Package: lxc Severity: grave Tags: security These two security issues were reported by Tyler Hicks on oss-security:
* Roman Fiedler discovered a directory traversal flaw that allows arbitrary file creation as the root user. A local attacker must set up a symlink at /run/lock/lxc/var/lib/lxc/<CONTAINER>, prior to an admin ever creating an LXC container on the system. If an admin then creates a container with a name matching <CONTAINER>, the symlink will be followed and LXC will create an empty file at the symlink's target as the root user. - CVE-2015-1331 - Affects LXC 1.0.0 and higher - https://launchpad.net/bugs/1470842 - https://github.com/lxc/lxc/commit/72cf81f6a3404e35028567db2c99a90406e9c6e6 (master) - https://github.com/lxc/lxc/commit/61ecf69d7834921cc078e14d1b36c459ad8f91c7 (stable-1.1) - https://github.com/lxc/lxc/commit/f547349ea7ef3a6eae6965a95cb5986cd921bd99 (stable-1.0) * Roman Fiedler discovered a flaw that allows processes intended to be run inside of confined LXC containers to escape their AppArmor or SELinux confinement. A malicious container can create a fake proc filesystem, possibly by mounting tmpfs on top of the container's /proc, and wait for a lxc-attach to be ran from the host environment. lxc-attach incorrectly trusts the container's /proc/PID/attr/{current,exec} files to set up the AppArmor profile and SELinux domain transitions which may result in no confinement being used. - CVE-2015-1334 - Affects LXC 0.9.0 and higher - https://launchpad.net/bugs/1475050 - https://github.com/lxc/lxc/commit/5c3fcae78b63ac9dd56e36075903921bd9461f9e (master) - https://github.com/lxc/lxc/commit/659e807c8dd1525a5c94bdecc47599079fad8407 (stable-1.1) - https://github.com/lxc/lxc/commit/15ec0fd9d490dd5c8a153401360233c6ee947c24 (stable-1.0) Can you prepare an update for jessie-security? Cheers, Moritz -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to debian-bugs-rc-requ...@lists.debian.org with a subject of "unsubscribe". Trouble? Contact listmas...@lists.debian.org
