Your message dated Tue, 12 Nov 2024 18:19:40 +0000
with message-id <e1tavuk-007hjd...@fasolo.debian.org>
and subject line Bug#1087384: fixed in icinga2 2.14.3-1
has caused the Debian Bug report #1087384,
regarding CVE-2024-49369: Security: fix TLS certificate validation bypass.
to be marked as done.

This means that you claim that the problem has been dealt with.
If this is not the case it is now your responsibility to reopen the
Bug report if necessary, and/or fix the problem forthwith.

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-- 
1087384: https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=1087384
Debian Bug Tracking System
Contact ow...@bugs.debian.org with problems
--- Begin Message ---
Source: icinga2
Version: 2.14.2-1
Severity: grave
Tags: upstream security
Justification: user security hole
X-Debbugs-Cc: Debian Security Team <t...@security.debian.org>

Dear Maintainer,

I'm pretty sure you're aware, nevertheless here is the but report:

https://icinga.com/blog/2024/11/12/critical-icinga-2-security-releases-2-14-3/

Today, we are releasing security updates for Icinga 2 fixing a
critical vulnerability that allowed to bypass the certificate
validation for JSON-RPC and HTTP API connections.
Impact

The TLS certificate validation in all Icinga 2 versions starting
from 2.4.0 was flawed, allowing an attacker to impersonate both
trusted cluster nodes as well as any API users that use TLS
client certificates for authentication (ApiUser objects with the
client_cn attribute set).

By impersonating a trusted cluster node like a master or satellite,
an attacker can supply a malicious configuration update to other
nodes (if the accept_config attribute of the ApiListener object is
set to true) or instruct the other node to execute malicious commands
directly (if the accept_commands attribute of the ApiListener object
is set to true). These attributes are expected to be set in most
distributed installations, but in case they are not, an attacker
can still retrieve potentially sensitive information.

When impersonating API users, the impact depends on the permissions
configured for the individual users using certificate authentication.
This may include permissions like updating the configuration and
executing commands as well.

We expect most installations to be affected by this vulnerability
and recommend upgrading as soon as possible.

P.S.S Ignore the version information below, however stable & oldstable
are affected too.

Hilmar

-- System Information:
Debian Release: 12.8
  APT prefers stable-updates
  APT policy: (500, 'stable-updates'), (500, 'stable-security'), (500, 'stable')
Architecture: arm64 (aarch64)
Foreign Architectures: armhf

Kernel: Linux 6.6.51+rpt-rpi-v8 (SMP w/4 CPU threads; PREEMPT)
Kernel taint flags: TAINT_CRAP
Locale: LANG=en_GB.UTF-8, LC_CTYPE=en_GB.UTF-8 (charmap=UTF-8), LANGUAGE not set
Shell: /bin/sh linked to /usr/bin/dash
Init: systemd (via /run/systemd/system)

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--- Begin Message ---
Source: icinga2
Source-Version: 2.14.3-1
Done: Bas Couwenberg <sebas...@debian.org>

We believe that the bug you reported is fixed in the latest version of
icinga2, which is due to be installed in the Debian FTP archive.

A summary of the changes between this version and the previous one is
attached.

Thank you for reporting the bug, which will now be closed.  If you
have further comments please address them to 1087...@bugs.debian.org,
and the maintainer will reopen the bug report if appropriate.

Debian distribution maintenance software
pp.
Bas Couwenberg <sebas...@debian.org> (supplier of updated icinga2 package)

(This message was generated automatically at their request; if you
believe that there is a problem with it please contact the archive
administrators by mailing ftpmas...@ftp-master.debian.org)


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

Format: 1.8
Date: Tue, 12 Nov 2024 18:28:00 +0100
Source: icinga2
Architecture: source
Version: 2.14.3-1
Distribution: unstable
Urgency: high
Maintainer: Debian Nagios Maintainer Group 
<pkg-nagios-de...@lists.alioth.debian.org>
Changed-By: Bas Couwenberg <sebas...@debian.org>
Closes: 1073041 1087384
Changes:
 icinga2 (2.14.3-1) unstable; urgency=high
 .
   * Team upload.
   * New upstream release.
     - Fixes CVE-2024-49369
     (closes: #1087384)
   * Replace pkg-config build dependency with pkgconf.
   * Ignore test failures on loong64.
     (closes: #1073041)
   * Bump Standards-Version to 4.7.0, no changes.
   * Update lintian overrides.
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Checksums-Sha256:
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icinga2_2.14.3-1_amd64.buildinfo
Files:
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 82af81b6eb04d4e96798e513636076f0 9397891 admin optional 
icinga2_2.14.3.orig.tar.gz
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icinga2_2.14.3-1.debian.tar.xz
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icinga2_2.14.3-1_amd64.buildinfo

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