On 2019-07-08, Andy Smith <a...@strugglers.net> wrote: > Hello, > > On Mon, Jul 08, 2019 at 04:18:28PM -0000, Curt wrote: >> Well, looking at Ted Ts'o short patch, where he mentions the security >> implications of the thing at some length, *twice* > > I think that some of Ted's stance might not be because Ted thinks it > is dangerous but because there has been in the past very vocal > opposition to any use of RDRAND, given that it is part of the > unauditable innards of the CPU. >
I'm incapable of deriving telepathically the cognitive ruminations of Mr. Ts'o and lack the expertise to second-guess a kernel hacker of his stature. I've quoted primarily and principally from the workaround patch written by Ts'o that Debian will be applying by default in Buster to all x86 cpus containing the RDRAND instruction, in which he expresses his serious caveats concerning its application. I think these reserves are relevant and pertinent to the patch itself and should be revealed to the user, whom we cannot assume or expect to follow the technical discussions of the development team, in the release-notes for Buster.