On Wednesday 07 September 2011 22:06:55 Raphael Geissert wrote: > On Wednesday 07 September 2011 10:57:51 Raphael Geissert wrote: > > On Monday 05 September 2011 14:55:50 Kurt Roeckx wrote: > > > So you're basicly saying that X509_verify_cert() should give an > > > error in case it finds DigiNotar somewhere in the chain? > > > > > > I'm not opposed to such a change, but would like to see a better > > > option in the future. > > > > Yes. I will try to spend some time with a debugger later today to find > > the right place to implement such check. Or do you have any hint? (the > > cn validation functions didn't seem to be executed in one case I tried) > > Attached is the first version of patch against the 1.0.0 series that does > that. I implemented it in check_name_constraints, but given that 0.9.8 > doesn't have support for name constraints I might as well move it to a > separate function. I've tested it on the rogue *.google.com cert with > verify(1) and a few others with different clients (tried the urls > mentioned on the bug report, of which only ingcommercialbanking still uses > a DigiNotar cert.) > Attached are a bundle of the certs needed to verify(1) the rogue google > cert, and the rogue cert itself. Perhaps they could be included in the > test suite.
I somehow ended up adding an O instead of a 0 in the exported patch for 1.0.0. Attached are the fixed 1.0.0 patch (as v2, to avoid confusions) and the previous patch for 0.9.8. > The patch for 0.9.8 is also attached, but I haven't tested it yet. It was > made based on squeeze's openssl and it seems to apply fine to lenny's > openssl (just a few lines of difference.) > > Kurt, what do you think? would upstream be interested in the patch, or at > least in reviewing it? Cheers, -- Raphael Geissert - Debian Developer www.debian.org - get.debian.net
Description: make X509_verify_cert indicate that any certificate whose name contains "DigiNotar" is revoked. Origin: vendor Forwarded: no Last-Update: 2011-09-07 Bug: http://bugs.debian.org/639744 diff -urpN openssl-0.9.8o-4squeeze1.orig/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c openssl-0.9.8o-4squeeze1/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c --- openssl-0.9.8o-4squeeze1.orig/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c 2009-06-26 06:34:21.000000000 -0500 +++ openssl-0.9.8o-4squeeze1/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c 2011-09-07 21:23:58.000000000 -0500 @@ -78,6 +78,7 @@ static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *c static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); +static int check_ca_blacklist(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); const char X509_version[]="X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT; @@ -312,6 +313,9 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx ok=internal_verify(ctx); if(!ok) goto end; + ok = check_ca_blacklist(ctx); + if(!ok) goto end; + #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */ ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx); @@ -661,6 +665,29 @@ static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX return 1; } +static int check_ca_blacklist(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) + { + X509 *x; + int i; + /* Check all certificates against the blacklist */ + for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--) + { + x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); + /* Mark DigiNotar certificates as revoked, no matter + * where in the chain they are. + */ + if (x->name && strstr(x->name, "DigiNotar")) + { + ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED; + ctx->error_depth = i; + ctx->current_cert = x; + if (!ctx->verify_cb(0,ctx)) + return 0; + } + } + return 1; + } + /* Lookup CRLs from the supplied list. Look for matching isser name * and validity. If we can't find a valid CRL return the last one * with matching name. This gives more meaningful error codes. Otherwise
Description: make X509_verify_cert indicate that any certificate whose name contains "DigiNotar" is revoked. Origin: vendor Forwarded: no Last-Update: 2011-09-07 Bug: http://bugs.debian.org/639744 diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c.orig b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c index bd6695d..1aaf5d3 100644 --- a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c.orig +++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c @@ -617,6 +617,17 @@ static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--) { x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); + /* Mark DigiNotar certificates as revoked, no matter + * where in the chain they are. + */ + if (x->name && strstr(x->name, "DigiNotar")) + { + ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED; + ctx->error_depth = i; + ctx->current_cert = x; + if (!ctx->verify_cb(0,ctx)) + return 0; + } /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */ if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) continue;
