* Simon Richter <s...@debian.org>, 2016-07-08, 14:33:
given that it is now possible to generate arbitrary short key ID
collisions[1], and that it's now computationally feasible to at least
generate a pair of keys with colliding long key IDs, I'd like to
rethink practices and tools.
With the web of trust, in principle there shouldn't be a problem.
I have a valid trust path to Piotr's correct key. I don' have any to
the fake key, because no one I trust has signed a key from the evil32
set
...yet.
Given that many crypto tools have --feel-free-to-shoot-me-in-the-foot as
the default, and some even don't have --do-not-shoot-me-in-the-foot as
an option (see #800134), it's only a matter of time before someone slips
up.
Or maybe it's already happened? Check out debian-hiding-problems@, er, I
mean debian-private@ archives.
--
Jakub Wilk
