Joey Hess <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > Goswin von Brederlow wrote: >> concerning your >> >> 1. Unsafe resource file reading. >> >> and >> >> 2. Unsafe XSHISENLIB environment variable. >> >> Both of them, if exploitable, would be bugs in the Xrm or Xpm library >> respectively. >> >> The same argument can probably made against pretty much any X >> application and X itself. There is a lot of software that just loads >> in user defined xpm files and such. > > Actually there's very little software that is suid/sgid and reads in > user-controlled X resource files. In fact xshisen is the only such > program I know of, aside from X itself (which I assume does so > securely). I think that hole is likely exploitable, and it's not a bug > in X, especially given the documentation.
That might be true for X resource files and the docs sound realy scary (also shown by your segfault). But aren't there any suid/sgid game programs with xpm (or png or jpeg or any other complex lib for that matter) support? Any kde/gnome program can probably be exploited by messing with the theming support of them. At what point do you say this library may not be used in a suid/sgid program? Is it even OK to use libc? > It is a bug in the xpm library when a malformed xpm can be exploited. > Such holes have been found before (CAN-2004-0914). However, such xpm > bugs typically don't let a local user increase their permissions. The > fact that xshisen turns a xpm exploit into a gid games exploit is a > design hole in xshisen. > > -- > see shy jo So what do you suggest? Fork, drop the suid/sgid in the child, load the xpm and send the raw image through IPC back to the parent? Or create a suid/sgid xshisen-scorefile-writer that capsules the scorfile access (and just that) and run xshisen as normal user? Or should suid/sgid programs never load user-controlled data (like kde/gnome theming or xpms) at all? What are acceptable options? MfG Goswin -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] with a subject of "unsubscribe". Trouble? Contact [EMAIL PROTECTED]