Package: tor Severity: wishlist Tags: patch
Hi! I prepared a trivial patch to adopt security hardened features from gcc. This is quite interesting for the remote and undesired possibility that 0days were to be discovered or any malicious activity against a certain node is targeted using the Tor relay-retransmission network flow. For the implementation itself, it's completely trivial, as hardening-includes wrap all the intelligence about which architectures supports a features and which does not in a dynamic way, plus it adds helpful functionality on specific disable switches in case you need them. I've tested this patch on both i386 and amd64 and works perfectly well, plus I've been running a patched amd64 relay at ~3Mbytes/s for about 3 days without errors. As for the reasons about applying it, I consider you'll already have them all so I wont make you loose your time reading them :-), but if you consider there exists any one not to apply, please tell me! Please consider applying the attached patch. Greetings, Dererk -- BOFH excuse #167: excessive collisions & not enough packet ambulances
hardening.patch.gz
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