Your message dated Sun, 12 Apr 2026 12:37:49 +0000
with message-id <[email protected]>
and subject line Bug#1118288: fixed in openssh 1:10.3p1-1
has caused the Debian Bug report #1118288,
regarding openssh-client: ssh-agent does not handle paths with spaces
to be marked as done.
This means that you claim that the problem has been dealt with.
If this is not the case it is now your responsibility to reopen the
Bug report if necessary, and/or fix the problem forthwith.
(NB: If you are a system administrator and have no idea what this
message is talking about, this may indicate a serious mail system
misconfiguration somewhere. Please contact [email protected]
immediately.)
--
1118288: https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=1118288
Debian Bug Tracking System
Contact [email protected] with problems
--- Begin Message ---
Package: openssh-client
Version: 1:10.2p1-1
Severity: normal
ssh-agent does not gracefully handle paths with spaces for the agent
socket. This was less of a problem when it used $TMPDIR, but now that
it uses $HOME, this breaks things for the Git testsuite[0], which sets
$HOME to a path with spaces (to test that Git code is robust in that
case).
Here's an example to demonstrate:
----
#!/bin/sh -ex
tmpdir=$(mktemp -d)
mkdir "$tmpdir/path with spaces"
cd "$tmpdir/path with spaces"
export HOME="$PWD"
mkdir .ssh
eval $(ssh-agent)
----
ssh-agent, as well as all other parts of OpenSSH, should be robust with
arbitrary Unix paths to the extent possible (for instance, with the
shell, it might not be possible to handle trailing newlines, but
everything else should work).
[0] Thread at
https://lore.kernel.org/git/[email protected]/T/#m77d1c02f0c018e9c71cf6e0cb699811abf0c39ce
-- System Information:
Debian Release: forky/sid
APT prefers unstable
APT policy: (500, 'unstable'), (1, 'experimental')
Architecture: amd64 (x86_64)
Kernel: Linux 6.16.11+deb14-amd64 (SMP w/24 CPU threads; PREEMPT)
Locale: LANG=en_CA.UTF-8, LC_CTYPE=en_CA.UTF-8 (charmap=UTF-8), LANGUAGE not set
Shell: /bin/sh linked to /usr/bin/dash
Init: systemd (via /run/systemd/system)
LSM: AppArmor: enabled
Versions of packages openssh-client depends on:
ii adduser 3.153
ii init-system-helpers 1.69
ii libc6 2.41-12
ii libedit2 3.1-20250104-1
ii libfido2-1 1.16.0-2
ii libgssapi-krb5-2 1.21.3-5
ii libselinux1 3.8.1-1
ii libssl3t64 3.5.4-1
ii passwd 1:4.18.0-1
ii zlib1g 1:1.3.dfsg+really1.3.1-1+b1
Versions of packages openssh-client recommends:
ii xauth 1:1.1.2-1.1
Versions of packages openssh-client suggests:
pn keychain <none>
pn libpam-ssh <none>
pn monkeysphere <none>
pn ssh-askpass <none>
-- no debconf information
--
brian m. carlson (they/them)
Toronto, Ontario, CA
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--- End Message ---
--- Begin Message ---
Source: openssh
Source-Version: 1:10.3p1-1
Done: Colin Watson <[email protected]>
We believe that the bug you reported is fixed in the latest version of
openssh, which is due to be installed in the Debian FTP archive.
A summary of the changes between this version and the previous one is
attached.
Thank you for reporting the bug, which will now be closed. If you
have further comments please address them to [email protected],
and the maintainer will reopen the bug report if appropriate.
Debian distribution maintenance software
pp.
Colin Watson <[email protected]> (supplier of updated openssh package)
(This message was generated automatically at their request; if you
believe that there is a problem with it please contact the archive
administrators by mailing [email protected])
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Hash: SHA512
Format: 1.8
Date: Sun, 12 Apr 2026 12:49:45 +0100
Source: openssh
Architecture: source
Version: 1:10.3p1-1
Distribution: unstable
Urgency: medium
Maintainer: Debian OpenSSH Maintainers <[email protected]>
Changed-By: Colin Watson <[email protected]>
Closes: 321525 1118288 1132572 1132573 1132574 1132575 1132576
Changes:
openssh (1:10.3p1-1) unstable; urgency=medium
.
* New upstream release:
- ssh(1): validation of shell metacharacters in user names supplied on
the command-line was performed too late to prevent some situations
where they could be expanded from %-tokens in ssh_config. For certain
configurations, such as those that use a "%u" token in a "Match exec"
block, an attacker who can control the user name passed to ssh(1)
could potentially execute arbitrary shell commands. Reported by
Florian Kohnhäuser (closes: #1132573).
We continue to recommend against directly exposing ssh(1) and other
tools' command-lines to untrusted input. Mitigations such as this can
not be absolute given the variety of shells and user configurations in
use.
- CVE-2026-35414: sshd(8): when matching an authorized_keys
principals="" option against a list of principals in a certificate, an
incorrect algorithm was used that could allow inappropriate matching
in cases where a principal name in the certificate contains a comma
character. Exploitation of the condition requires an authorized_keys
principals="" option that lists more than one principal *and* a CA
that will issue a certificate that encodes more than one of these
principal names separated by a comma (typical CAs strongly constrain
which principal names they will place in a certificate). This
condition only applies to user- trusted CA keys in authorized_keys,
the main certificate authentication path
(TrustedUserCAKeys/AuthorizedPrincipalsFile) is not affected. Reported
by Vladimir Tokarev (closes: #1132576).
- CVE-2026-35385: scp(1): when downloading files as root in legacy (-O)
mode and without the -p (preserve modes) flag set, scp did not clear
setuid/setgid bits from downloaded files as one might typically
expect. This bug dates back to the original Berkeley rcp program.
Reported by Christos Papakonstantinou of Cantina and Spearbit (closes:
#1132572).
- CVE-2026-35387: sshd(8): fix incomplete application of
PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms and HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms with regard
to ECDSA keys. Previously if one of these directives contains any
ECDSA algorithm name (say "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384"), then any other ECDSA
algorithm would be accepted in its place regardless of whether it was
listed or not. Reported by Christos Papakonstantinou of Cantina and
Spearbit (closes: #1132574).
- CVE-2026-35388: ssh(1): connection multiplexing confirmation
(requested using "ControlMaster ask/autoask") was not being tested for
proxy mode multiplexing sessions (i.e. "ssh -O proxy ..."). Reported
by Michalis Vasileiadis (closes: #1132575).
- ssh(1), sshd(8): support IANA-assigned codepoints for SSH agent
forwarding, as per draft-ietf-sshm-ssh-agent. Support for the new
names is advertised via the EXT_INFO message. If a server offers
support for the new names, then they are used preferentially. Support
for the pre-standardisation "@openssh.com" extensions for agent
forwarding remains supported.
- ssh-agent(1): implement support for draft-ietf-sshm-ssh-agent "query"
extension.
- ssh-add(1): support querying the protocol extensions via the agent
"query" extension with a new -Q flag.
- ssh(1): support multiple files in a ssh_config RevokedHostKeys
directive.
- sshd(8): support multiple files in a sshd_config RevokedKeys
directive.
- ssh(1): add a ~I escape option that shows information about the
current SSH connection (closes: #321525).
- ssh(1): add an "ssh -Oconninfo user@host" multiplexing command that
shows connection information, similar to the ~I escapechar.
- ssh(1): add an "ssh -O channels user@host" multiplexing command to get
a running mux process to show information about what channels are
currently open.
- sshd(8): add 'invaliduser' penalty to PerSourcePenalties, which is
applied to login attempts for usernames that do not match real
accounts. Defaults to 5s to match 'authfail' but allows administrators
to block such attempts for longer if desired.
- sshd(8): add a GSSAPIDelegateCredentials option for the server,
controlling whether it accepts delegated credentials offered by the
client. This option mirrors the same option in ssh_config.
- ssh(1), sshd(8): support the VA DSCP codepoint in the IPQoS directive.
- sshd(8): convert PerSourcePenalties to using floating point time,
allowing penalties to be less than a second. This is useful if you
need to penalise things you expect to occur at >=1 QPS.
- ssh-keygen(1): support writing ED25519 keys in PKCS8 format.
- Support the ed25519 signature scheme via libcrypto.
- sshd(8): make IPQoS first-match-wins in sshd_config, like other
configuration directives.
- sshd(8): fix potential crash when MaxStartups is using a single
argument (i.e. not using the MaxStartups x:y:z form) to a value below
10.
- sshd(8): fix a potential hang during key exchange if needed DH group
values were missing from /etc/moduli.
- ssh-agent(1): fix return values from extensions to be correct wrt
draft-ietf-sshm-ssh-agent: extension requests should indicate failure
using SSH_AGENT_EXTENSION_FAILURE rather than the generic
SSH_AGENT_FAILURE error code. This allows the client to discern
between "the request failed" and "the agent doesn't support this
extension".
- ssh(1): use fmprintf for showing challenge-response name and info to
preserve UTF-8 characters where appropriate.
- scp(1): when uploading a directory using sftp/sftp (e.g. during a
recursive transfer), don't clobber the remote directory permissions
unless either we created the directory during the transfer or the -p
flag was set.
- All: implement missing pieces of FIDO/webauthn signature support,
mostly related to certificate handling and enable acceptance of this
signature format by default.
- sshd_config(5): make it clear that DenyUsers/DenyGroups overrides
AllowUsers/AllowGroups. Previously we specified the order in which the
directives are processed but it was ambiguous as to what happened if
both matched.
- ssh(1): don't try to match certificates held in an agent to private
keys. This matching is done to support certificates that were loaded
without their private key material, but is unnecessary for
agent-hosted certificate which always have private key material
available in the agent. Worse, this matching would mess up the request
sent to the agent in such a way as to break usage of these keys when
the key usage was restricted in the agent.
- sftp(1): if editline has been switched to vi mode (i.e. via "bind -v"
in .editrc), setup a keybinding so that command mode can be entered.
- ssh(1), sshd(8): improve performance of keying the sntrup761 key
agreement algorithm.
- ssh(1), sshd(8): enforce maximum packet/block limit during
pre-authentication phase.
- sftp(1): don't misuse the sftp limits extension's open-handles field.
This value is supposed to be the number of handles a server will allow
to be opened and not a number of outstanding read/write requests that
can be sent during an upload/download.
- sshd(8): don't crash at connection time if the main sshd_config lacks
any subsystem directive but one is defined in a Match block.
- sshd_config(5): add a warning next to the ForceCommand directive that
forcing a command doesn't automatically disable forwarding.
- sshd_config(5): add a warning that TOKENS are replaced without
filtering or escaping and that it's the administrator's responsibility
to ensure they are used safely in context.
- sshd(8): don't mess up the PerSourceNetBlockSize IPv6 mask if sscanf
didn't decode it.
- ssh-add(1): when loading FIDO2 resident keys, set the comment to the
FIDO application string. This matches the behaviour of ssh-keygen -K.
- sshd(8): don't strnvis() log messages that are going to be logged by
sshd-auth via its parent sshd-session process, as the parent will also
run them though strnvis(). Prevents double-escaping of non-printing
characters in some log messages.
- ssh-agent(1): escape SSH_AUTH_SOCK paths that are sent to the shell as
setenv commands. Unbreaks ssh-agent for home directory paths that
contain whitespace (closes: #1118288).
- All: Remove unnecessary checks for ECDSA public key validity.
- sshd(8): activate UnusedConnectionTimeout only after the last channel
has closed. Previously UnusedConnectionTimeout could fire early after
a ChannelTimeout. This was not a problem for the OpenSSH client
because it terminates once all channels have closed but could cause
problems for other clients (e.g. API clients) that do things
differently.
- scp(1): when using the SFTP protocol for transfers, fix implicit
destination path selection when source path ends with "..".
- sftp(1): when tab-completing a filename, ensure that the completed
string does not end up mid-way through a multibyte character, as this
will cause a fatal() later on.
- ssh-keygen(1): fix crash at exit (visible via ssh-keygen -D) when
multiple keys loaded.
- scp(1)/sftp(1): correctly display bandwidths >2GBps in the progress
meter.
- sshd(8): fix condition introduced in openssh 10.2p1 stable branch
where a PAM module that changed the requested username between
SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST messages during authentication could confuse
the PAM stack and let it proceed with a different understanding of the
active username than the rest of sshd. Reported by Mike Damm.
- sshd(8): immediately report interactive instructions to clients when
using keyboard-interactive authentication with PAM.
- sshd(8): fix duplicate PAM messages under some situations.
- sshd(8): don't leak PAM handle on repeat invocations.
- sshd(8): fix ut_type for btmp records, correctly using LOGIN_PROCESS
and USER_PROCESS.
- sshd(8): allow uname(3) in the seccomp sandbox. This is needed by
zlib-ng on RISC-V platforms.
- All: remove remaining OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms() calls. We already
have OPENSSL_init_crypto() in the compat layer.
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