control: tag -1 patch On Sat, Aug 9, 2014 at 9:46 PM, Steve Langasek wrote: > Which according to elsewhere in my mailbox, you've dealt with by uploading a > 10-day delayed NMU. This is unacceptable
Sorry for not getting the nmu mail out in a timely manner, but real life got in the way. What is not acceptable is the assumed bad faith and the misguided attempt at public shaming (after only half a day) without considering the possibility of RL events or other benign possibilities. A simple "hey, what's going on with this thing I'm seeing in deferred" mail directed at me would have been the kind thing to do. > I have removed pam_1.1.3-8.1_amd64.changes from the delayed queue. If you > have changes that you would like to see included in this package, please > send them to the BTS where they belong. The proposed patch is now attached. I plan to upload that to delayed/5 after about a week or so to give you lots of additional time for review (way more than the normal nmu process requires). Best wishes, Mike
diff -u pam-1.1.8/debian/changelog pam-1.1.8/debian/changelog --- pam-1.1.8/debian/changelog +++ pam-1.1.8/debian/changelog @@ -1,3 +1,13 @@ +pam (1.1.8-3.1) unstable; urgency=high + + * Non-maintainer upload by the Security Team. + * Fix CVE-2013-7041: case-insensitive comparison used for verifying + passwords in the pam_userdb module (closes: #731368). + * Fix CVE-2014-2583: multiple directory traversal issues in the + pam_timestamp module (closes: 757555) + + -- Michael Gilbert <mgilb...@debian.org> Sat, 09 Aug 2014 09:50:42 +0000 + pam (1.1.8-3) unstable; urgency=low * debian/rules: On hurd, link libpam explicitly with -lpthread since glibc diff -u pam-1.1.8/debian/patches-applied/series pam-1.1.8/debian/patches-applied/series --- pam-1.1.8/debian/patches-applied/series +++ pam-1.1.8/debian/patches-applied/series @@ -23,0 +24,2 @@ +cve-2013-7041.patch +cve-2014-2583.patch only in patch2: unchanged: --- pam-1.1.8.orig/debian/patches-applied/cve-2013-7041.patch +++ pam-1.1.8/debian/patches-applied/cve-2013-7041.patch @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +From 57a1e2b274d0a6376d92ada9926e5c5741e7da20 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Dmitry V. Levin" <l...@altlinux.org> +Date: Fri, 24 Jan 2014 22:18:32 +0000 +Subject: pam_userdb: fix password hash comparison + +Starting with commit Linux-PAM-0-77-28-g0b3e583 that introduced hashed +passwords support in pam_userdb, hashes are compared case-insensitively. +This bug leads to accepting hashes for completely different passwords in +addition to those that should be accepted. + +Additionally, commit Linux-PAM-1_1_6-13-ge2a8187 that added support for +modern password hashes with different lengths and settings, did not +update the hash comparison accordingly, which leads to accepting +computed hashes longer than stored hashes when the latter is a prefix +of the former. + +* modules/pam_userdb/pam_userdb.c (user_lookup): Reject the computed +hash whose length differs from the stored hash length. +Compare computed and stored hashes case-sensitively. +Fixes CVE-2013-7041. + +Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/731368 + +--- a/modules/pam_userdb/pam_userdb.c ++++ b/modules/pam_userdb/pam_userdb.c +@@ -222,12 +222,15 @@ user_lookup (pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *database, const char *cryptmode, + } else { + cryptpw = crypt (pass, data.dptr); + +- if (cryptpw) { +- compare = strncasecmp (data.dptr, cryptpw, data.dsize); ++ if (cryptpw && strlen(cryptpw) == (size_t)data.dsize) { ++ compare = memcmp(data.dptr, cryptpw, data.dsize); + } else { + compare = -2; + if (ctrl & PAM_DEBUG_ARG) { +- pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_INFO, "crypt() returned NULL"); ++ if (cryptpw) ++ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_INFO, "lengths of computed and stored hashes differ"); ++ else ++ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_INFO, "crypt() returned NULL"); + } + }; + only in patch2: unchanged: --- pam-1.1.8.orig/debian/patches-applied/cve-2014-2583.patch +++ pam-1.1.8/debian/patches-applied/cve-2014-2583.patch @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +From 9dcead87e6d7f66d34e7a56d11a30daca367dffb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Dmitry V. Levin" <l...@altlinux.org> +Date: Wed, 26 Mar 2014 22:17:23 +0000 +Subject: pam_timestamp: fix potential directory traversal issue (ticket #27) + +pam_timestamp uses values of PAM_RUSER and PAM_TTY as components of +the timestamp pathname it creates, so extra care should be taken to +avoid potential directory traversal issues. + +* modules/pam_timestamp/pam_timestamp.c (check_tty): Treat +"." and ".." tty values as invalid. +(get_ruser): Treat "." and ".." ruser values, as well as any ruser +value containing '/', as invalid. + +Fixes CVE-2014-2583. + +Reported-by: Sebastian Krahmer <krah...@suse.de> + +--- a/modules/pam_timestamp/pam_timestamp.c ++++ b/modules/pam_timestamp/pam_timestamp.c +@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ check_tty(const char *tty) + tty = strrchr(tty, '/') + 1; + } + /* Make sure the tty wasn't actually a directory (no basename). */ +- if (strlen(tty) == 0) { ++ if (!strlen(tty) || !strcmp(tty, ".") || !strcmp(tty, "..")) { + return NULL; + } + return tty; +@@ -243,6 +243,17 @@ get_ruser(pam_handle_t *pamh, char *ruserbuf, size_t ruserbuflen) + if (pwd != NULL) { + ruser = pwd->pw_name; + } ++ } else { ++ /* ++ * This ruser is used by format_timestamp_name as a component ++ * of constructed timestamp pathname, so ".", "..", and '/' ++ * are disallowed to avoid potential path traversal issues. ++ */ ++ if (!strcmp(ruser, ".") || ++ !strcmp(ruser, "..") || ++ strchr(ruser, '/')) { ++ ruser = NULL; ++ } + } + if (ruser == NULL || strlen(ruser) >= ruserbuflen) { + *ruserbuf = '\0';
