan...@ustc.edu> wrote: >> >> >>> 在 2017/2/14 18:10, Till Schneidereit 写道: >>> >>> On Tue, Feb 14, 2017 at 12:14 AM, 段垚 <duan...@ustc.edu> wrote: >>>> >>>> I guess all popular softwares have exploits being traded. How this fact >>>> >>>>> invalidates my argument? >>>>>> >>>>>>> I was responding to your point about the threat declining because of >>>>>>> >>>>>> the >>>>>> declining usage of Flash. This is demonstrably not true. >>>>>> >>>>>> Why? Assume >>>>>> >>>>> threat_of_flash = exploits_of_flash_per_year * >>>>> usage_of_flash_per_year >>>>> >>>>> If usage_of_flash_per_year is declining but threat_of_flash is >>>>> increasing, >>>>> then exploits_of_flash_per_year must be increasing. >>>>> But the report you cited does not provide such data. >>>>> >>>>> That assumption doesn't hold: malicious uses of Flash don't need >>>>> >>>> non-malicious ones. >>>> >>>> I agree. So let me ask this question instead: is there any proof that >>> local-only Flash >>> exploits are increasing? >>> >>> I don't know. I do know that legitimate usage of Flash, be it via file: >> or >> otherwise, is steadily declining. That's all that's needed to change the >> cost/benefit balance here. >> >> >> In fact it seems quite likely that there'll be an inverse relationship: >>>> less (non-malicious) usage means less testing of potentially exploitable >>>> code paths, which would increase the threat. >>>> >>>> I would assume Adobe will actively test Flash plugin with local contents >>> for a reasonablely long time. Do you mean tests in Firefox for local >>> Flash >>> contents >>> will inevitably decrease even if you don't disable it? >>> >>> What I'm saying is that testing and hardening against attacks isn't free, >> so requires investing resources. This entire thread is based on the >> conclusion that Flash usage has diminished to a point where it's can no >> longer a good investment of resources to keep doing these activities for >> this fairly niche-usage of Flash. >> >> >> One solution to this is to decouple the amount of testing done for those >>>> code paths from how frequently they're used. In practice that's not >>>> trivial >>>> because at least some testing comes in the form of investigating crash >>>> reports from users. Another solution is what's proposed here: disable >>>> less-well tested configurations altogether. >>>> >>>> Also I think forbidding non-http(s) Flash does not fix thoses exploits >>>>> >>>>>> magically. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Sure, this is about reducing attack surface, not completely >>>>>>> eliminating >>>>>>> >>>>>> it. >>>>>> >>>>>> Non-http(s) Flash takes only a small fraction of all Flash contents, >>>>>> >>>>> even >>>>> for users who do use non-http(s) Flash. >>>>> I don't think users want to drop their local Flash for a small fraction >>>>> of >>>>> reduced attack surface, >>>>> especially if those local Flash don't have alternatives yet. The more >>>>> practical reaction is trying another browser. >>>>> >>>>> The underlying assumption here is that these usages of Flash are rare >>>> enough that the incompatibility, while unfortunate, becomes acceptable. >>>> Note that other browser vendors are planning their own measures for >>>> restricting Flash usage, too. >>>> >>>> Although usage of local Flash is rare, I'd point out that local Flash >>> contents usually have higher >>> value than those on web sites, Because users only save important contents >>> to disks. >>> Additionally, local Flash contents are much harder to replace than those >>> on web sites >>> because users can hardly contact the author. Please consider more for >>> users. >>> >>> We are doing precisely that, but we believe that our users are better >> served by us investing resources in tasks that have more impact. Again, >> the >> underlying assumption in this entire thread is that our users won't be >> affected as strongly as you assume, or few enough will. >> _______________________________________________ >> dev-platform mailing list >> dev-platform@lists.mozilla.org >> https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-platform >> > > > _______________________________________________ > dev-platform mailing list > dev-platform@lists.mozilla.org > https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-platform > _______________________________________________ dev-platform mailing list dev-platform@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-platform
