Your message dated Fri, 12 May 2023 08:24:13 +0000 with message-id <e1pxo4t-00drlb...@fasolo.debian.org> and subject line Bug#1035981: fixed in nova 2:27.0.0-4 has caused the Debian Bug report #1035981, regarding CVE-2023-2088 / OSSA-2023-003: Unauthorized volume access through deleted volume attachments to be marked as done.
This means that you claim that the problem has been dealt with. If this is not the case it is now your responsibility to reopen the Bug report if necessary, and/or fix the problem forthwith. (NB: If you are a system administrator and have no idea what this message is talking about, this may indicate a serious mail system misconfiguration somewhere. Please contact ow...@bugs.debian.org immediately.) -- 1035981: https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=1035981 Debian Bug Tracking System Contact ow...@bugs.debian.org with problems
--- Begin Message ---Source: nova Version: 2:26.1.0-2 Severity: grave Tags: patch Affects ~~~~~~~ - Cinder: <20.2.1, >=21.0.0 <21.2.1, ==22.0.0 - Glance_store: <3.0.1, >=4.0.0 <4.1.1, >=4.2.0 <4.3.1 - Nova: <25.1.2, >=26.0.0 <26.1.2, ==27.0.0 - Os-brick: <5.2.3, >=6.0.0 <6.1.1, >=6.2.0 <6.2.2 Description ~~~~~~~~~~~ An unauthorized access to a volume could occur when an iSCSI or FC connection from a host is severed due to a volume being unmapped on the storage system and the device is later reused for another volume on the same host. **Scope:** Only deployments with iSCSI or FC volumes are affected. However, the fix for this issue includes a configuration change in Nova and Cinder that may impact you on your next upgrade regardless of what backend storage technology you use. See the *Configuration change* section below, and item 4(B) in the *Patches and Associated Deployment Changes* for details. This data leak can be triggered by two different situations. **Accidental case:** If there is a problem with network connectivity during a normal detach operation, OpenStack may fail to clean the situation up properly. Instead of force-detaching the compute node device, Nova ignores the error, assuming the instance has already been deleted. Due to this incomplete operation OpenStack may end up selecting the wrong multipath device when connecting another volume to an instance. **Intentional case:** A regular user can create an instance with a volume, and then delete the volume attachment directly in Cinder, which neglects to notify Nova. The compute node SCSI plumbing (over iSCSI/FC) will continue trying to connect to the original host/port/LUN, not knowing the attachment has been deleted. If a subsequent volume attachment re-uses the host/port/LUN for a different instance and volume, the original instance will gain access to it once the SCSI plumbing reconnects. Configuration Change -------------------- To prevent the intentional case, the Block Storage API provided by Cinder must only accept attachment delete requests from Nova for instance-attached volumes. A complicating factor is that Nova deletes an attachment by making a call to the Block Storage API on behalf of the user (that is, by passing the user's token), which makes the request indistinguishable from the user making this request directly. The solution is to have Nova include a service token along with the user's token so that Cinder can determine that the detach request is coming from Nova. The ability for Nova to pass a service token has been supported since Ocata, but has not been required until now. Thus, deployments that are not currently sending service user credentials from Nova will need to apply the relevant code changes and also make configuration changes to solve the problem. Patches and Associated Deployment Changes ----------------------------------------- Given the above analysis, a thorough fix must include the following elements: 1. The os-brick library must implement the ``force`` option for fibre channel, which which has only been available for iSCSI until now (covered by the linked patches). 2. Nova must call os-brick with the ``force`` option when disconnecting volumes from deleted instances (covered by the linked patches). 3. In deployments where Glance uses the cinder glance_store driver, glance must call os-brick with the ``force`` option when disconnecting volumes (covered by the linked patches). 4. Cinder must distinguish between safe and unsafe attachment delete requests and reject the unsafe ones. This part of the fix has two components: a. The Block Storage API will return a 409 (Conflict) for a request to delete an attachment if there is an instance currently using the attachment, **unless** the request is being made by a service (for example, Nova) on behalf of a user (covered by the linked patches). b. In order to recognize that a request is being made by a service on behalf of a user, Nova must be configured to send a service token along with the user token. If this configuration change is not made, the cinder change will reject **any** request to delete an attachment associated with a volume that is attached to an instance. Nova must be configured to send a service token to Cinder, and Cinder must be configured to accept service tokens. This is described in the following document and **IS NOT AUTOMATICALLY APPLIED BY THE LINKED PATCHES:** (Using service tokens to prevent long-running job failures) https://docs.openstack.org/cinder/latest/configuration/block-storage/service-token.html The Nova patch mentioned in step 2 includes a similar document more focused on Nova: doc/source/admin/configuration/service-user-token.rst 5. The cinder glance_store driver does not attach volumes to instances; instead, it attaches volumes directly to the Glance node. Thus, the Cinder change in step 4 will recognize an attachment-delete request coming from Glance as safe and allow it. (Of course, we expect that you will have applied the patches in steps 1 and 3 to your Glance nodes.) Errata ~~~~~~ An additional nova patch is required to fix a minor regression in periodic tasks and some nova-manage actions (errata 1). Also a patch to tempest is needed to account for behavior changes with fixes in place (errata 2). Patches ~~~~~~~ - https://review.opendev.org/882836 (2023.1/antelope cinder) - https://review.opendev.org/882851 (2023.1/antelope glance_store) - https://review.opendev.org/882858 (2023.1/antelope nova) - https://review.opendev.org/882859 (2023.1/antelope nova errata 1) - https://review.opendev.org/882843 (2023.1/antelope os-brick) - https://review.opendev.org/882835 (2023.2/bobcat cinder) - https://review.opendev.org/882834 (2023.2/bobcat glance_store) - https://review.opendev.org/882847 (2023.2/bobcat nova) - https://review.opendev.org/882852 (2023.2/bobcat nova errata 1) - https://review.opendev.org/882840 (2023.2/bobcat os-brick) - https://review.opendev.org/882876 (2023.2/bobcat tempest errata 2) - https://review.opendev.org/882869 (Wallaby nova) - https://review.opendev.org/882870 (Wallaby nova errata 1) - https://review.opendev.org/882839 (Xena cinder) - https://review.opendev.org/882855 (Xena glance_store) - https://review.opendev.org/882867 (Xena nova) - https://review.opendev.org/882868 (Xena nova errata 1) - https://review.opendev.org/882848 (Xena os-brick) - https://review.opendev.org/882838 (Yoga cinder) - https://review.opendev.org/882854 (Yoga glance_store) - https://review.opendev.org/882863 (Yoga nova) - https://review.opendev.org/882864 (Yoga nova errata 1) - https://review.opendev.org/882846 (Yoga os-brick) - https://review.opendev.org/882837 (Zed cinder) - https://review.opendev.org/882853 (Zed glance_store) - https://review.opendev.org/882860 (Zed nova) - https://review.opendev.org/882861 (Zed nova errata 1) - https://review.opendev.org/882844 (Zed os-brick) Credits ~~~~~~~ - Jan Wasilewski from Atman (CVE-2023-2088) - Gorka Eguileor from Red Hat (CVE-2023-2088) References ~~~~~~~~~~ - https://launchpad.net/bugs/2004555 - http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2023-2088 Notes ~~~~~ - Limited Protection Against Accidents... If you are only concerned with protecting against the accidental case described earlier in this document, steps 1-3 above should be sufficient. Note, however, that only applying steps 1-3 leaves your cloud wide open to the intentional exploitation of this vulnerability. Therefore, we recommend that the full fix be applied to all deployments. - Using Configuration as a Short-Term Mitigation... An alternative approach to mitigation can be found in OSSN-0092 https://wiki.openstack.org/wiki/OSSN/OSSN-0092 - The stable/xena and stable/wallaby branches are under extended maintenance and will receive no new point releases, but patches for them are provided as a courtesy where available. OSSA History ~~~~~~~~~~~~ - 2023-05-10 - Errata 2 - 2023-05-10 - Errata 1 - 2023-05-10 - Original Version Jeremy Stanley OpenStack Vulnerability Management Team
--- End Message ---
--- Begin Message ---Source: nova Source-Version: 2:27.0.0-4 Done: Thomas Goirand <z...@debian.org> We believe that the bug you reported is fixed in the latest version of nova, which is due to be installed in the Debian FTP archive. A summary of the changes between this version and the previous one is attached. Thank you for reporting the bug, which will now be closed. If you have further comments please address them to 1035...@bugs.debian.org, and the maintainer will reopen the bug report if appropriate. Debian distribution maintenance software pp. Thomas Goirand <z...@debian.org> (supplier of updated nova package) (This message was generated automatically at their request; if you believe that there is a problem with it please contact the archive administrators by mailing ftpmas...@ftp-master.debian.org) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 Format: 1.8 Date: Fri, 12 May 2023 10:07:36 +0200 Source: nova Architecture: source Version: 2:27.0.0-4 Distribution: experimental Urgency: medium Maintainer: Debian OpenStack <team+openst...@tracker.debian.org> Changed-By: Thomas Goirand <z...@debian.org> Closes: 1035981 Changes: nova (2:27.0.0-4) experimental; urgency=medium . * Closing the correct bug and fix patch header (Closes: #1035981). Checksums-Sha1: c0a7b6644191ae557f454d46433058bdeba5e433 4827 nova_27.0.0-4.dsc 4d3a0d609118f3f470f945f5c60f0c5cf8588764 68812 nova_27.0.0-4.debian.tar.xz b11ec5af40b5ec5ad0547e9a21c0eb65752d86a4 22137 nova_27.0.0-4_amd64.buildinfo Checksums-Sha256: 7d355a5a27e3e2e5793476f6e5f49596b793c682e67c9030fba15ae951a42d3c 4827 nova_27.0.0-4.dsc 7aad959dbdc7ad6a7c5193cb3ad923c0974fe71ac803ddb36d266198c503bcfb 68812 nova_27.0.0-4.debian.tar.xz b66e4f0994edcbb466eb6a67ec7505fb853b5da981d00f48261e02d34da92230 22137 nova_27.0.0-4_amd64.buildinfo Files: afb0e02fa5f8c0729819ea03fc3f88d7 4827 net optional nova_27.0.0-4.dsc 7a02fc89aac5945bf82b583bdd4cebf0 68812 net optional nova_27.0.0-4.debian.tar.xz b54b9a8a11ed8941acb0b3e7a7f7d63e 22137 net optional nova_27.0.0-4_amd64.buildinfo -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAEBCAAdFiEEoLGp81CJVhMOekJc1BatFaxrQ/4FAmRd9N8ACgkQ1BatFaxr Q/7s2w/+NCN3yggQv0r13jhRYpyz18t6xHKr8T0l0Zg4rEwXhaX0CiDlIEE14l5j JHOAp3u5MBoFE0wfwuzx97UG2lFq+EWU0g9N22QmkxcFBaD1ivpYg+3aXej9VjNn 4JJvX4KM3RD7af45d3Fm479tf5+sJUFa1FMb+DpHrGqrs0Dj9dEEI+DBQzB4gbLR eSyVoThdT9Sg/g6KncE4eZBPpJdA0PW3V3n76YByfHvyJd7zHuur1/xDV3S+8Nd3 5hZnZzWnbJD2RKZu0zXEYyacE/QucelP7EmdDZTWr4qLBDlZH8HGwiVeYiX8Lwd7 grdMgZsJyavQYXo5QoaWhuglH4vmnKDla6CMdxWAqPqbmmOsQWSLbF4+MXuBFWCO Dr1DbEXWzdFDnOFtFWtbjKIRUNR8OnA1246HhsPK2AJIAUqmlCuV6GEuU2BLuwTE Uo1W93MW0bsani9pz9GVHex72uExnDwhGcLl1DEzOGZy5zPfxqLNNCX44UZbT/nv ooLMNKdEAkkSxU1DIry9xMaONWxAMygrBMLXsC2VCYTvRWtK3CnvnLB9BwhTQZ3B 30v+kAi741ENWcpcz7AOST4WfpLvX3Jhwv2U7QuJnCKAvanvvH+htzsWaL+Nga1X Lkuep4eQ5lIHpUNb0//ebGKV7BI5z3JToashkH4azubrnxZJj6I= =IReN -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
--- End Message ---
