On Mon, Apr 20, 1998 at 01:20:10PM +0100, Ian Jackson wrote: > We should modify our libc so that opening a file in /tmp or /var/tmp - > determined by simple string comparison of the filename passed to > open(2) - fails if O_CREAT is specified without O_EXCL.
This should only be files directly under /tmp or /var/tmp, not in subdirectories, right? (otherwise using mkdir /tmp/prog.$$ instead of just >/tmp/prog.$$ doesn't fix the /tmp security holes). This also would make most uses of tar and similar in /tmp and /var/tmp work okay, I believe. Yes? Cheers, aj -- Anthony Towns <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> <http://azure.humbug.org.au/~aj/> I don't speak for anyone save myself. PGP encrypted mail preferred. ``It's not a vision, or a fear. It's just a thought.''
pgpk3GplGRaHX.pgp
Description: PGP signature
