Your message dated Fri, 01 Nov 2013 22:38:12 +0100
with message-id <52741f44.2060...@thykier.net>
and subject line tucan removed from Debian unstable
has caused the Debian Bug report #656388,
regarding tucan: insecure update mechanism
to be marked as done.
This means that you claim that the problem has been dealt with.
If this is not the case it is now your responsibility to reopen the
Bug report if necessary, and/or fix the problem forthwith.
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--
656388: http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=656388
Debian Bug Tracking System
Contact ow...@bugs.debian.org with problems
--- Begin Message ---
Package: tucan
Version: 0.3.9-1
Severity: grave
Tags: security
Justification: user security hole
Tucan comes with "plugins" to handle downloads from the various
download sites it supports. These plugins are basically python modules
which run with the same permissions as the user running tucan. The
tucan package comes with a set of such plugins in
/usr/share/default_plugins/, but it downloads updates of these plugins
via http/https and places them in ~/.tucan/plugins/. This means that
after an update, debian-packaged code is effectively replaced by code
directly from the upstream repository. This in itself is problematic,
but because the update mechanism is implemented in an insecure
fashion, a remote attacker could use it introduce a malicious plugin
which executes arbitrary code with the permissions of the user running
tucan.
The plugins tucan downloads are unsigned, so a remote attacker could
introduce a plugin containing malicious code either by compromising
the remote sites where the plugins are stored, or by means of a
man-in-the-middle attack on the http/https connection from tucan to
the site holding the updates (tucan doesn't seem to check the server
certificate on SSL connections). Tools for automating this kind of
exploit exist, e.g. https://code.google.com/p/ippon-mitm/
The best way to address this problem is probably to disable the update
mechanism entirely in the debian package, and distribute updated
plugin files via apt. (Upstream might want to look into signing their updates,
and possibly making changes to the program's design so that the plugins
run in some kind of sandbox rather than with full user permissions.)
--- End Message ---
--- Begin Message ---
Version: 10.3.9-1+rm
Hi,
tucan has been removed from Debian unstable and is no longer in testing
nor the last stable release. I am taking the liberty of closing all
remaining bugs filed against tucan. Sorry, we cannot provide with a
better resolution to your bug.
Note that bugs still affecting eresi in oldstable remain "open" and will
do so until oldstable is no longer supported or the bug is fixed via opu
(if applicable).
~Niels
--- End Message ---
