Package: xorg-server Version: 2:21.1.18-2 Severity: normal Tags: patch pending X-Debbugs-CC: [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected]
Dear maintainers, I've prepared an NMU for xorg-server (versioned as 2:21.1.18-2.1) and uploaded it to DELAYED/2. Please feel free to tell me if I should cancel it. But ideally we can have this in unstable before we release the DSAs for trixie-security and bookworm-security, while Thorsten prepared the bullseye-security one. Regards, Salvatore
diffstat for xorg-server_21.1.18-2 xorg-server_21.1.18-2.1 debian/patches/CVE-2025-62229/0001-present-Fix-use-after-free-in-present_create_notifie.patch | 86 +++++++++ debian/patches/CVE-2025-62230/0001-xkb-Make-the-RT_XKBCLIENT-resource-private.patch | 57 ++++++ debian/patches/CVE-2025-62230/0002-xkb-Free-the-XKB-resource-when-freeing-XkbInterest.patch | 87 ++++++++++ debian/patches/CVE-2025-62231/0001-xkb-Prevent-overflow-in-XkbSetCompatMap.patch | 47 +++++ xorg-server-21.1.18/debian/changelog | 10 + xorg-server-21.1.18/debian/patches/series | 4 6 files changed, 291 insertions(+) diff -u xorg-server-21.1.18/debian/changelog xorg-server-21.1.18/debian/changelog --- xorg-server-21.1.18/debian/changelog +++ xorg-server-21.1.18/debian/changelog @@ -1,3 +1,13 @@ +xorg-server (2:21.1.18-2.1) unstable; urgency=medium + + * Non-maintainer upload. + * present: Fix use-after-free in present_create_notifies() (CVE-2025-62229) + * xkb: Make the RT_XKBCLIENT resource private (CVE-2025-62230) + * xkb: Free the XKB resource when freeing XkbInterest (CVE-2025-62230) + * xkb: Prevent overflow in XkbSetCompatMap() (CVE-2025-62231) + + -- Salvatore Bonaccorso <[email protected]> Mon, 27 Oct 2025 17:44:51 +0100 + xorg-server (2:21.1.18-2) unstable; urgency=medium [ NoisyCoil ] diff -u xorg-server-21.1.18/debian/patches/series xorg-server-21.1.18/debian/patches/series --- xorg-server-21.1.18/debian/patches/series +++ xorg-server-21.1.18/debian/patches/series @@ -2,3 +2,7 @@ 05_Revert-Unload-submodules.diff 06_use-intel-only-on-pre-gen4.diff 07_use-modesetting-driver-by-default-on-GeForce.diff +CVE-2025-62229/0001-present-Fix-use-after-free-in-present_create_notifie.patch +CVE-2025-62230/0001-xkb-Make-the-RT_XKBCLIENT-resource-private.patch +CVE-2025-62230/0002-xkb-Free-the-XKB-resource-when-freeing-XkbInterest.patch +CVE-2025-62231/0001-xkb-Prevent-overflow-in-XkbSetCompatMap.patch only in patch2: unchanged: --- xorg-server-21.1.18.orig/debian/patches/CVE-2025-62229/0001-present-Fix-use-after-free-in-present_create_notifie.patch +++ xorg-server-21.1.18/debian/patches/CVE-2025-62229/0001-present-Fix-use-after-free-in-present_create_notifie.patch @@ -0,0 +1,86 @@ +From 4b84491451364a2a9121d43eed6790f5fbcd7046 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Olivier Fourdan <[email protected]> +Date: Wed, 2 Jul 2025 09:46:22 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH xserver 1/4] present: Fix use-after-free in + present_create_notifies() + +Using the Present extension, if an error occurs while processing and +adding the notifications after presenting a pixmap, the function +present_create_notifies() will clean up and remove the notifications +it added. + +However, there are two different code paths that can lead to an error +creating the notify, one being before the notify is being added to the +list, and another one after the notify is added. + +When the error occurs before it's been added, it removes the elements up +to the last added element, instead of the actual number of elements +which were added. + +As a result, in case of error, as with an invalid window for example, it +leaves a dangling pointer to the last element, leading to a use after +free case later: + + | Invalid write of size 8 + | at 0x5361D5: present_clear_window_notifies (present_notify.c:42) + | by 0x534A56: present_destroy_window (present_screen.c:107) + | by 0x41E441: xwl_destroy_window (xwayland-window.c:1959) + | by 0x4F9EC9: compDestroyWindow (compwindow.c:622) + | by 0x51EAC4: damageDestroyWindow (damage.c:1592) + | by 0x4FDC29: DbeDestroyWindow (dbe.c:1291) + | by 0x4EAC55: FreeWindowResources (window.c:1023) + | by 0x4EAF59: DeleteWindow (window.c:1091) + | by 0x4DE59A: doFreeResource (resource.c:890) + | by 0x4DEFB2: FreeClientResources (resource.c:1156) + | by 0x4A9AFB: CloseDownClient (dispatch.c:3567) + | by 0x5DCC78: ClientReady (connection.c:603) + | Address 0x16126200 is 16 bytes inside a block of size 2,048 free'd + | at 0x4841E43: free (vg_replace_malloc.c:989) + | by 0x5363DD: present_destroy_notifies (present_notify.c:111) + | by 0x53638D: present_create_notifies (present_notify.c:100) + | by 0x5368E9: proc_present_pixmap_common (present_request.c:164) + | by 0x536A7D: proc_present_pixmap (present_request.c:189) + | by 0x536FA9: proc_present_dispatch (present_request.c:337) + | by 0x4A1E4E: Dispatch (dispatch.c:561) + | by 0x4B00F1: dix_main (main.c:284) + | by 0x42879D: main (stubmain.c:34) + | Block was alloc'd at + | at 0x48463F3: calloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:1675) + | by 0x5362A1: present_create_notifies (present_notify.c:81) + | by 0x5368E9: proc_present_pixmap_common (present_request.c:164) + | by 0x536A7D: proc_present_pixmap (present_request.c:189) + | by 0x536FA9: proc_present_dispatch (present_request.c:337) + | by 0x4A1E4E: Dispatch (dispatch.c:561) + | by 0x4B00F1: dix_main (main.c:284) + | by 0x42879D: main (stubmain.c:34) + +To fix the issue, count and remove the actual number of notify elements +added in case of error. + +ZDI-CAN-27238 + +This vulnerability was discovered by: +Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative + +Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <[email protected]> +(cherry picked from commit 6dd511a2d7a7c158fa6056dd7f60b3dbe4e334fc) +--- + present/present_notify.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/present/present_notify.c b/present/present_notify.c +index 445954998..00b3b68bd 100644 +--- a/present/present_notify.c ++++ b/present/present_notify.c +@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ present_create_notifies(ClientPtr client, int num_notifies, xPresentNotify *x_no + if (status != Success) + goto bail; + +- added = i; ++ added++; + } + return Success; + +-- +2.51.1 + only in patch2: unchanged: --- xorg-server-21.1.18.orig/debian/patches/CVE-2025-62230/0001-xkb-Make-the-RT_XKBCLIENT-resource-private.patch +++ xorg-server-21.1.18/debian/patches/CVE-2025-62230/0001-xkb-Make-the-RT_XKBCLIENT-resource-private.patch @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +From dfbccbeeb08dd16a217f0c31df2c53da3ddc293f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Olivier Fourdan <[email protected]> +Date: Wed, 10 Sep 2025 15:55:06 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH xserver 2/4] xkb: Make the RT_XKBCLIENT resource private +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +Currently, the resource in only available to the xkb.c source file. + +In preparation for the next commit, to be able to free the resources +from XkbRemoveResourceClient(), make that variable private instead. + +This is related to: + +ZDI-CAN-27545 + +This vulnerability was discovered by: +Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative + +Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <[email protected]> +Reviewed-by: Michel Dänzer <[email protected]> +(cherry picked from commit 5af12dc7f33d9e8f92dcfcdc5e14202c19ad7be2) +--- + include/xkbsrv.h | 2 ++ + xkb/xkb.c | 2 +- + 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/include/xkbsrv.h b/include/xkbsrv.h +index fbb5427e1..b2766277c 100644 +--- a/include/xkbsrv.h ++++ b/include/xkbsrv.h +@@ -58,6 +58,8 @@ THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + #include "inputstr.h" + #include "events.h" + ++extern RESTYPE RT_XKBCLIENT; ++ + typedef struct _XkbInterest { + DeviceIntPtr dev; + ClientPtr client; +diff --git a/xkb/xkb.c b/xkb/xkb.c +index 5131bfcdf..26d965d48 100644 +--- a/xkb/xkb.c ++++ b/xkb/xkb.c +@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ int XkbKeyboardErrorCode; + CARD32 xkbDebugFlags = 0; + static CARD32 xkbDebugCtrls = 0; + +-static RESTYPE RT_XKBCLIENT; ++RESTYPE RT_XKBCLIENT = 0; + + /***====================================================================***/ + +-- +2.51.1 + only in patch2: unchanged: --- xorg-server-21.1.18.orig/debian/patches/CVE-2025-62230/0002-xkb-Free-the-XKB-resource-when-freeing-XkbInterest.patch +++ xorg-server-21.1.18/debian/patches/CVE-2025-62230/0002-xkb-Free-the-XKB-resource-when-freeing-XkbInterest.patch @@ -0,0 +1,87 @@ +From 9284bacbf52641ed70e445dfb02bf361f27ff62f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Olivier Fourdan <[email protected]> +Date: Wed, 10 Sep 2025 15:58:57 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH xserver 3/4] xkb: Free the XKB resource when freeing + XkbInterest +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +XkbRemoveResourceClient() would free the XkbInterest data associated +with the device, but not the resource associated with it. + +As a result, when the client terminates, the resource delete function +gets called and accesses already freed memory: + + | Invalid read of size 8 + | at 0x5BC0C0: XkbRemoveResourceClient (xkbEvents.c:1047) + | by 0x5B3391: XkbClientGone (xkb.c:7094) + | by 0x4DF138: doFreeResource (resource.c:890) + | by 0x4DFB50: FreeClientResources (resource.c:1156) + | by 0x4A9A59: CloseDownClient (dispatch.c:3550) + | by 0x5E0A53: ClientReady (connection.c:601) + | by 0x5E4FEF: ospoll_wait (ospoll.c:657) + | by 0x5DC834: WaitForSomething (WaitFor.c:206) + | by 0x4A1BA5: Dispatch (dispatch.c:491) + | by 0x4B0070: dix_main (main.c:277) + | by 0x4285E7: main (stubmain.c:34) + | Address 0x1893e278 is 184 bytes inside a block of size 928 free'd + | at 0x4842E43: free (vg_replace_malloc.c:989) + | by 0x49C1A6: CloseDevice (devices.c:1067) + | by 0x49C522: CloseOneDevice (devices.c:1193) + | by 0x49C6E4: RemoveDevice (devices.c:1244) + | by 0x5873D4: remove_master (xichangehierarchy.c:348) + | by 0x587921: ProcXIChangeHierarchy (xichangehierarchy.c:504) + | by 0x579BF1: ProcIDispatch (extinit.c:390) + | by 0x4A1D85: Dispatch (dispatch.c:551) + | by 0x4B0070: dix_main (main.c:277) + | by 0x4285E7: main (stubmain.c:34) + | Block was alloc'd at + | at 0x48473F3: calloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:1675) + | by 0x49A118: AddInputDevice (devices.c:262) + | by 0x4A0E58: AllocDevicePair (devices.c:2846) + | by 0x5866EE: add_master (xichangehierarchy.c:153) + | by 0x5878C2: ProcXIChangeHierarchy (xichangehierarchy.c:493) + | by 0x579BF1: ProcIDispatch (extinit.c:390) + | by 0x4A1D85: Dispatch (dispatch.c:551) + | by 0x4B0070: dix_main (main.c:277) + | by 0x4285E7: main (stubmain.c:34) + +To avoid that issue, make sure to free the resources when freeing the +device XkbInterest data. + +ZDI-CAN-27545 + +This vulnerability was discovered by: +Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative + +Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <[email protected]> +Reviewed-by: Michel Dänzer <[email protected]> +(cherry picked from commit 5a6d82bfb305e99ff6a531f5166457e674b2f861) +--- + xkb/xkbEvents.c | 2 ++ + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/xkb/xkbEvents.c b/xkb/xkbEvents.c +index 0bbd66186..3d04ecf0c 100644 +--- a/xkb/xkbEvents.c ++++ b/xkb/xkbEvents.c +@@ -1056,6 +1056,7 @@ XkbRemoveResourceClient(DevicePtr inDev, XID id) + autoCtrls = interest->autoCtrls; + autoValues = interest->autoCtrlValues; + client = interest->client; ++ FreeResource(interest->resource, RT_XKBCLIENT); + free(interest); + found = TRUE; + } +@@ -1067,6 +1068,7 @@ XkbRemoveResourceClient(DevicePtr inDev, XID id) + autoCtrls = victim->autoCtrls; + autoValues = victim->autoCtrlValues; + client = victim->client; ++ FreeResource(victim->resource, RT_XKBCLIENT); + free(victim); + found = TRUE; + } +-- +2.51.1 + only in patch2: unchanged: --- xorg-server-21.1.18.orig/debian/patches/CVE-2025-62231/0001-xkb-Prevent-overflow-in-XkbSetCompatMap.patch +++ xorg-server-21.1.18/debian/patches/CVE-2025-62231/0001-xkb-Prevent-overflow-in-XkbSetCompatMap.patch @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +From 0a5ef7ab659f9402126617c351ced12dec7b84df Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Olivier Fourdan <[email protected]> +Date: Wed, 10 Sep 2025 16:30:29 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH xserver 4/4] xkb: Prevent overflow in XkbSetCompatMap() +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +The XkbCompatMap structure stores its "num_si" and "size_si" fields +using an unsigned short. + +However, the function _XkbSetCompatMap() will store the sum of the +input data "firstSI" and "nSI" in both XkbCompatMap's "num_si" and +"size_si" without first checking if the sum overflows the maximum +unsigned short value, leading to a possible overflow. + +To avoid the issue, check whether the sum does not exceed the maximum +unsigned short value, or return a "BadValue" error otherwise. + +ZDI-CAN-27560 + +This vulnerability was discovered by: +Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative + +Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <[email protected]> +Reviewed-by: Michel Dänzer <[email protected]> +(cherry picked from commit c1c652fd1948dd9d6b8cba0733981dfa21e4af4c) +--- + xkb/xkb.c | 2 ++ + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/xkb/xkb.c b/xkb/xkb.c +index 26d965d48..137d70da2 100644 +--- a/xkb/xkb.c ++++ b/xkb/xkb.c +@@ -2992,6 +2992,8 @@ _XkbSetCompatMap(ClientPtr client, DeviceIntPtr dev, + XkbSymInterpretPtr sym; + unsigned int skipped = 0; + ++ if ((unsigned) (req->firstSI + req->nSI) > USHRT_MAX) ++ return BadValue; + if ((unsigned) (req->firstSI + req->nSI) > compat->size_si) { + compat->num_si = compat->size_si = req->firstSI + req->nSI; + compat->sym_interpret = reallocarray(compat->sym_interpret, +-- +2.51.1 +
