On 9/1/25 1:23 PM, Guillem Jover wrote:
* Make the format extensible to other signature formats or workflows
(such as x509, secure-boot, IMA, etc., even if there's currently no
intention to add support for any of this).
When we discussed support for IMA internally many years back we had no
good answer for the key rotation problem. That feels very annoying with
embedded signatures. You need to re-sign all the debs that you have in
storage and need to get all signatures on disk updated - unless you
generate immutable images that you can update all at once.
Maybe a timestamp countersignature and/or signature transparency would
help authenticate the provenance even if the signature key leaked. At
which point the question for me is if we are mostly talking about
provenance, for which other systems are being invented - including
tracking what went into the package, or if there is other value like IMA
at runtime.
Kind regards
Philipp Kern
